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SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL BuSINESS

TRANSACTIONS: THE TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY IN TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS
INTRODUCTION

T

HE building of a successful international business requires that
American industries make continuing contributions to the market
by way of special services, unique products, and new techniques in the
application of know-how for materials. In this sense, technology and
commerce are progressing together to expand the horizons of businessmen. Today technology offers the American and foreign businessman the opportunity to share in a mutually beneficial transnational enterprise heretofore beyond contemplation. Technology
plays a dual role in transnational business. Through technological
advances in transportation and communication new markets have
appeared, and goods can be shipped to remote ports in less time and
in better condition than ever before. Also, technology itself has become a marketable commodity which can be profitably transferred
to foreign customers by various means. Thus, the American businessman has truly become a "merchandiser of science" in transnational
transactions.'
Lawrence C. McQuade has described the situation most accurately in his recent article in the Denver Law journal, which sets the
theme for this symposium.
Out of technology-that vigorous offspring of scienceflows an impulse to change and innovation in commerce and in-

dustry. For the businessman of breadth and imagination, it opens
new horizons. For the self-satisfied and the stand-patters, it poses
a peril to markets and customers which can no longer be taken for

granted. For the lawyer, it calls for adaptation and change at a rate
fast enough to foster the new, yet moderate enough to preserve a
responsible measure of stability and respect for the virtues of values
2
which have endured the tests of experience.
Remarks by Emmett H. Heitler, Executive Vice President, Samsonite Corporation, in
his Keynote Address to the Western Regional Conference on Transnational Transactions, Denver, Colorado, April 21, 1967.
2 McQuade, Transnational Transactions, Technology and the Law, 44 DEN. L. J. 327,
I

328 (1967).
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The partnership of technology and transnational business necessarily contemplates an exciting challenge for the creative lawyer.
Each businessman entering into a transnational relationship seeks
first of all to benefit from the transaction. Secondly, each party must
see that his interests are protected to the fullest possible extent from
violation by his "foreign partner." Third, he must have the necessary
language in the legal contractual document that gives it the strength
to guide both purposes to a successful conclusion. 3 In order to accomplish these basic objectives, the advice and planning of counsel
is a necessity. The lawyer's function in this transnational setting is
one of anticipating and providing for the unforeseen yet avoidable
disputes wrought by uncertainty and ambiguity in such agreements.
These issues must be resolved within a legal framework, acceptable
to both parties, which will promote the mutual confidence and good
faith essential to a successful working relationship.
On April 21, 1967, the University of Denver College of Law
hosted the Western Regional Conference on Transnational Transactions. The theme of the Conference was "Science, Industry and
Law in Transnational Transactions." Its twin objectives were (1)
to promote a wider participation of the community, both legal and
business, in matters of international concern; and (2) to clarify
basic policies through an in-depth discussion of some specific practical problems of transnational business transactions, including
those pertinent to the Rocky Mountain region. The Denver Law
journal is privileged to include in this symposium articles representing the finished product of many of the issues raised at the conference.
In this symposium, two basic policy questions are discussed
relating to the assumption that the goal of transnational business is
to achieve the ultimate success of transferring technology in the
most expeditious and mutually profitable manner. First, should the
product of technology or the process itself be transferred, and what
legal problems in the protection of the transfer might arise? Mr.
Campbell, in his article on licensing, addresses this issue, suggesting
that with careful planning, technological know-how can be licensed
abroad and receive capital gains tax advantages in the United States.
Furthermore, patent protection for the product of technology or
for the process is discussed in an article which was not presented
at the Conference, but which serves as an important contribution
to the symposium theme. Secondly, what kind of arrangement should
the American businessman enter into with his foreign neighbor for
3 Remarks by Phillip B. Smith, Vice President, Great Western Sugar Company, at the
Western Regional Conference on Transnational Transactions, Denver, Colorado, April
21, 1967.
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the transfer of his technology abroad, and what legal problems
should he be prepared to encounter? The foreign joint venture arrangement and the distributorship are discussed in separate articles
as feasible in particular circumstances. Problems of drafting agreements are considered also, with special regard to choice of law and
choice of forum in order to anticipate possible questions of foreign
law that might arise in transnational litigation.
Clearly, there is no single way to do business properly and
profitably in the various countries throughout the world. There is
no simple solution to building a transnational business. Each company and each product, each service, each country offers a potentially
4
different problem and requires its own legal and business solution.
However, the discussion contained in this symposium may serve as
a guide to the lawyer with transnational business clients. It can
serve as a springboard of ideas to spark his imagination and inventive genius as he faces the challenge of technology in the trans5
national business world.
Timothy B. Walker
Symposium Editor

4 Remarks by Emmett H. Heitler, supra note 1.

5 The Board of Editors would like to thank Messrs. Emmett H. Heitler and Phillip B.
Smith for having submitted notes and ideas to us for incorporation into this issue.

THE FOREIGN JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION:
SOME LEGAL AND BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS
By WILLIAM R. Ross*
Private internationallaw involving the organization of corporations under foreign civil and common law systems can be an
exciting and challenging experience for an American lawyer. One
such corporate organization is the foreign joint venture corporation,
involving local ownership and management participation. Mr. Ross
discusses some basic requirements of foreign law and major business
considerations with which the American lawyer must be acquainted
in order to form such a business venture. He emphasizes the importance of participationand counsel of the lawyer during the early
stages of negotiation. He points out the importance of choosing the
propt~er foreign co orate orm as a firm foundation for immediate
and continued success of the venture and offers ways of handling
the problem of control of management. Mr. Ross concludes that
with proper investigation, negotiation, and planning from both
legal and business points of view, the foreign joint venture corporation can be a useful and satisfactory way for American businesses
to enter or expand activities in foreign markets.
INTRODUCTION

E VER

since the famed clipper ships, and -before, United States
businessmen have sought and discovered new markets in international trade. As the industrial revolution of the 19th century
progressed, the export-import trade began to grow and it has continued to expand, picking up momentum particularly in post-World
War II years when the industrial nations of Europe began to get
back on their feet. Manufacturing subsidiaries of U. S. corporate
parents have been established around the world to bring facilities
producing U. S. goods closer to the far-flung marketplaces. In recent
times it has become the policy of the large industrial concerns of
this nation to treat the entire globe as a single market for goods and
services of practically every kind.
As a result of this continuing trade explosion, which has made
this nation the foremost industrial country in the world, the commercial, financial, legal and governmental interests and problems
have taken on new dimensions, creating new complexities and adding
new matters which must be considered by the lawyer called into the
private international field.
For example, in past years the expansion of foreign trade and
*Counsel for International Operations, The Gates Rubber Co.; member of the Wyoming
Bar and the Colorado Bar.
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the in-flow and out-flow of capital and earnings occasioned by international investment have not been as significant in the private and
governmental sectors as they have become today. Thus, a matter of
which we are much more aware and which is important to all U. S.
companies doing business abroad is that of maintaining a favorable
balance of payments at the national level. This problem is at the
moment of vital concern to the U. S. Government, and while there
may be other factors having equal or greater influence on this problem, such as the national government itself, the President of the
United States has asked for increased export trade and decreased
direct investment in foreign ventures to combat the problem.'
International trade is becoming more and more involved as an
instrument in foreign affairs. Hardly any policy of the United States
relating to international commerce does not first require review by
or approval of the United States State Department. For example,
recent legislation enacted and approved to permit rationalization of
U. S. and Canadian manufacture and trade of automobiles and
original equipment automotive parts was first proposed to the Congress by the Administration after representatives of the U. S. Departments of Commerce and State had participated in the discussions
and negotiations leading to the rationalization agreement and the
preparation of the implementing legislation. 2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is of major importance in foreign affairs.
And a system of import quotas can be detrimental to the commercial
interests of a foreign country and, thus, to the foreign relations of
the United States; such a system also can be imposed with conditions
designed to influence a foreign country's position on important
political interests of the United States.
The newly emerging and so-called less-developed nations of
the world are more and more becoming a significant influence on
international trade by providing new markets and new sources of
goods. To these nations world trade is required for their survival
and growth, and, to that end, it is a policy of the U. S. Government
to foster, encourage and promote participation by private enterprise
in foreign economic development. 8 Many of these nations have
1 See McQuade, Corporate Voluntary Balance of Payments Program and the Lawyer,
SYMPOSIUM, PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROADSTRUCTURES AND SAFEGUARDS 205

(Southwestern Legal Foundation 1966). See also 33 Fed. Reg. 49 (1968)

(establish-

ing mandatory controls on foreign direct investment).
2 Hearings on H.R. 9042, An Act to provide for the implementation of the agreement

concerning automotive products between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Canada, Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 122, 490 (Sept. 14, 15, 16, 20 and 21, 1965).
3 Important to all U.S. investors considering less-developed countries is the investment
guaranty program of the U.S. Agency for International Development under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which guarantees investments against certain political
and business risks.
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established incentives designed to encourage investment from abroad
to develop industrial and trade potential.4
In recent years, various countries, both developed and lessdeveloped, have become nationalistic in their attitudes toward world
trade and investments from abroad, undoubtedly a result of expanded industrialization and trade programs. Their concern, of
course, stems in part from foreign exchange problems and their
purpose is to protect industrial and commercial activities which have
been established. Attempts to accomplish this purpose are by several
means, including raising of tariffs, imposing conditions on investments from abroad and closing their borders to imports of goods
also manufactured by newly established local facilities.
This does not mean that the American businessman is no longer
welcome in the world of industry and trade; it does mean, however,
that he will not be able in all instances to invest as freely as he has
in the past. In these circumstances, more and more attention has been
directed lately by American businessmen to associating with a local
partner in a joint venture corporation as a way of bringing their
companies to the markets of the world or of expanding existing
international endeavors.
It is the purpose of this article to set down some characteristics
of the foreign joint venture corporation -its definition, establishment, management and operation requirements- hopefully raising
for the lawyer some practical legal, governmental and business considerations which will be of assistance to him in his private international practice.
I. THE JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION
A. Definition
A foreign joint venture corporation can be defined as a separate
legal entity formed abroad usually by two corporations, one U. S.
and one local, to achieve an economic objective in which the participants desire limited liability for an indefinite term and, from the
American point of view, a familiar corporate framework of organization, management and operation. It combines the advantages of
the incorporated business organization with those of the traditional
joint venture relationship.
The joint venture corporation concept has been in existence in
4Typical of such incentives are those offered by Ghana to enterprises that develop the
productive capacity of the economy, expand exports and offer management and technical training to Ghanaians. Such incentives include exemption from payment of
income and other corporate taxes, special depreciation allowances and waiver of tax
on dividends to non-residents. See BusiNEss INTERNATIONAL CORP., INVESTING,
LICENSING AND TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD (May 1966). One should also note
that so-called developed nations likewise offer attractive incentives to encourage economic expansion and the establishment of new industries. See, e.g., Law Office, Frank
Boas, Esq., Doing Business in Belgium, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 6455 (1967).
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this country for a good many years. 5 And, as we will examine later,
it can be quite useful as a successful foreign undertaking to manufacture and to sell locally produced goods. And, it fits in compatibly
with the corporation and company laws and commercial codes of
the countries of the world.
B. Advantages of a Joint Venture
There are several reasons why an American firm may want to
consider the use of a joint venture to enter or expand its activities
in the general world market or a particular foreign market. The
basic reason, of course, is to take advantage of a favorable and
profitable demand for a firm's products in a market area. In so
doing, it may be useful and wise to rely on the knowledge and reputation of a well established local business firm in order better to
understand the likes and dislikes of the local consumer and to obtain
more intimate knowledge of the local customs and practices of commerce; also, manufacturing and marketing skills may 'be pooled.
Another reason is that an American company may be able to furnish
idle equipment and machinery which, although used, may be more
than satisfactory to local requirements of both a potential partner
and the market; it is likely that such equipment can be contributed in return for all or a major portion of the interest in the new
corporation. The joint venture also permits the U. S. partner to enter
more markets or to diversify by spreading investment capital while
at the same time, perhaps, meeting local or U. S. public policies
calling for limitations on investments. It limits the financial risks
involved in those countries where political and economic stability
and commercial benefits are in doubt; it satisfies in many instances
the nationalistic attitudes of the local government, a development
which, particularly in the emerging nations and in Japan,6 has effectively restricted the introduction of U. S. capital; it limits resentment
toward U. S. investment.
There are disadvantages to the joint venture. In some instances,
it is possible that joint ventures may be too rigid to meet today's
fluid markets, restricting the American company's capacity to adjust
strategy and tactics, like shutting down operations which are un5 Note, Joint Venture Corporations:Drafting the CorporatePapers, 78 HARV. L. REv.
6

393 (1964).
See FOREIGN TAX AND TRADE WINDS, Oct. 1966 [Release No. 96(10-66), Matthew

Bender & Co.], in which it is reported that a U.S. company lost a two-year fight
to establish a wholly-owned subsidiary in Japan. A ruling handed down by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI] required 50% ownership by a local
Japanese firm in the undertaking applied for, and consultation by the U.S. company with
the Japanese government about its production plans for the first three years. See also
FOREIGN TAX AND TRADE WINDS, Apr. 1967 [Release No. 102(4-67), Matthew
Bender & Co.], and Bus. INT'L., Mar. 3, 1967, which report some liberalization by
the Japanese government of investment requirements.
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profitable or no longer necessary, or altering the product mix of
a given plant. Another disadvantage is that the American firm
could suddenly find itself competing with a joint venture in which
it holds an interest in markets where tariff barriers are falling and
customs unions or free trade associations are formed, such as EEC,
EFTA, LAFTA, CACM and the Arab Common MarketT Still
another disadvantage - and this may be a quite important one, depending upon the circumstances - the American firm may not have
the control of the operation it desires or is accustomed to having.
Despite these factors, the joint venture has been useful for American investment abroad. 8
C. Findingthe Partner
Probably the most important initial step in the establishment
of a joint venture relationship is finding a suitable local partner.
And finding such a partner may take a great deal of time and effort.
Careful and painstaking investigation of all potential partners is
required. The goal is to find a local partner who has like or nearly
like business objectives, corporate history, policies and requirements,
management philosophy and the like. Compatibility is the byword,
for it, together with complete good faith exhibited and practiced by
both partners at all times, really determines in the long run the
success or failure of the joint venture. The association hopefully is
to be successful and continuing. Keeping this in mind, potential
partners should hold extensive "sounding out" discussions to decide,
initially, whether the relationship is desirable. All matters pertinent
to the venture ought to be discussed, at least to some degree, to the
end that the scope of the joint venture can be defined. In this connection, attention should be given to the possibilities of growth. The
manufacturing and marketing potential of the products involved,
and the ability of the prospective venture to manufacture and to sell
them should be studied. The delicate matter of management decision
making must be thoroughly explored in depth to determine whether
conceivable conflicts between the two exist or could develop over
the manner in which the decisions are to be made. Generally, the
parties should attempt to discover any reservations either may have
with regard to matters which could, slowly or rapidly, deteriorate
relationships during the course of the joint venture operation.
These are, essentially, business considerations, but the lawyer
will be called upon to render counsel and advice in a number of
matters and to draft and review various documents required in the
775

BUSINESS

INTERNATIONAL

CORP.,

MANAGEMENT

CHECKLISTS

OPERATIONS 31 (1966), citing Bus. INT'L., Sept. 4, 1964.
8
See JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES (Friedmann

1961).

FOR

FOREIGN

& Kalmanoff eds.
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transaction, and he will need to recognize the business problems
which arise in order that his analyses and advice can be meaningful
and valuable. Hopefully, he will be permitted to attend all or nearly
all discussions so that he can become intimately acquainted with all
aspects of the proposition.
II.

ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION

A. The PreorganizationAgreement
Prior to the establishment of the joint venture corporation, the
parties would be well advised to reduce to writing important agreements reached during the negotiation stage. This document, called
the preorganization agreement and executed by both parties, will
evidence agreement of the partners to proceed with the project.
It will constitute a reflection of the intention of the parties, general
in some respects and specific in others, with regard to the objectives
and policies of the joint venture corporation. It also will serve as
a sort of "legislative history" of the joint venture organization which
can be used to assist in the interpretation of any agreements the
new company might have with either partner.
A typical preorganization agreement should set forth the principal objectives of the new company; the amount of authorized
capital it is to have; how much capital is to be issued; how the
capital is to be paid in and when; shares of capital each partner is
to have; conditions pertaining to transfer of shares (e.g., right of
first refusal). It should describe generally what the articles of
association of the new company are to contain, such as provisions
for compensation of directors, officers or managers and how it is
to be determined, voting and quorum requirements, procedure for
amending the articles, and the like. It should state the corporate
structure and how it can be changed. It should also state whether
there are to be any agreements between the new corporation and the
individual partners, such as lease agreements covering plant and
equipment, agreements to furnish management for the new company,
agreements to furnish technical assistance, agreements to license
rights respecting patents, know-how and trademarks. There should
be a description of the duties of each partner in organizing the new
corporation; a provision stating how the costs of organization of
the new corporation are to be borne; and a stipulation as to whether
any disputes between the partners arising under the agreement are
to be referred to arbitration, and, if so, who is to act as arbitrator
and where the arbitration is to take place. Finally, dissolution and
liquidation procedures should be specified as well as the laws of the
country under which the agreement is to be construed and the juris-
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diction to which the parties submit. Other matters may be included,
depending upon the requirements of the parties.
B. Choosing the Corporate Structure
There are several matters which are primary in choosing the
kind of corporate organization best suited to the venture. The size
and the objectives of the venture will be important considerations
in the choice. Local laws and practices generally will be influencing
factors, particularly where they relate to the manner of organization
and management and to investment and repatriation of profits and
capital. The amount of capital to be required, initially and in the
future, and the liability of each partner could be influencing factors.
In the final analysis, however, the partners should seek the kind of
structure which is easy to organize and which furnishes flexible,
economical and profitable operation with only as much publicity
as is necessary.
A joint venture corporation, regardless of its type, will encounter in its daily problems the same kinds of laws as will practically any other corporation, such as negotiable instruments law,
sales law, customs requirements, property law, insurance law, taxation codes and trade regulations, to name just a few. And, although
the lawyer will find it necessary to think through all problems with
which he is confronted in choosing the kind of corporate structure,
perhaps this is a good time to point out that he will not need, nor
will he be able, to gain a comprehensive knowledge of the legal
systems of the various countries of the world. He must equip himself with a general understanding of applicable laws of the country
in which the venture is to be organized and operated; in some instances, he will have to gain specific knowledge and understanding.
Generally, he will find most applicable civil law concepts in force
in one civil law country descriptive of the practices in other civil
law countries. In all instances relating to problems specific in nature, he should be guided by the advice and counsel of a competent
local attorney.
In establishing a foreign joint venture corporation, the American partner will want to give specific consideration to the local laws
pertaining to corporate organization, taxation, industrial property
rights, special laws or aspects of laws relating to foreigners, and,
perhaps, the property law, antimonopoly law and social and labor
legislation.9 Of special importance will be laws and regulations
respecting restrictions on remittance of profits and repatriation of
9 Not

to be overlooked is the applicability of U.S. tax and antitrust laws and trade
regulations, topics not covered in this article.
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capital, including limitations on payments by local companies of
royalties and fees. All such laws will be part of the framework
within which the joint venture corporation will be established and
operated. They also will furnish the basis for answers to the basic
question of whether a joint venture corporation is the kind of operation desirable to the objectives of the American company and whether
it furnishes a practicable and profitable method for meeting the
business purposes intended.
The American lawyer will most probably find that the form
of organization to be chosen for the joint venture corporation will,
regardless of its type, resemble fairly closely the corporate structure
familiar to him in the United States. The elements of its structure
will be drafted to meet the business purpose much the same as the
provisions of the articles of incorporation of a company in this
country are selected and directed. However, because the foreign
joint venture corporation is multi-national, considerations will arise
which will complicate usually uncomplicated corporate questions.
For example, the local partner probably will not be as large as the
American client and his operation may be family-held and managed;
he, thus, may take a more personal view of the operation of the
venture. The American partner, on the other hand, will consider
the venture as a subsidiary or affiliated part of his world-wide organization. The result could be a basic divergence of views, and possibly
there will immediately arise the question of whether one or the other
is to have control of a particular function, especially where it may
be a 50-50 equity ownership venture.
In most foreign countries there are two kinds of corporations.
One is the kind which most closely corresponds to our corporation:
the socigt&anonyme, sociedad anonima or Aktiengesellschaft. The
second form is what is called the limited liability company - known
as the socitg a responsabilitelimitee, the sociedad de responsabilidad
limitada, or the Gesellschaft mit Beschriinkter Haftung.
1. The Corporation
Under the civil law, the corporation is a creature of contract
and not a creature of charter granted by the state. Simply stated,
the shareholders execute a contract of organization similar in form
and substance to articles of incorporation. When filed with the
proper registry, the contract becomes the basic corporate document
and, after completing certain other formalities, the corporation is
then authorized to commence operation.
A civil law corporation is similar in many respects to the U. S.
corporation. It constitutes an individual legal entity distinct from
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that of the associates or shareholders. 10 Each shareholder's liability
is limited to a definite contribution." Although not a creature of
government charter, the civil law corporation usually is governed
fairly strictly by the commercial and civil laws of the nation and
by the organization contract.' 2 The reason, of course, is to afford
protection for its stockholders and the persons with whom it deals.
The laws, once properly translated, are quite readily understandable; they normally set down the requirements in logical order
and concise terms, and the kinds of requirements are not unlike
those prevailing in common law jurisdictions. For example, the
formation requirements will specify the number of organizers necessary (the number will vary from country to country, usually from
three to seven). And it is not unusual for the laws to require a
minimum number of continuing stockholders, usually the same number as that required to organize the corporation in the first instance.'"
Most civil law countries permit some or all of the stockholders to be
foreign corporations. This provision is, of course, vital to the establishment of the joint venture.
The capital structure requirements are much the same as in
this country: the capital is divided into shares and normally they
can be common or preferred, of one or more series, and either
nominative or to bearer. No par shares are permitted in some
countries.' 4 Bearer stock has been used extensively because of its
flexibility in transfer and the fact that it provides anonymity, a
consideration which has been of significance to stockholders in civil
law countries, perhaps to avoid taxes imposed on transfer. Each
shareholder has one vote for each share of stock issued to him.
However, in some countries the voting powers of holders of large
blocks of shares may be limited. 5 Statutory provisions may impose
minimum capital requirements and will state how much of the authorized capital must be subscribed. Usually a specified portion of
authorized capital must be paid in. Corporate shares are freely
transferable after a minimum subscription price has been paid in.
It is possible that some countries will require every corporation to
list its shares on a stock exchange even though no shares are to be
10 See, e.g., CODE OF COMMERCE (TITRE IX DES SOCIETIES) art. 2 (BeIg.). See generally 1 DOING BUSINESS ABROAD (H. Landau ed. 1962) for a discussion of civil code
corporations.
11 CODE OF COMMERCE art. 26 (BeIg.).
12 Id., art. 1.
1s In France, for example, there may not be less than seven shareholders. FRENCH COMPANY LAW OF JULY 24, 1966, art. 73.
1
4 See, e.g., CODE OF COMMERCE art. 41 (Belg.)
15 In Belgium, no person may cast a number of votes exceeding one fifth of the total
votes pertaining to all the outstanding shares or two fifths of the votes pertaining to
the shares actually represented. CODE OF COMMERCE art. 76.
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made available to the public generally. Payment of capital subscriptions usually can be made in cash or kind, but contributions in
kind may be subjected to careful scrutiny. In some countries, it is
the practice to require appraisal by experts to determine the proper
value of the contribution."6
It is in the area of corporate management where the peculiarities of the civil law corporation are most recognizable in their differences from the American corporation concept. What we in this
country would normally regard as decisions taken by the Board of
Directors may in civil law countries be acted upon only by the
stockholders in meetings. Under the civil law concept, directors
are the officers- they run the corporation in its day-to-day activities. They are elected and may meet in much the same manner
as in this country. Usually they will act among themselves to name
from their membership the chairman of the board, or the managing
director as he may be called, who under our concept would be the
president. 17 The American partner will be called upon, and perhaps
be hard-pressed, to understand that the question, "Will we be able
to control the Board of Directors?" is usually not appropriate or
applicable when referring to a foreign corporation. Voting control
as we know it must be had in the stockholders' meetings, for it is
by this body that the administrative officers are elected, the dividends to be distributed are determined, and the acts of management
are approved.
Directors may not have to be stockholders, nor in all countries
must they be nationals, but it may be required that they be residents
of the country.'" Their duties usually are defined as representmg and acting for the company, carrying on the operations which
constitute its business and appointing employees and agents. Ordinarily each director will have authority to perform all acts necessary
to the normal operation of the business, and each may act individually unless the organization agreement provides otherwise."a
They may meet periodically to decide matters necessary to their
functions as administrators, but always subject to the direct control
18 In Belgium, a certified public accountant is required to report in particular on the

description of each contribution in kind, on the methods of evaluation adopted and
on the remuneration to be attributed in return for the contribution. CODE OF COMMERCE art. 29 bis.
17 In West Germany, the functions of corporate opration are directed by three main
bodies: the board of management (whose members are appointed by the board of
directors); the board of directors (some of whose members are appointed by the
shareholders and some by the employees) ; and by the shareholders' meeting. AKTG,
HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] §§ 70, 86 & 105.

18 In Venezuela, residents may be elected as alternate directors who may substitute for
nonresident directors. See J. BENSON, REPORT ON VENEZUELAN TAX, LABOR AND
CORPORATION LAW para. 858 (1964).

19 In Italy, the direction of a corporation (societa per azioni) may be placed with a
single director (amministratore unico). CIVIL CODE art. 2381.
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and supreme authority of the stockholders and with the reservation
that important policy decisions will be taken by the stockholders
in meeting.
Stockholders' meetings usually are called by notice, but sometimes by publication in a newspaper, or by written notice. They
usually are required to be held in the country where the head office
is located. Proxies are permitted. Voting requirements and majorities may vary depending upon the question, and protection of
minority stockholders is handled much the same as it is in common
law countries.
One requirement of civil law corporations which American
businessmen may find a bit strange and sometimes objectionable is
that which calls for the publication, usually in an official gazette,
of the corporation's annual financial statements, annual reports of
the directors and of a statutory auditor 20 regarding financial and
commercial operations, the minutes of the meetings of the stockholders and any amendments to the organization agreement.
Formation of a civil law corporation is relatively easy. The first
step is the preparation of the organization agreement. This agreement will contain all provisions relating to the corporate name,
principal office, purposes, duration, capital, shares, administration,
management, shareholders' meetings, financial statements, dissolution and liquidation and any other provisions which the shareholders
may find appropriate to include.
The next step is the subscription of the capital, which may be
either public or private. If by private subscription, the incorporation is effected by written agreement to the articles, either in meeting or recorded by notary, signed by the organizers or on their behalf by an attorney-in-fact. When the documents of incorporation,
including the minutes of the organization meeting, have been recorded and published, 2 ' the corporation is then ready to commence
operations.
2. The Limited Liability Company
Usually we think of corporations as being associations of capital; the shareholders who contribute the capital to the association
have little involvement with day-to-day corporate operations. Other
types of business organizations, on the other hand, may be thought
of as more personally associated with the contributors of capital;
20 Most civil law countries require by statute the appointment of an auditor or board of

auditors whose primary function is to inform the shareholders periodically of the
financial condition of the company. In some countries, the authority of the auditor is
quite extensive, including the right to call shareholder meetings in the event of the
failure to do so by the directors. CIVIL CODE art. 2406 (Ital.).
21 Filing is with a national governmental agency, usually the ministry serving commerce
or industry, and publication may be required in an official gazette.
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it is usually the case that the contributors of capital also contribute
a great deal of their time and efforts to the day-to-day operation and
management of the enterprise. Somewhere in between lies the
limited liability company, which involves both the personal and the
capital association factors. It combines the benefits of a corporate
form with the flexibility of operation of a partnership. It is a legal
entity commonly available in most countries of the world; it is used
usually for business firms which most closely resemble in character
our closely- or family-held corporation. It may also be desirable for
almost any small or medium-size enterprise."
Shareholders are referred to as "partners" or "members" and
usually only two are necessary to form the limited liability company.
Foreign corporations or non-resident individuals2 3 may be shareholders, and in many countries it is not necessary for the foreign
corporate shareholder to register or qualify in the country in order
to hold membership. Requirements as to maximum and minimum
capitalization vary from country to country.
As in the case of corporations, the liability of each shareholder
is limited to his subscription, but there is an important difference.
All shareholders are jointly and severally liable for the total amount
of capital not paid in at the time of organization and remaining
unpaid. Usually, all capital must be subscribed, but the amount
which must be paid in at the time of organization may vary from
country to country.2 4 Capital contributions in kind are permitted
and in some countries may be valued informally,25 but in others a
formal appraisal may be required. 6
The capital is divided into shares,2 7 each share having the same
fixed value; there is only one class of shares and there are no bearer
2

For a discussion of limited liability companies, see Eder, Limited Liability Firms
Abroad, 13 U. Prrr.L. REv. 193 (1952).

See generally 1 DOING BUSINESS ABROAD

(H. Landau ed. 1962), for a discussion of limited liability companies.
23 See, e.g., Brazil's DECREE-LAw No. 3,708 of Jan. 10, 1919, which governs limited
liability companies in that country. In Belgium, however, only physical persons may
be shareholders. CODE OF COMMERCE art. 119.

The author acknowledges the assistance of Dr. Joaquim Renato Correa Freire of
the law firm of Davids, Freire, Caiuby & Fernandes, Sao Paulo, Brazil, for the Brazilian authorities cited in this article.
24 In Brazil, while the entire amount of the capital must be subscribed, there appears to
be no requirement as to the amount which must be paid in. DECREE-LAW No. 3,708
of Jan. 10, 1919. In Venezuela, all capital must be subscribed and at least 50% must
be paid in. See J. BENSON, REPORT ON VENEZUELAN TAX, LABOR AND CORPORATION
LAW para. 894 (1964). In Belgium, all capital must be subscribed and a minimum of
50,000 francs paid in. However, if authorized capital exceeds 50,000 francs, each
share subscribed in cash must be at least 20% paid in. CODE OF COMMERCE art. 120.
25 See DECREE-LAW No. 3,708 of Jan. 10, 1919 (Braz.).
26 Cf. FRENCH COMPANY LAW OF JULY 24, 1966, art. 40, which requires formal

appraisal by a Commission of Contributions appointed by the shareholders for that
purpose. Shareholders are jointly and severally liable for a period of five years from
organization for the value attributed.
27 In some countries, a partner's holding may not be represented by shares. Each partner
has a single share of the company which represents his proportional ownership in the
company.
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certificates. Normally, however, ownership is evidenced by the organization agreement, which is amended to reflect the transfer of
ownership.28 In any event, generally, ownership is not readily transferable.2 9 One aspect of a limited liability company which is different from the corporation form and which may be of particular interest to American businessmen is that it is not required, usually,
to publish minutes of meetings or annual financial statements.
Management of a limited liability company is carried out with
much greater flexibility than is the case with a corporation. Regular,
formal meetings of shareholders may 'be provided for (with provisions for proxies) but ordinarily they are neither required nor held.
Some decisions of shareholders may be agreed to by correspondence
even by cable.
Responsibility for conduct of company business normally is
placed with one or more managers rather than with a board of directors. Usually one or more of the managers must be a resident; and
in some countries the managers must be shareholders.
The limited liability company is organized by execution and
filing8 ° of an organization agreement that may 'be in the form of a
private instrument, and it need not be published. Normally the
organization agreement will set forth the nationality of the founders, the amount of the capital, each member's share, how the capital
is realized - i.e., in cash or through contributions in kind - how
the financial statements are to be prepared and distributed, rules
for distribution of profits and a provision for an auditor, if desired
or required by local law. 1 Additionally, it may be advisable to include in the organization agreement provisions specifying how management is to be carried out (especially who is to have management
authority regarding particular matters), a description of duties of
the managers, a provision for compensation of the managers, grounds
for which a shareholder may be excluded, special voting requirements, if any, for particular purposes, how amendments to the
agreement may be made, and any other matters which in the circumstances may be important to the protection of the investment.
It is advisable, even though provided for by law, to include in the organization agreement a restriction on the transfer of shares, especially where such transfer may be
occasioned by the death of an individual shareholder. In Belgium, transfers between
living persons and upon death can be made only with the consent of 50% of shareholders holding three fourths of the capital, excluding the capital represented by the
shares in question, unless the shares are transferred to the surviving spouse, to
ascendants and descendants in direct line, to another shareholder, or to someone
approved in the organization agreement. CODE OF COMMERCE art. 126. This kind of
provision is particularly important where it is necessary to use nominee-shareholders.
29 Ordinarily, a share can be transferred only with the consent of a majority of the
shareholders. Sometimes the consent of all shareholders is required.
30 See note 21 supra.
31
The appointment of an independent auditor normally is not required but probably is
desirable.
2
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3. Which One?
Which of the corporate forms the partners to the joint venture
choose is vitally important; whether the venture is successful in
"getting off the ground" may depend in large measure on the corporate structure selected.
Both the corporation and the limited liability company have
acceptable features; individual advantages of one may be preferable
to those of the other in meeting the requirements assigned by the
partners. Generally, however, it would appear that for most foreign
joint venture endeavors, the limited liability company form will more
nearly meet the tests of ease of organization, flexibility and economy
of operation and privacy in its business affairs.
C. This Matter of Control
A matter which can become a serious problem, and one which
can be most misunderstood in negotiations between the parties to
a joint venture corporation, is that of control of the corporation,
either in its executive management or day-to-day operation, or both.
For some years now American business usually has had the luxury
of having control of a foreign operation, either by ownership of a
majority of the equity or by voting arrangements where a board of
directors is controlled by the American company. The traditional
reasons therefor have been quite logical: to exercise independence
in the operation of the venture, to integrate the local operation into
the world-wide operation of the American corporation with minimum influence by local ownership, and to obtain as much of the
profits from the business operation as possible, all justified by the
American investor on the basis that he has filled an investment void.
Lately, however, local investors are demanding at least equal representation by ownership or otherwise, and, as indicated earlier, their
governments are backing them up. Consequently, the American
businessman is now forced to reappraise his philosophy and approach regarding foreign investments. Even so, American businessmen, in a great many instances, are still called upon to contribute
a great deal more than the local partner is able in the circumstances
to produce.
Usually the American partner will be the one who furnishes
technical assistance and know-how needed in the manufacture of
the products of the joint venture corporation. Often the U. S. company will be able to furnish the benefits of its marketing experience
in the marketplaces around the world. Also it may be that the U. S.
partner has a patent which is particularly attractive to the local
partner. Another important consideration is the fact that the American partner might bring to the joint venture a world-wide reputation
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which could foster an immediate market penetration and provide
the impetus for fast growth in the market. And it is also possible
that the American partner will be able to provide business and
management consulting services.
More often than not, these are the reasons why the local partner wants to become associated with the American partner in the
first place. And to the American businessman, these reasons justify
his expecting final authority on various matters, if not the total
operation, while at the same time splitting the profits on the basis
of the investment contribution of each. The American partner, however, should not overlook equally important contributions which
can be made by the local partner. As already indicated, his knowledge of local customs regarding acceptable marketing practices and
constmer demands will be extremely valuable to the venture. As a
matter of fact, the local partner's marketing organization may be
entirely satisfactory for the distribution of the new company's
products. Capable management may be furnished by many local
partners. Contacts with governmental officials and practices, at all
levels, may be beneficial. Accordingly, the local partner, as well,
may be able to expect final authority in matters in which he is competent and, thus, complement the joinder - a desirable end.
But in these circumstances, and certainly in a 50-50 ownership
joint venture corporation, the stage is set for the ever-present possibility of deadlock, regardless of the good faith both parties sincerely
indicate and intend in the negotiations and establishment of the
undertaking. Therefore, positive steps ought to be taken to express
or provide a means of resolving differences, particularly where they
vitally affect the purposes and objectives. Such measures should be
discussed and adopted prior to organization, or at least during the
early stages of operation, to avoid as much as possible the danger
of deadlock resulting from the veto power accompanying evenlydivided ownership.
There are various means by which the problem can be handled.
One is for the principal partners to own 49% each of the equity
of the new company with the remaining 2% owned by a third, independent party who would be called upon to break any deadlock.
Another is to state simply in the organization agreement that one
or the other is to be responsible for the management. A more satisfactory arrangement is to provide in the organization agreement for
the assignment to each partner of responsibilities and authority for
various functions necessary to the operation of the venture. In this
way successes and failures in each of the functions can be identified
with the partner responsible.
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Authority can also be granted by operating and management
contracts. For example, it is not uncommon (or unreasonable) for
the partner furnishing technical assistance to have control over the
quality of the products manufactured, a factor vital to the objectives
of the venture. The quality standards to be maintained will, of
course, be established by the partners based on the requirements of
the markets served. But to meet and maintain those standards, acceptable production practices and techniques may be necessary and
ought to be established and supervised by the one furnishing the
assistance. Obviously this kind of authority must be exercised wisely
and with restraint.
Another way in which the matter can be handled is by arbitration. But an objection in principle to this kind of procedure is that
the partners really are parties to a proceeding which is adversary
in nature, while actually the carrying on of a joint venture operation
contemplates something other than adversity. Sometimes, however,
arbitration can be useful, and if the parties should decide that it
would be desirable, the provision therefor should state that a court
or body of a specified third country be used and that the matters
be resolved according to the laws of that country. This would assure
that the controversy would be heard before a neutral court or body
of arbitrators.
CONCLUSION

For the American businessman, association with a local partner
in a foreign joint venture corporation offers many advantages. An
established local partner can furnish part of the capital, thus decreasing the amount of the investment required of the American
investor; he can provide knowledge of the local market, distribution
facilities and qualified management. In recent years, American
businesses of many kinds have discovered this form of investment
a satisfactory way to enter and expand activities in foreign markets.
The lack of complete financial control has not appeared to be a
serious problem to either partner. Joinder with a local partner also
helps to meet requirements of local governments and to support the
policies of our own national government.
For the American lawyer, it is a challenging and exciting experience to join together two different legal systems, taking desirable
features from each for use in achieving for his businessman client
a workable framework for, hopefully, a profitable and long-lasting
undertaking.

CONFLICT AVOIDANCE THROUGH CHOICE

OF LAW AND FORUM
By

COURTLAND

H.

PETERSON*

A lawyer, when involved in the drafting of an international

contract for a client, may, in general, adopt one of two approaches.
He may, as is the custom of civil law lawyers, identify the law
which is to govern the contract, or specific provisions thereof, by

incorporating by reference an identifiable legal system. Or, if inclined to use the second approach as are many common law lawyers,
he may attempt to foresee any problems which might arise and
deal with them through precise provisions. Professor Peterson discusses the two approaches, the rationale that perpetuates them, and
the advantages and disadvantages of each. Although each contract
must be treated individually, Professor Peterson suggests that every
contract should include provisions specifying choice of law and
forum. Such provisions can at least minimize the uncertainty which
is necessarily involved in a contractualsituation involving more than
a single legal system.

T is fundamental that basic terms in the formation of a contract price, quantity and quality, timing of delivery or other performance - are almost entirely economic decisions for the client to make.
The function of the lawyer with regard to drafting such terms is
therefore not so much to advise about their desirability as it is to
express them clearly and unambiguously in the contract documents.
Given an approximate equality of negotiating ability on each side
of the contract, such basic terms will reflect with fair accuracy both
market value and other bargaining strengths of the parties.
The role of the lawyer is clearly larger with respect to those
supplementary provisions of the contract which deal with the implementation of performance, interpretation, modification, termination
and enforcement. As to these matters he must advise on the wisdom
of inclusion as well as perform the mechanics of drafting. Moreover, since these provisions present legal issues, they presuppose the
applicability of a legal system against which they can be evaluated.
When several legal systems are potentially applicable, either alternatively or cumulatively, the drafting problems are obviously magnified.
This is especially true where the systems in question are those of
different countries, with different legal traditions and institutions.
*Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law; B.A. 1951, LL.B. 1953,
University of Colorado; M. Comp. L., University of Chicago, 1959; Dr. Jur., Freiburg University, Germany, 1963.
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In such cases the systems serving as the regulative background for
evaluation and enforcement may vary widely, not only as to specific rules but also as to the broader principles of propriety and
public policy.1 The purpose of the present article is to review some
of the important factors which bear on these magnified problems,
to alert the reader to some of the dangers of reliance on oversimplified answers to highly complex questions, and to suggest a
common sense approach to drafting for the international transaction.
It should be noted at the outset that the contract provisions
referred to above as supplementary are, except for highly onerous
clauses, less clearly affected by market and bargaining strength than
are the basic contract terms. The consequence of this fact is that
more latitude is usually available for differences in the approach
to drafting. The lawyer therefore has greater freedom to express
his experience, prejudices and legal risk-taking propensities. This
somewhat mixed blessing is reflected in the great variation of drafting philosophy between practitioners.
To the extent that generalization about drafting philosophy is
possible, however, there are two schools of thought on the subject.
One of these, which may be called the incorporation-by-reference
school, attempts to solve the problem of the applicable law by the
relatively simple adoption of an identified legal system as a matter
of contract, or by the adoption of one system to govern one defined
aspect of the agreement and one or more other systems to govern
other aspects. Such a provision may or may not be coupled with a
contractual choice of forum. This incorporation view, which is usually favored by lawyers with training or experience in the civil law
countries, results in rather simple, straight-forward documents with
a minimum of detail beyond the basic terms.2
The second approach, which may be called the legislative or
codification view, attempts to foresee as fully as possible the problems which may arise under the particular agreement and to deal
with them by fairly precise provisions in the contract itself. This
approach obviously tends in the direction of highly complex docu1 Diversity of legal rules is, of course, an interstate as well as an international phenomenon, but substantial homogeneity of legal traditions, the growth of common
American theories about conflict of laws, and the wide adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code have all tended to dampen the effects of diversity in the interstate
sphere. Such ameliorating influences have as yet had much less impact on international transactions.
2 See Lalive, Negotiations with American Lawyers - A Foreign Lawyer's View, in
SYMPOSIUM

ON NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL CON-

TRACTS, 1965, at 1, 8-18 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1966). There are, of course,
some European contracts which are traditionally detailed, but these are the exception
rather than the rule. Van Hecke, A Civilian Looks at the Common-Law Lawyer, in
PARKER SCHOOL SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 5, 9-10 (1962).
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ments. It is the view most often favored by lawyers with common
law backgrounds.3
The broad subject of arbitration is beyond the scope of the
present inquiry, but before taking a closer look at these two drafting
approaches it should be noted that the increasing use of arbitration
in international contracts cases has an impact on drafting philosophy.
The rules and procedures under which arbitrators decide cases vary
widely, of course, depending on the terms of submission. But even
where the contract contains a choice of law clause, and especially
when it does not, arbitrators frequently feel greater latitude than
courts in the search for applicable legal rules. In some cases, as for
example where the arbitrator is designated an amiable compositeur,
almost complete discretion is left to the arbitrator. Since most arbitrators do feel bound, however, to follow express provisions as the
"law of the contract" whatever else may appear in the terms of
submission, contracts containing arbitration clauses are rather uniformly ones in which the legislative or codification approach is most
satisfactory.4
Several factors may be suggested to explain the preference of
civil law lawyers for incorporation and the inclination of common
law lawyers toward more detailed drafting. The lawyer in a civil
law country is, of course, accustomed to working with detailed codes.
Whether such codes really do contribute to greater certainty in the
judicial process is debatable, but the civil law lawyer does argue with
some justification that the individual draftsman of a contract cannot
be expected to supply the same degree of foresight or detail as has
gone into the drafting of the code. 5 The conclusion then follows
logically enough that the contract draftsman should content himself
with detailed drafting only in those areas where the specific transaction requires adaptation; beyond that he should simply refer to
an appropriate legal system. This conclusion is reinforced by the
rather uniform willingness of courts in civil law countries to permit
party autonomy in such matters. Especially in the European coun3 Van Hecke, supra note 2, at 10-11; Brudno, Negotiations with Foreign Lawyers - An
American Lawyer's View, in SYMPOSIUM ON NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING INTER-

1965, at 23-39 (Southwestern Legal Foundation
1966).
4 Cf. Mezger, The Arbitrator and Private InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ARBITRATION 229, 231 (M. Domke ed. 1958). See also Lagergren, The Limits of
Party Autonomy II, in THE SOURCES OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 201 (C.
Schmitthof ed. 1964).
5Cf. Lalive, supra note 2, at 9. Lalive's interesting discussion suggests, however, that
these differences in attitude are quite complex, involving historical and psychological
influences as well. Id. at 8-18.
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS,
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tries, civil law courts not only enforce the parties' choice of law but
also regularly defer without objection to the parties' stipulation of
a particular forum.6
The common law lawyer, on the other hand, is haunted by the
famous pronouncement of Learned Hand in E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard
S. S. Co.7 In that case a bill of lading, delivered in Italy and covering a shipment from Milan to New York via Southampton, contained
both a limitation of the carrier's liability and a stipulation that the
contract was to be "governed by English law." The limitation of
liability was probably invalid under the British Carriage of Goods
Act, but Hand, holding the limitation clause valid in the absence

of proof by libelant that it was invalid under Italian law, declared:
People cannot by agreement substitute the law of another place;
they may of course incorporate any provisions they wish into their
agreements - a statute like anything else - and when they do,
courts will try to make sense out of the whole, so far as they can.
But an agreement is not a contract, except as the law says it shall be,
and to try to make it one is to pull on one's bootstraps. Some law
must impose the obligation, and the parties have nothing whatever
to do with that; no more than with whether their acts are torts or
crimes.8

The case law,9 scholarly opinion'0 and even statutes1" have since
ameliorated the effects of this devastating attack on party autonomy
6

See Van Hecke, Choice-of-Law Provisions in European Contracts, in PARKER SCHOOL
SYMPOSIUM

ON INTERNATIONAL

CONTRACTS

44-53 (1962). There are, of course,

exceptions for particular types of matters, such as domestic relations, real property,
bankruptcy, etc., but the exceptions are not the same in all countries. Uniformity of
exception as well as of recognition of party autonomy was encouraged by the adoption
in 1963 of a Draft Convention on the General Jurisdiction of Contractual Forums by
the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The text of this Draft Convention
isreprinted in 13 AM. J. CoMP. L. 160 (1964). A comparison of the recognition of
forum contracts in the United States and British Commonwealth jurisdictions with
each other and with the provisions of the Draft Convention can be found in Cowen &
Da Costa, The Contractual Forum -A
Comparative Study, 43 CAN. B. REv. 453
(1965). For the situation in Latin America see Folsom, Choice-of-Law Provisions in
Latin American Contracts, in PARKER SCHOOL SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 54-63 (1962).
7 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931).
8
9

Id. at 117.
One of the leading American cases isSiegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d
189 (2d Cir. 1955), which makes an interesting comparison with Gerli because italso
involved Cunard as defendant and was decided by the same court. See also Maw,Conflict Avoidance in InternationalContracts, inPARKER SCHOOL SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 23-35 (1962).

10See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws 467-68 (1962); H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 202-03 (4th ed. Scoles 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT
OF LAws § 332a '(Tent.Draft No. 6, 1960) ; A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN,THE
LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS-CASES

246-50 (1965).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§

1-105.

AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
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by one of our most distinguished jurists, but the enforceability of
choice of law clauses is even yet a matter of some doubt in American law.' 2 Of course the power to select a forum often exerts a
strong though indirect influence on the law actually to be applied
to a transaction. And it now appears clear that contractual consent
to the jurisdiction of a particular court, if coupled with actual notice,
satisfies the demands of the due process clause even if the agreement is an adhesion contract.' 3 But whether the parties can confer
exclusive jurisdiction on a designated forum by contract is a matter
of even greater uncertainty than their power to choose an applicable
law.' 4 Small wonder that the American lawyer takes Hand's advice:
If you want to be sure that a particular rule is applicable, express it
specifically in the contract.
One anomaly resulting from the dubious enforceability of
choice-of-exclusive-forum clauses in American law is that in some
cases the preferences of civil and common law lawyers involved
ought to be reversed. Suppose, for example, a contract is made in
New York between American and German parties which designates
German law as applicable and German courts as exclusively competent to adjudicate. The New York courts (or other United States
courts) are much more likely to ignore these provisions than a German court would be if the designation were New York law and an
12Even Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955), discussed
in note 9 supra, expressed some doubt as to the parties' ability to stipulate the law
governing the validity of their contract, although affirming their power to designate
the law governing interpretation. 221 F.2d at 195. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 10, takes a broader view but also imposes restrictions. For an interesting
article discussing the attitudes of various United States courts toward party autonomy
and the relevant considerations that affect such attitudes, see Johnston, Party Autonomy in Contracts Specifying Foreign Law, 7 WM. & MARY L. REv. 37 (1966).
13National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (case involving internal as opposed to international conflict of laws question).
14In 1955 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an advance agreement on forum,
deferring to the foreign jurisdiction where this was "reasonable." Win. H. Muller &
Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955). Three years later
the Fifth Circuit declined to enforce a choice of forum clause on the ground that such
agreements to oust the jurisdiction of courts are contrary to public policy. Carbon
Black Export, Inc. v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cr. 1958). The Supreme
Court denied certiorari in Muller, 350 U.S. 903 (1955). In Carbon Black certiorari
was granted but later dismissed as improvidently granted, on the (questionable) theory
that no conflict between circuits was presented, since Muller involved an in personam
and Carbon Black an in rem proceeding. 359 U.S. 180, 183 '(1959). Recently, however, the Second Circuit itself, sitting en banc, has resolved the question against
enforcement of such clauses by overruling Muller. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967). Since this was done principally on the theory that such
clauses are forbidden by § 3(8) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (46 U.S.C.
§§ 1300-15), Indussa presumably leaves the matter open as to contracts not covered
by that Act. See also Lenhoff, The Parties' Choice of a Forum: "ProrogationAgreements," 15 RUTGERS L. REV.414 (1961).
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American forum. Therefore, a German lawyer desiring to obtain
the benefit of some specific rule of German law would be better
advised to express it in the contract than to simply designate German
law as applicable. By the same token the lawyer on the American
side of the transaction should have less concern about the applicability of German rules to a potential dispute under an omnibus
choice of German law and forum clause than he would have if the
drafting were more specific. The rather rare occurrence of this reversal of attitudes, one suspects, is attributable to the fact that lawyers drafting international contracts seldom are able to foresee or
investigate the specific advantages or disadvantages which will accrue
from the choice of a particular law or forum.
However fair it may be to describe the incorporation and legislative philosophies of drafting as general tendencies, several factors
operate to blur the differences in result to which a sharp distinction
between them might otherwise lead. One such factor is that the
common law lawyer, having drafted more or less exhaustively, is
likely to include a choice of law or forum clause in his boilerplate
as a backstop to his own limited foresight. An opposing factor is
at work on the civil law lawyer; if the transaction involves reference
to a common law system, he is likely to indulge in more detailed
drafting because of his own uncertainties about what the applicable
common law rule may be. Clients, of course, usually favor simplicity in drafting, either through lack of understanding of the legal
complexities and risks involved, or else on the more rational ground
of a desire to keep the transaction flexible and negotiable. This is
offset to some extent by clients' normal suspicion of foreign courts
or any foreign law. The net effect of these conflicting pressures is
usually a set of contract documents falling somewhere between
simple incorporation by reference and very detailed codification, but
involving elements of both. The choice of law clause is a very
common element. Clauses consenting to jurisdiction or designating
exclusively competent forums are less frequently included, but are
by no means rare. A separate but related type of clause is frequently
used to designate the controlling text, when the contract documents
are drafted in more than one language.
There are thus four different types of clauses, with a host of
possible variations and combinations. The following are fairly
standard examples of these basic types:
(1) Choice of law: This agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of [name of state or country] and
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the legal relations and obligations of the parties shall be
5
governed by said laws.1
(2) Consent to jurisdiction: The parties hereby consent to the
jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of [name
of state or country] for the resolution of any dispute arising under this agreement.1"
(3) Exclusive forum: The parties agree that the courts of general jurisdiction of [name of state or country] shall have
exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of any dispute
arising under this agreement.
(4) Controlling text: This agreement has been drafted in both
the [
] and the [
] languages. Each text
shall be valid; nevertheless, in the event of conflict in the
interpretation of the obligations of the parties, it is agreed
that the [
] text shall be controlling. 7
All four of these clauses might well be found in the same contract, in one form or another. If all four did appear in one document then normally - but not necessarily - the first three clauses
would name one state or country and the fourth clause would designate the language of that country as controlling. In fact, however,
it is rather rare to find all four in the same contract, or even to find
all of the first three in one contract drafted in a single language.
The important point to be observed is that each of these clauses
deals with a related but separate problem of uncertainty in private
international law; the problems are separate, but because of the
relationship between them the "partial drafting" which deals with
Many lawyers apparently use only the first half of this clause and omit the latter part,
either on the theory that the word "construed" includes legal effect as well as interpretation, or on the theory that no stipulation as to law governing validity would be
enforced anyway; see note 12 supra. But it certainly is not clear that stipulations as
to law governing validity are wholly unenforceable, and even less certain that interpretation includes validity by implication. Also, the normal assumption seems to be
that the law referred to by a choice of law clause is the local law of the designated
state or country. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332a (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1960). This may be a safe assumption from the American point of view,
but there is some danger in assuming that it holds true in other countries. The leading
English case on stipulations as to governing law interpreted such a clause as adopting
the whole law, including the conflict of laws rules of the designated country. Vita
Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C. 277. (P.C.) (n.s.). But cf.
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1955).
16 Such clauses should probably provide for adequate notice by the complaining party,
although formal service of process is not usually regarded as necessary under such a
clause. Otherwise the provision may run afoul of due process standards, and this
might be true even if actual notice were given. Compare National Equipment Rental
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 '(1964), with Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
17 See generally on such clauses de Vries, Choice of Language in InternationalContracts,
in PARKER SCHOOL SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 14-22 (1962);
Folsom, Clauses in International Contracts Involving Choice of Law, Language,
Forum, and Conflict Avoidance, in SYMPOSIUM ON NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, 1965, at 49-52 (Southwestern Legal
Foundation 1966).
15
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some but not all of these problems may give rise to some unexpected
results.
Consider, for example, a contract drafted in French and English
texts which contains only a choice of law clause designating the law
of France as applicable. If a conflict of interpretation arose, would
the French text be regarded as controlling? Presumably a French
court would say it was, but would an American court do so?" 8
Would a French court regard the choice of law clause as consenting
to the jurisdiction of the French courts, so as to justify the acquisition of personal jurisdiction without service of process?
Or take the case of a contract consenting to the jurisdiction of
a foreign court, but without further provision for the other problems.
Does such a consent dispense with the necessity for notice to the
defendant, even if it is clear that formal service of process would
not be required? Would a foreign judgment rendered without such
notice be enforceable in the United States? 9 Would either an American or the foreign court assume that the consent to jurisdiction of
the foreign court contained by implication an adoption of that foreign law? To what extent may a consent to jurisdiction, especially
if coupled with a choice of law clause looking to the law of the
same country, be regarded as a designation of the courts of that
country as exclusively competent? To what extent should the designation of a particular forum as exclusively competent be regarded
as a choice of law2

or as consenting to jurisdiction of that forum

without formal service? To what extent does a controlling text
clause imply a selection of forum or a choice of law?21
These questions could be multiplied, not only to show the relationship between individual clauses but to demonstrate the varying
impact which different combinations of clauses may have. When
one adds the complication that the courts of different countries hold
a variety of attitudes not only about party autonomy as a single
concept but also about different aspects of party autonomy, the
possibilities for unforeseen results from "partial drafting" become
very complex indeed.
The present writer willingly confesses to preference for the
codification or legislative view of drafting - which basically means
putting just about everything into an important contract which the
drafter can get past opposing counsel and his own client. But it
should be emphasized that the problems raised above apply not
only to the codifier but also to the incorporator by reference. In fact,
supra note 17, at 51.
19See note 16 supra.
20 See Van Hecke, supra note 6, at 46.
21 See Folsom, supra note 17, at 51.
18 Cf. Folsom,
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in many situations they apply with special force to the latter because
the balance of the contract affords fewer clues to the resolution of
disputes in his case than in that of the codifier. It should also be
pointed out that these problems are not avoided by the lawyer who
engages in "partial drafting" intentionally, who, typically, includes
a choice of law clause but consciously avoids jurisdiction clauses."
If his intention is to keep the issues of interpretation and enforcement fluid and uncertain, of course, then that is an end to the matter,
although one may wonder why in that state of affairs he bothered
with a choice of law clause. But if he supposes that his choice of
law clause alone either solves the other problems by implication,
or that it is somehow exempt from consideration by a tribunal confronted with the jurisdictional issues, then he may be brought to a
rude awakening.
The moral to be derived from all of this is a rather obvious
one. At least to the extent one can assume the primary purpose of
contract drafting is the avoidance of uncertainty, then all of the
problems of choice of law and forum should be dealt with expressly.
If it is intended that permissible inferences about the resolution of
one such problem should not be drawn from express provision for
another problem, then that too should be stated expressly. In either
case the successful draftsman is normally the one who not only
foresaw the possibility of litigation but was also able to forestall it
by his advance identification of the rules that were to govern the
transaction. Because choice of law and forum comprise not a single
problem but a complex of problems, these suggestions therefore also
transcend other differences in drafting philosophy.
These comments do not, of course, tell us very much about
which law or which forum to choose, and it is doubtful whether
that choice ought ever to be made in the abstract. Some lawyers
prefer always to designate their own law as applicable and their
own courts as forum, and when two such lawyers from different
countries face each other across the negotiating table the result is
apt to be a test of bargaining strength or no provision for the problems at all. Other lawyers may be inclined to avoid the problem
of such a "home team" influence by choosing both a neutral forum
and a neutral law, but there is great danger in this choice because
many courts, especially in the United States 23 but also in Europe, 4
refuse to permit party autonomy in these matters in the absence of
22

23
24

There may, of course, be perfectly valid reasons for avoiding choice of forum clauses.
See Folsom, supra note 17, at 55.
See Ynterna, Autonomy in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. CoMP. L. 341 (1952). But cf.
A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 469 (1962).
See Lagergren, supra note 4, at 214-15.
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a "reasonable relation" between the transaction and the forum or
law selected.
There is never any really adequate substitute for knowledge of
the alternative effects which would be produced by the choice of
particular systems or forums. Unfortunately, except for the special
knowledge of a foreign system which a draftsman may happen to
have, or except as the existence of especially advantageous rules
may come to light in the process of negotiation, the obstacles to
comprehensive research in the law of a foreign system are simply
too great to permit much of this sort of weighing of alternatives.2
There is, however, one rule of thumb that has much to recommend
it. If the weighing of alternative effects is not possible, then the
principal advantage of choice of law for the international contract
is the identification of the rules to be applied, whatever they may
prove to be. In the event that a dispute does arise, such a clear
identification of applicable rules is most apt to permit negotiation
and settlement without litigation. It follows, therefore, that any
choice of law or forum should be one likely to be observed and
enforced by the courts of both parties. This, of course, is the primary reason for avoiding the choice of neutral law and neutral
forum, because the chances are fairly high that such party autonomy
will not be permitted and that the benefits of any choice at all are
therefore endangered. If the highest obtainable degree of certainty
in the selection of applicable law is to be the objective, however,
this rule of thumb would go beyond the minimum assurance resulting from selection of a system with a "reasonable relation" to the
transaction. It would suggest, in addition, the selection of a system
to which the otherwise applicable choice of law rules of the parties'
own systems might reasonably be expected to lead.26 This does not
mean that choice of law can safely be left to choice of law rules
and ignored in drafting, but rather that uncertainties in the application of conflict of law rules can be avoided while at the same time
obtaining the most favorable possible climate for the recognition
of party autonomy.
The scope of the present article does not permit discussion of
a number of other factors which bear upon these problems, such as
the desirability of compliance with the formality requirements in all
potentially applicable systems,2 the juggling of place of perform2 Cf. Brumbaugh, Choice-of-Law Provisions in Licensing Contracts, in PARKER SCHOOL
SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 36 '(1962).

26 It is interesting to compare this rule of thumb with the suggestion that choice of law

should always designate the place of performance. Folsom, supra note 17, at 55. The
latter rule appears to be more nearly an illustration of the approach suggested here,
rather than a departure from it.
27 See Maw, supra note 9, at 27-28.
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ance or other contacts as a method of influencing the selection of
the applicable law,28 or the impact of mandatory rules of law of a
forum on the whole complex of autonomy problems.29 Another
vital area which must here be left untouched is the potential enforceability of a judgment once obtained, whether it be an American judgment exported for enforcement abroad80 or a foreign judgment presented for enforcement in the United States.8 ' What has
been said, however, is perhaps enough to suggest that choice of law
and forum clauses, while not foolproof, are useful enough devices
to deserve thorough rather than matter of course drafting in the
preparation of international contracts.

28

See Maw, supra note 9, at 28-30. But cf. Folsom, supra

note 17, at 54.
See Battifol, Public Policy and the Autonomy of the Parties: Interrelations Between
Imperative Legislation and the Doctrine of Party Autonomy, in INSTITUTE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 68-81 (Univ. of Mich. 1949).
30 See Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Western Europe, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 367 (1963) ; Kulzer, Some
Aspects of Enforceability of Foreign Judgments: A Comparative Study, 16 BUFF. L.
REV. 84 (1966); Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American judgments Abroad, 29
YALE L.J. 188 '(1919) ; Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign MoneyJudgments: One Down and More to Go, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 72 (1964).
31 See Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 291
(1963); Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50
COLUM. L. REv. 783 (1950) ; Smit, InternationalRes Judicataand CollateralEstoppel
29

in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 44 (1962). For an exhaustive appendix of
the reported cases in this country involving foreign judgments see C. PETERSON, DIE
ANERKENNUNG
(1964).

AuSLAENDISCHER

URTEILE

IM

AMERIKANISCHEN

RECHT

107-27

INCREASING PROFITS FROM FOREIGN

KNOw-How LICENSING
ROLAND P. CAMPBELL*

Many United States businesses have a substantial invesment in
research and development but because of a lack of capital, or for
other reasons, are not able to export their products to foreign markets. Mr. Campbell explores the possibility of licensing technical
know-how for use in foreign markets, as a method of increasing
profits where investment through direct export of products is impossible. He outlines the requirements necessary for royalties from
such licensing to be treated as capital gains for tax purposes. He
demonstrates that it is possible to satisfy capital gains requirements
by transferringall substantialrights in proprietary technology, while,
at the same time, retaining rights to cancel the license for any act
of the licensee which impairs the licensor's security or property interest in the licensed technology.

W

ITH world markets becoming closer and more accessible in
terms of the lowering of tariff barriers and transportation
costs, the U.S. businessman is becoming increasingly aware of the
opportunities for profits in the foreign marketplaces. For U.S. companies with ample capital, foreign profits may be realized by direct
investment in manufacturing facilities or equity investment in established companies. Those U.S. companies manufacturing products
suitable for export find their profits through the normal export
channels. But there are many U.S. companies that lack the capital
for direct investment and who manufacture products that, for one
reason or another, cannot be exported. For such companies the
route to foreign profits may be confined to the foreign licensing
of that technical know-how that has made them successful in the
domestic market.
Even though foreign profits may be limited to licensing revenues, it does not necessarily follow that these profits are less than
those obtainable from the more conventional methods of doing
business abroad. Certainly if profits are measured in terms of return on investment, the profit from licensing is indeed gratifying
since seldom, if ever, is there capital invested. The research and
development necessarily undertaken to maintain and increase a
competitive position in the domestic market is normally expensed
for U.S. tax purposes. And it is the results of this expensed research
and development that are used as the subject matter of the knowhow license agreement. If favored tax treatment, such as capital
*General Atty., Ball Bros. Research Corp.; member of the Ohio Bar; Bachelor of Eng'r
1948, LL.B. 1956, University of Toledo.
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gain treatment of royalty, can be added to a no-capital cost investment in the form of a number of foreign licenses, the profit picture
obviously becomes much more attractive.
One of the objectives of this article is an attempt to relate the
legal requirements for capital gain know-how licensing to the usual
expectations of the parties in a know-how licensing arrangement.
Another objective is to outline the salient requirements for capital
gain licensing, having in mind that the basic parameters of a foreign
license agreement are often agreed upon by U.S. businessmen when
they are abroad-before consulting legal counsel and without
counsel participating in the negotiations.
I.

KNow-How AS PROPERTY

The proper transfer of all substantial rights in the property
aspects of know-how will entitle the transferor to capital gain treatment of the royalty income from the transfer.' Before coping with
the considerations involved in properly transferring all substantial
rights, it is necessary to at least attempt to define "know-how" and
those classes of know-how which constitute property.
Since we are primarily concerned here with the licensing of
manufacturing technology, "know-how" may be defined as machine
designs, drawings, process techniques, manufacturing specifications,
technical notes, and other technical information which is of importance to the licensor in his manufacturing operations. Much of
this know-how is documented, but some exists solely in the minds
of the licensor's skilled technical personnel. All know-how will not
be considered as property. But it has been established that know-how
such as process techniques, and machine designs which are reduced
to practice and kept secret, will qualify as property,2 whereas that
know-how which is not reasonably secret or comprises services will
not be property and thus royalty derived therefrom will be treated
as ordinary income for tax purposes. 3
Within the context of capital gain know-how licensing considerations, it is not necessary to think of secret technology in the
same manner as would be necessary in trade secret litigation. Be1E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961);

Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1962). In each of these
cases the court ruled against the taxpayer but established guide lines as to what would
be considered a transfer of all substantial rights. The basis for capital gain treatment
of intangible property rights such as patents, trademarks and know-how is found in
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1221, 1231.
2
Nelson v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1953). See also Nash, The Concept of
"Property" in Know-how as a Growing Area of Industrial Property: Its Sale and
Licensing, 6 IDEA 289, 294-96 (1962).
3
Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 (Part 1) CUM. BULL. 133, and cases cited therein. See Bell
Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 152 U.S.P.Q. 182 (1966) (report of trial
comm'r), ajfd per curiam, 381 F.2d 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (reprinting report of trial
comm'r).
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cause of the difficulties a plaintiff encounters in proving his case
with respect to an appropriation of trade secrets, there is a tendency
for the prospective licensor to dismiss important technology as not
being licensable for capital gains purposes. Until there is good
reason for doing otherwise (and good reason may mean a rejection
of the licensor's claim for capital gain treatment from a license
agreement), it is suggested that for license planning purposes the
frospective capital gains licensor adopt the following portion of
the definition of a trade secret from the American Law Institute's
Restatement of Torts:
[I]nformation which is used in one's business, and which gives him
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
4
know or use it;

as -modified by the following:
[T]he secrecy with which a court of equity deals is not necessarily

that absolute secrecy that inheres in discovery, but that qualified
secrecy that arises from mutual understanding, and that is required
alike by good faith and by good morals; 5

and
A plurality of individual discoverers may have protectible, wholly
separate rights in the same trade secret. 6

For the purposes of this article, the term "proprietary technology" will be used with reference to the property aspects of knowhow rather than "trade secret," with the suggestion that such definition includes that reasonably secret technical know-how which
should be considered as property. The term "transfer" will be used
in some instances rather than "license" since the transfer or grant
of rights necessary in capital gains licensing more nearly approaches
a sale rather than a permissive use.
A. Some Uncertainties
The legal requirements for an entirely satisfactory foreign
licensing program that will also result in capital gain treatment of
royalty will not be found in today's case law concerning know-how
nor in the Internal Revenue rulings. We do, however, find certain
suggestions and some case law that, in most respects, will enable
a practical licensing arrangement to be consummated and yet pro7
duce the desired tax result.
4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 757, comment b (1939).

5 Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 387, 67 A. 339, 343 (1907).
6
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
'" The few tax cases handed down in connection with licensing or selling secret technology adopt, by analogy, the many cases dealing with the licensing and sale of
patents. See, e.g., cases cited note 1 supra. The analogy doctrine is also used with
respect to antitrust questions in the licensing of know-how. See Macdonald, Knowhow Licensing and the Antitrust Laws, 62 MICH. L. REV. 351 *(1964) ; Stedman, Legal
Problems in the International and Domestic Licensing of Know-how, 29 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 247

(1965).
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Lest the prospective licensor becomes discouraged at this point,
one might ask how often the businessman has the opportunity to
resell the same property a number of times. Yet this is exactly
what he does when he licenses the same technology in a number of
different countries. 8 While there are some uncertainties, the objective is to handle the foreign licensing program and the individual
licenses so as to stay within the precedents and sound conclusions
that may be drawn therefrom, while avoiding these uncertainties
until such time as the law further develops.
B. Transfer of All SubstantialRights
Accepting the fact that a transfer of all substantial rights in
proprietary technology (property) will entitle the licensor to capital
gain treatment on the royalty income, it is necessary to determine
how all substantial rights may be transferred. A 1964 Revenue
Ruling can be used as a starting point and provides in part as follows:
The unqualified transfer in perpetuity of the exclusive right
to use a secret process or other similar secret information qualifying
as property within all the territory of a country . . . will be treated
as the transfer of all substantial rights in the property in that
country.9

While Revenue Ruling 64-56 is helpful with respect to the re-

quirement of an exclusive and perpetual right to use, it is somewhat
misleading as to the requirements for a transfer of all substantial
rights in a licensing transaction. The property right in a trade secret
essentially consists of the right to prevent a wrongful or unauthorized
use or disclosure.' ° Therefore, in order to transfer all substantial
rights, it is necessary that the licensor grant not only the exclusive

right to use, but also the right to prevent all others from using or
disclosing."
8 This is a difficult concept to grasp but may be thought of with reference to foreign

patenting. A U.S. patent application may be filed and issued in a number of foreign
countries, thus representing a different property right in each country for a single
inventive act in the U.S. To the extent secret technology is protected by the laws of
the various foreign countries, the owner of such secret technology should have protectible property rights in such country. For an enlightening treatment of the foreign
law of "know-how" see Ladas, Legal Protection of Know-how, 7 IDEA 397 (1964).
9
Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 (Part 1) CuM. BULL. 133, 135. While this ruling is not
directly in point in licensing, it is helpful as illustrating I.R.S.'s property view on
secret technology. For an analysis of this ruling see Cohen, Long-awaited Ruling on
Transfer of Know-how Sets Guidelines in Important Areas, 21 J. TAXATION 38
(1964).
10 E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 '(Ct. Cl. 1961).
11 E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961);
Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1962). One must assume
from Du Pont that a U.S. court will think of the foreign law as being comparable to
U.S. law in that the owner of secret technology has the right to prevent a wrongful
use of disclosure and that this is a property right. Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 (Part 1)
CuM. BULL. 133, 134, also indicates that the foreign law must offer substantial pro-

tection for secret information, thus suggesting the I.R.S. test for "qualifying as
property."
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While U.S. courts have held that there is an implied covenant
in a sale of secrets that the transferor will not be able to use or disclose such secrets,1 2 it seems clear from the court's reasoning in
Du Pont and Stalker, supra, that a positive promise on the part of
a licensor not to disclose is also necessary in order to establish a
complete transfer. The licensor's promise should not, however, be
absolute since he would then be precluded from licensing in other
countries; but it should be sufficient that the licensor promises not
to disclose to others in the licensee's country, nor to disclose to any
third parties elsewhere except under a requirement of secrecy, and
to disclose for use by others only in territories other than that in
3
which the licensee has been granted rights.1
Since the license agreement must contain a restrictive secrecy
covenant on the part of the licensor with respect to disclosing the
proprietary technology, it is necessary to consider carefully what
know-how should be included in the contract as "proprietary technology" quite apart from the tax considerations. Otherwise, the
licensor may well find that he has materially restricted his freedom
of action with respect to subsequent, or parallel, licensing of similar
technology in the same country. Discretion should lead the licensor
to include, as proprietary technology, only that know-how reasonably qualifying as such. Non-proprietary know-how may be included
in the agreement under a separate heading and the licensee can be
required to keep such know-how in secrecy, while the licensor need
not so limit himself. Of course, royalties on such non-proprietary
know-how are not subject to capital gains treatment.
It is not uncommon for a given item of proprietary technology,
for example, a process, to have usefulness for producing products
other than those which have been manufactured by the licensor or
desired to be manufactured by the licensee; or the secret process
may be used by the licensor to produce a variety of different products and it is preferred to transfer rights to use with respect to
only one of the products. The question is then raised as to whether
the transfer of rights to use for less than all purposes is a transfer
of all substantial rights since the licensor is left with the right to
use for other purposes. There is authority in tax cases concerning
patents that a transfer of less than for all uses or products covered
by the patent will still qualify for capital gain.' 4
12 Radium Remedies Co. v. Weiss, 173 Minn. 342, 217 N.W. 339 (1928).
13 The task here is to preserve the trade secret status of the technology in each license
and to go only far enough to give the licensee a right equivalent to that of the licensor
in the licensed country.

14 United States v. Carruthers, 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955) ; First Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 136 F. Supp. 818 (D.N.J. 1955) ; Rouverol v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 186

(1964). But cf. Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1958).
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'While courts have followed the reasoning in patent tax cases
when deliberating transfers of trade secrets, the recent Pickren decision casts some doubt on the scope of the analogy doctrine.1 5
Therefore, unless a limitation with respect to use is of such importance that the licensor is willing to risk the capital gain treatment,
caution dictates that the transfer of rights be not so restricted.
C. UnqualifiedTransfer
In the broad sense, the transfer of proprietary technology may
be thought of as being comparable to the sale of a chattel. In the
usual sale of a chattel, the buyer acquires completely free of restraints
as to the nature and locale of the use and has the right to dispose
of the chattel as he sees fit. In the event the total purchase price is
not paid at the time of transfer, it is customary for the seller to condition the sale. He does this by prohibiting use of the chattel outside a specified area, requiring the transferee to carry insurance
to protect the property value of the chattel, and imposing such other
conditions on the sale as may be necessary to protect the transferor's
security interest. However, the transaction is still a sale and, to the
extent reasonably necessary to protect the property right or the security interest, the licensor may also condition or qualify the transfer
and still effect a disposition of all substantial rights in his property."
In considering the licensor's needs with respect to the security
and property interest in the proprietary technology, the restrictions
or qualifications which may be imposed in connection with the
transfer should be based upon payment of the monetary considerations and the need to keep the proprietary technology in secret and
to control its use. These interests are secured by the licensor retaining the right to cancel the licensee's use of the proprietary technology for breach of contractual requirements protecting the licensor's security and property interests. The following areas are of major concern to the licensor and reservation of the right to cancel for
breach should not adversely affect the capital gain status of the
transaction.
15In looking at whether the contract as a whole evidenced an intent to make a complete
transfer of all rights, the court attached significance to the transfer being the exclusive
right "to manufacture, or have manufactured, use and sell, or have sold, the products
derived from the aforementioned formulas" instead of granting "rights in and to the
secret formulas." It is difficult to visualize what right could be retained in view of a
grant to make products derived from the formulas. Nevertheless, a transfer limited to
a given use, field of use, or products is far more restricted than a transfer of all rights
in and to the proprietary technology. Pickren v. United States, 378 F.2d 595, 597, 600
(5th Cir. 1967) (emphasis added).
16This conclusion may be drawn from the court's reasoning in the patent cases, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 140 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Kimble
Glass Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 183 (1947); Myers v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 258
(1946). So long as there has been a complete transfer, a court should not consider
those conditions that may accompany the transfer to detract therefrom when based
upon considerations which protect the respective business interests.
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Royalties - Licenses are rarely paid for on a lump sum basis
at the time of grant. Instead, the licensor is reimbursed over a period
of time in accordance with the use made of the licensed technology.
Therefore the licensor's security interest will exist during the period
of the agreement in which royalties are payable by the licensee. 7
In the event minimum royalties or production rates are required,
tht same reasoning will apply. 18
Best Efforts Provisions - A licensor will want the licensee to
use the proprietary technology to the widest extent reasonable under
the circumstances. Therefore, it is common to insert a "best efforts"
provision in the contract. This should be deemed a reasonable restriction during the royalty payment period in view of the licensor's
dependency upon the licensee's use for his income.' 9
Bankruptcy - Insolvency - The licensor may cancel in the
event the licensee becomes insolvent or bankrupt during the royalty
payment period. 20 This is a proper protection of the licensor's security interest. It would seem that the licensor should also be able
to cancel in the event the licensee files bankruptcy proceedings even
after all royalties are paid. This should be considered as a protection
of the licensor's property interest in the proprietary technology
which otherwise might pass into the hands of creditors free of the
secrecy restrictions.
Sublicensing - Since the capital gain licensor cannot again
license the same proprietary technology in the licensee's country,
he may want to give the licensee sublicensing rights. It is important,
however, that the sublicensing agreements be worded properly so
as to protect the proprietary technology. Therefore, the licensor
should be able to condition the license by making all sublicenses
subject to the licensor's reasonable approval.2 '
Secrecy and Enforcement - It is clear that an unrestricted disclosure to a third party destroys the property value of proprietary
technology2 2 and thus the licensor may properly qualify the transfer
by requiring the licensee to hold the technology in confidence.2 3 It
should arguably follow that the licensee could be required to take
17 Reid
18

v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 622 (1956).

Watson v. United States, 222 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1955) ; Golconda Corp. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 506 (1957).
19See Kronner v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 730 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
20See Commissioner v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 140 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (dictum).
21 See Rollman v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1957). The same also applies
to assignments. See Crook v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 242 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
22

Pomeroy Ink Co. v. Pomeroy, 77 N.J. Eq. 293, 78 A. 698 (1910).
23 If the licensor ever expects again to license the same proprietary technology in other
countries, he should require the first and subsequent licensees to hold in confidence
in order to protect the trade secret status of such proprietary technology.
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action against a wrongful user or discloser in the licensed territory,
since the licensor must give the licensee the right to do so pursuant
to Du Pont and Stalker, supra.
The foregoing represent only the more significant conditions
for breach of which the licensor will wish to retain the right to cancel.
The test as to cancellation rights is whether the licensor has transferred all substantial rights to the proprietary technology. Therefore,
a right to cancel for events not within the control of the licensor,
and conditioned with respect to events occurring after the transfer,
should be proper as long as the cancellation right can be related to
24
the licensor's property or security interest.
D. Exclusive and Perpetual Use Within All the
Territory of a Country
It is necessary that the transfer of rights to use the proprietary
technology be exclusive and perpetual within all the territory of a
country.2 5 At first glance, the words "exclusive" and "perpetual"
have a tone of conclusiveness such that the businessman inherently
hesitates because of the presumed finality of the transaction and
the fear that a poor licensee may be chosen. However, we have noted
that the transfer may be qualified in a number of respects that will
greatly reduce the business risks in terms of protecting the licensor's
security and property interest in the transferred technology. Since it
necessarily follows that the exclusiveness and perpetualness of the
transfer is also thus qualified, and when it is remembered that licensing has been chosen as the method of doing business abroad, it
becomes possible to view the transaction more objectively.
Depending upon the exact nature of the technology, the market
for the products produced, and the licensee's position in that market,
an exclusive or perpetual transfer or grant of rights may be viewed
as reasonable under widely varying circumstances.
Assume, for example, that the proprietary technology to be
licensed consists of design and engineering drawings for apparatus
specifically designed by the licensor to produce a given product
For a collection of cases dealing with cancellation rights, see Bell Intercontinental
Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1967).

2
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See Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1

(Part 1) CuM. BULL. 133, 135. The need for this lan-

guage is derived from the analogy concept established by E.I. Du Pont De Nemours
& Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961), and Stalker Corp. v. United
States, 209 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1962). A trade secret, if kept secret, may have
a perpetual life and thus is analogous to a trade name in this regard. Reid v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 622 (1956), and Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Commissioner,
6 T.C. 856 (1946), hold that capital gain treatment will be accorded royalty received

from an exclusive and perpetual transfer of a trade name. Since a transfer of rights
less than throughout the territory of a country would leave the licensor still free to
license others in such country, the transfer must be with respect to the country as a
whole in order to transfer all substantial rights.
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which could be substantially as well manufactured by other apparatus known to, or perhaps even used by, the transferor. An exclusive
and perpetual transfer of the right to use the drawings leaves the
transferor completely free, if he so wishes, to manufacture the same
products in the first licensee's country.
In some industries, the requirements for effectively competing
require almost continuous improvement and development of new
products, processes, or production apparatus. The perpetual transfer
of today's technology could well mean that the licensee has rights,
and the licensor has given rights, which are valuable for only a few
years. And when the licensor's new technology is developed, he is
free to license another or again license the former licensee under a
new agreement.
It is not unusual, particularly in the less industrialized and
geographically smaller foreign countries, to find that one company
has most of the business in a given product or product line. In this
case, an exclusive license to such company is really not more restrictive on the licensor than would be a nonexclusive grant. Also, if the
technology is such that substantial capital investment is needed in
the way of new plant or equipment, the licensor could well find that
all prospective licensees will insist on the protection of an exclusive
license.
Because the exclusive grant of rights to use must be throughout the territory of a country, it is possible that the otherwise ideal
licensee, because of product shipping costs or other problems, may
not be able to effectively cover his national market and the licensor
is penalized in that he will not obtain the optimum royalty return.
With the formation of trading blocs such as the European Economic
Community, European, Latin American, and Central American Free
Trade Associations, and as progress continues toward the lowering
of trade barriers between member states, the requirement that the
grant of exclusive rights to use be throughout the territory of a
country will become of diminishing and perhaps even negligible
importance in many instances. Since the exclusiveness of the grant
need only be with respect to use of the manufacturing technology,
and not as to sales of products produced through use of the technology,26 a licensor could grant, for example, an exclusive license
to a company in southern France and feel reasonably certain that if
he licensed a Belgian concern, the latter would adequately cover
the northern French market.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961);
Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1962). A transfer of
use with respect to products may be dangerous in view of Pickren v. United States,
378 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1967).

2E.I.
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TECHNOLOGY AND SERVICES

As a practical matter, licensees would not normally be satisfied
with receiving only the proprietary technology aspects of the licensor's know-how. In initially negotiating the license, the licensor
will normally agree to give the licensee all technical information
reduced to written or pictorial form for the agreed-upon royalty
consideration. That know-how existing primarily in the minds of
the licensor's technical staff is given the licensee on the basis of an
hourly charge or per diem for consulting services rendered. To the
extent that non-property know-how is included for the stipulated
royalty, an allocation would probably be made by the Internal Revenue Service setting a portion of the royalty against the proprietary
technology and the balance against the non-proprietary portion of
the know-how. 27 Therefore, for tax purposes it is desirable to classify the know-how provisions in the agreement into proprietary
technology, non-proprietary technology, and consulting services, and
assign values to each, recognizing that the consideration for the nonproprietary technology and services will be considered as ordinary
income. The licensee should not find this objectionable so long as
the values do not exceed those previously agreed upon.
In classifying the know-how, Revenue Ruling 64-56 is of some
help in connection with the "services" question. This ruling indicates that to the extent services are ancillary and subsidiary to the
property (proprietary technology) transfer, the services will be
treated for tax purposes similarly to the property. Examples given
in the ruling as ancillary and subsidiary services are those "in promoting the transaction by demonstrating and explaining the use of
the property, or by assisting in the effective 'starting-up' of the property transferred." 2 A question of fact is involved in each instance,
depending upon the character of the proprietary technology and
additional technology and services provided.
III.

IMPROVEMENTS

It is customary in international licensing arrangements for each
of the parties to desire the use of the technical improvements made
by the other. The licensor is primarily motivated by the possibility
of the licensee improving the licensed technology to the point where
the licensee may become a significant competitive threat. On the
other hand, the licensee often suspects that the licensor is willing
to grant licenses because he has some valuable improvements in the
offing and therefore is merely disposing of old technology.
2Rev.

2

Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 (Part 1) CuM. BULL. 133, 134-35.

Id. at 134.
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When the licensor includes technical improvements in the license, the consideration therefor is usually included in the basic
royalty rate which is then set, having in mind both the proprietary
and non-proprietary technology and the improvements. The reason
for this is the difficulty in predicting what improvements may be
made as well as what values should be assigned to future technology
yet to be developed. In nonexclusive licensing, the licensor's improvement rights need not be coped with on the basis of their status as
property. This is also true with respect to the licensee's improvements which, if provided for in the agreement, should be treated
as nontaxable additional compensation to the licensor.
In capital gain licensing, attention must be given as to how to
license the use of improvements which cannot be classified as proprietary technology and consequently should not be considered as
property. If improvements are included in the agreement as a single
class, and payment therefor is an unspecified portion of the royalty,
then it should follow that an allocable share of the royalty would
be treated as ordinary income since routine nonsecret type improvements should be considered as services and not property. 29 The allocation problem should be avoided if only reasonably secret improvements in the proprietary technology are included under the theory
that improvements in trade secrets must of themselves be trade secrets. However, an improvement clause so restricted is not in accordance with general licensing practice, since the licensee will want all
know-how improvements.
One solution to the allocation problem would be to divide the
licensor's improvements into two classes: those that are more important and would normally be considered by the licensor as reasonably secret, and a second class to include the more routine improvements. The secret class should also be treated so as to vest rights in
the licensee more than six months after the reduction to practice
thereof so as to satisfy the six-month holding period. 0 The transfer
of the secret improvements should be effected in the same manner
used for the basic proprietary technology. Also, care should be taken
in drafting the secrecy covenants so as to preserve the property status
of these improvements. The nonsecret improvements could be handled in the same manner as technical services or non-proprietary
technology and so defined.8 '
at 135. One of the patent cases, Kronner v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 730 (Ct.
Cl. 1953), holds that improvements under a patent have the same property status as
the patent. However, it is suggested that the Kronner holding applies only to improvements clauses which purport to convey rights to improvements which come within the
scope of the patent claims.
SoINT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1222.
31 When both the licensor and licensee are to give rights to improvements, consideration might be given to a separate agreement providing for a royalty-free exchange of
such rights.
2Id.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

IV.

VOL. 45

FOREIGN LAW

It would be far beyond the scope of this article to do more than
suggest that detailed consideration be given to the foreign law aspects of the license agreement. The requirement of an exclusive and
perpetual grant, which is necessary for the desired U.S. tax treatment, deserves particular attention in view of the applicable foreign
law. As one example, such a grant may create an implied warranty
that the licensee may use the technology free of third party claims,
including patents. Therefore, it would be well, during license negotiations and in the license agreement, to specifically negate any
such warranties.
If the licensee is located within one of the European Common
Market countries, the provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome" and the implementing regulations concerning licensing's
deserve special attention in view of the exclusive and perpetual grant
by the licensor, the secrecy covenants, and also in connection with
licensee improvements provisions if included in the license.
CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing it may be concluded that the license agreement necessary to produce capital gain treatment of royalty need
not necessarily impose undue limits on the licensor's freedom of
action should the agreement be tested by the major problems encountered as a result of any licensing transaction.
In the final analysis, whether the licensor successfully meets
any such test will be determined by his rights to cancel the licensee's
use of the know-how. We have observed that the licensor may cancel for the licensee's failure to pay minimum and other royalties or
use best efforts, insolvency, bankruptcy, misuse of sublicensing rights
and, in general, for any act of the licensee which impairs the licensor's security or property interest.
When it is considered that the licensor is making his knowhow available abroad for the purpose of gaining further profit from
the results of his domestic R&D expenditures, it is submitted that
the capital gain license will provide him with a viable arrangement
leading to increased profits.
32

See 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.,

2000-11 (1965-1967)

(Transcript of Article 85 is

found at
2005, 2031, and 2051; transcript of Article 86 is found at
2101).
Articles 85 and 86 of the treaty spell out the substantive law of the Common Market
on restrictions of competition. See Ladas, Antitrust Law in the Common Market with
Special Reference to Industrial Property Agreements, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 709 (1962).
33
Regulation 17, Art. 4 (1962), 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.,
2431 (1965) and Regulation 17, Art. 5 (1962), 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.,
2441 (1965) (amended by
Regulation 59, see 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.,
2441.10 (1965)). While certain
permissible provisions in the nature of restraints in patent licenses are clarified by
Regulations 17 and 59, know-how licenses are treated on their merits. See Van Notten,
Know-how Licensing in the Common Market, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 525 (1963).

AGREEMENTS FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF
TECHNOLOGY ABROAD: THE DISTRIBUTOR
RELATIONSHIP
By JOHN A. MOORE*
The foreign distributorship is a widely used means for the
transmission of United States technology in internationalcommerce.
Mr. Moore points out some of the legal and business problems that
may arise in the distributor arrangement because of incomplete or
faulty drafting of the distributorship agreement. In order to avoid
some of these pitfalls, Mr. Moore discusses the major points of
consideration in drafting such agreements. Such matters as trade
restraint, U.S. export controls, choice of governing language and
law, payment and termination provisions should be clearly set out
in the agreement in order that the scope of the distributorshiprelation will be clearly understood and mutually agreeable to the parties
involved. As an Appendix to his article, Mr. Moore includes a
sample DistributorAgreement which may serve as a useful drafting
guide to the attorney.

I. OLD

T

AND NEW DEVICES

HE interrelationship of law, science and industry is vividly pres-

ent when the lawyer is called upon to prepare the legal instruments governing transmission of goods and technical information
and services across national boundaries. With increasing trade and
overseas operations, a great variety of new and old legal devices
are being employed. The lawyer must be alert both to use old and
familiar arrangements and to develop new and useful variations of
traditional legal arrangements when required. The ordinary American
lawyer finds that he cannot rely solely on traditional and tested legal
devices known to him when it comes to the transnational field. Innovation is required because of at least two major factors: (1) the
changing patterns of overseas activities and the constantly changing
requirements of national and regional laws; and (2) the fact that
the legal results flowing from the use of a particular legal device
will not be the same in the transnational field as when that device is
used in a purely national setting.
The American lawyer should be aware of the great variety of
legal arrangements and relationships being used for the transmission
of technology and goods. The following are a few examples:
A great variety of joint venture arrangements have proliferated
in the international sphere. These may be for direct participation by
*Partner, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado; member Colorado Bar; B.S., Yale University, 1951; LL.B., Harvard University, 1954.
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the joint venturers, or agreements to participate in a new form or
entity overseas.'
A great growth of licensing agreements has occurred over the
years in encouraging the use of patents and know-how and in de2
riving overseas profits without direct investment.
Equipment leasing agreements have grown in importance in
making technical equipment available across boundries in ways that
are economically possible for the receiving areas.'
Agreements for engineering services are vital in the international sphere, as are agreements for construction of highly compli4
cated industrial plants.
Agreements for the rendering of services and technical assistance assume a whole new variety of forms.' What is thought of as
one kind of services arrangement here may be cast in quite a different
mold for overseas use, to take advantage of special currency or
licensing regulations.
Employee and consultant agreements are widely used and raise
special problems of secrecy of information and ownership of developed technology.6
Representation and "finders" agreements are widely used.
Manufacturing and assembly operations will be the subject
of legal agreement where these operations are conducted overseas.
Parent-subsidiaryagreements regarding overseas activities of the
I A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 196 (W.

Surrey

& C. Shaw eds. 1963) (a publication of the Joint Comm. on C.L.E. of the A.L.I. and
A.B.A.). See also Blondeel, Problems Involved in Operating Within the EEC, in
DOING BUSINESS IN

THE COMMON MARKET, CCH COMM. MKT. REP., SPEC. REP.

15, 17-20 (1963). These may often be "coerced." See Murphy, Structuring International Business, in SYMPOSIUM, PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD - STRUCTURES AND
SAFEGUARDS 23, 47 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1966). There is some leveling
off in the Common Market. See Duerr, Alternative Methods of Operation Within
the EEC; Factors to Weigh in Doing Business in Europe, in DOING BUSINESS IN
THE COMMON MARKET, supra at 3, 6. An interesting German development is
described in Laundry, The GmbH & Co. Kommanditgesellschaft: German Partnership
Vehicle For Joint Ventures, 23 Bus. LAW. 213 (1967).
See Mr. Ross's treatment of joint venture possibilities elsewhere in this symposium.
2 G. POLLZIEN AND G. BRONFEN, INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AGREEMENTS 1 (1965);
A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 1, at
105-80. See generally 2 DOING BUSINESS ABROAD 586-619 (H. Landau ed. 1962);
Haight, International Protection of Rights in Technology in SYMPOSIUM, PRIVATE
INVESTORS ABROAD-STRUCTURES AND SAFEGUARDS 173, 186 (Southwestern Legal
Foundation 1966) and authorities cited therein.
3 Eckstrom, Licensing, Equipment Leasing and Patent and Trademark Protection in the
European Common Market, 2 SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1960 INSTITUTE
ON PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD 249, 282.

4 See generally Powell,

Some Legal and Practical Problems Encountered by U.S.
Concerns Performing Services in Latin America, 4 SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1962 INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD 41.

Compare Murphy, supra note 1, at 27, 36-38.
6 Discussed in Haight, supra note 2, at 178-82.
5
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subsidiaries become most vital in determining the effect of tax and
7
other rules on overseas operations.
Franchise,trademark use and management agreements are other
devices used in the transmission of technical and administrative
skills."
The focus of this paper is on one relationship for the transmission of products and technology: the agreement between the
U.S. manufacturer or distributor and a distributor in another country.
II.

OVERSEAS DISTRIBUTOR AGREEMENTS

A. Aspects of the Relationship
Distributor agreements are, of course, exceedingly widely used
in the international sphere.9 This is a classic way for the manufacturer to enter the export market, hopefully through carefully
selected and reliable distributors who will push the product sucessfully in the right foreign market. The setting up of a distribution
network can aid in the marketing of products all the way from
those which are simply bought and used or consumed without change,
to those which have a variety of technical installation, servicing or
adaptation problems.
The distribution network may be used in a variety of ways.
Moreover it is rather common for a U.S. manufacturer to go into
direct manufacturing and sales in certain foreign areas where the
market warrants it and the product can justify the investment, and
still maintain sales through distributors in other areas. The clear
advantage of using a distributor is to gain access to a foreign market
through a foreign seller who is familiar with the language and the
industry and selling patterns in the foreign area. The manufacturer
typically invests little or no capital in the foreign area and he may
not have to retain extensive and expensive language and other
foreign area skills on his own staff. As a result, of course, he shares
a good deal of his profit with the foreign seller.'0
7 Drachsler, Parent Control of Subsidiary, in 1 DOING BUSINESS ABROAD 228 (H. Landau ed. 1962); Weidenbruch, Planning for Business Operations Involving Related
Taxpayers: Foreign Aspects, N.Y.U. 25TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 379 (H. Sellin ed.
1967) ; Tillinghast, The Application of Section 482 to InternationalOperations:InterCompany Pricing Problems, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 1433 (H. Sellin ed.
1966).
S See generally Eckstrom, supra note 3, and material cited in 2 DOING BUSINESS
ABROAD, supra note 2; compare agreement forms X & XII, Foreign Operations Service,
Inc., Contracts and Agreements II (mimeo. Essex, Conn.), and form 9, id. III.
9
A good practical analysis is found in P. MACDONALD, PRACTICAL EXPORTING AND
IMPORTING 61-69 (2d ed. 1959). An excellent discussion of various legal aspects is
found in Meek, Overseas Distributorship Agreements, 21 Bus. LAW 661 (1966).
Problems in lining up distribution and possible use of a Combination Export Manager
are treated in U. Ammann, Doing Business in the European Common Market, Oct. 1,
1963 (unpublished thesis in University of Denver Library), at 59-62.
10 Moon, Administrative and Legal Controls: How and Who?, in SYmposIum, PRIVATE
INVESTORS ABROAD STRUCTURES AND SAFEGUARDS 1, 4 (Southwestern
Legal
Foundation 1966).
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As has been pointed out, the distributor relationship at its
best is one that provides incentives to both manufacturer and distributor." The rewards to the distributor must be sufficiently great
to induce him to invest the time and expense necessary to obtain
substantial sales. And the arrangement must provide enough return
to the manufacturer to warrant the maintenance of inventories with
locally adapted specifications, and to provide sales and service
materials and supplies adequately to back up his product in the
foreign target area.
However, the commencement of any distributor relationship
is necessarily somewhat experimental. Therefore the distributor
agreement will usually provide an inexpensive exit for either side
if the expectations are not achieved.12 This will be particularly
important for the manufacturer who must be able to switch from
an unsatisfactory performance by a distributor to a better one in
order to maintain sales revenues sufficient to justify his capital
investment at home.
Variations in the distributor pattern are (1) sales to the foreign
distributor f.o.b. manufacturer's location or a U.S. port, with no
overseas establishment by the manufacturer; (2) employment for
a foreign country or area of a manufacturer's "factory" representative, whose duty it will be to establish and assist authorized distributors and be relatively near at hand when problems or special
requirements arise; and (3) establishment of a bonded warehouse
or assembly or manufacturing establishment overseas from which
deliveries are made as required by the distributors. Important legal
considerations in these arrangements will be considered hereafter
without purporting to give an exhaustive or complete comment on
all aspects of the relationship.
B. Formality
Distributor agreements assume a wide variety of forms. As
businessmen and lawyers know, they are frequently extremely simple,
being not much more than appointment by the manufacturer of a
given firm to a distributorship. However the simplicity of these less
formal arrangements is deceptive. When a legal problem arises,
it will usually be found that much of the actual distribution agreement, for legal purposes, is contained in the flow of special instructions, circulars, sales policy, correspondence and other communications going back and forth between the manufacturer and the
distributor. Indeed, it is common for the manufacturer t0 find that
his factory representative abroad, or his sales director at home,
111d.
12 "Trial" periods are also employed. P. MACDONALD, supra note 9, at 63.
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has created by these communications a legal arrangement of which
he has little knowledge.
As an appendix to this paper, the reader will find a form of
distributor agreement intended to be something of a guide and to
illustrate certain of the points raised. As with all forms, no claim
can be made that this form is adequate for all situations.1" Distributor agreements frequently represent the result of a compromise
between the desire of the client to have a very simple formal arrangment and the wish of his lawyer to have the arrangement
spelled out in some detail. This is of course the case with many
legal agreements, but it occurs particularly with distributor agreements because a great deal of business custom and usage is known
and assumed in the distributor relationship.
The writer does not suggest the client should be saddled with
an unnecessarily complex agreement. However, he does recommend
a formal agreement and one that is somewhat more detailed than
often found in practice. It is submitted that this will be an advantage
to the manufacturer in the long run for a variety of reasons. One
advantage is that the written agreement gives an ideal opportunity to
explain the expected relationship to both parties. This is particularly useful in the transnational setting because the assumptions
on either side concerning the distributorship may be quite different.
It is commonplace that the chief problem in foreign trade is clear
communication. Spelling out what is expected of the parties allows
questions to come up at an early stage before erroneous assumptions
are acted upon. Further, there is no escape from the conclusion that
the distributor relationship will consist of a series of legal rights
and duties regardless of whether these are set forth in a written
agreement. If a rather formal agreement is not used, these rights
and duties, as mentioned above, may be built up in the various communications that flow between the parties. The businessman will
find it far easier, clearer and cheaper to turn to a written agreement
when a problem arises than to puzzle through years of correspondence to find his answer.
To take the simple case of termination, it is a great deal easier
to look at a specific termination clause in an agreement than to dig
back into the client's files and examine correspondence setting up
the distributorship in the hope the parties said something reasonably
clear about rights to terminate and results of termination. Trying
13 Other forms may be found in Foreign Operations Service, Inc., Contracts and Agree-

ments II (mimeo. Essex, Conn.), e.g. form XI(A), and Hess, A Mid-Continent Lawyer's Initial Approach to Foreign Trade, Counseling Mid-Continent Clients Who
Trade Abroad 1, 18 (U. Mo. Int'l Law & Foreign Trade Div., Symposium 1965). A
good checklist for the distributor agreement is found in P. MACDONALD, supra note
9, at 65-69.
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to determine what a so-called "informal" agreement really provides
can be very expensive in lawyer's time and court or arbitrator determinations, and the results still may be unclear and unsatisfactory.
Both the supplier and the distributor will experience turnover
of personnel from time to time. There is a distinct advantage in
having written agreements which new people can review to see what
is expected instead of relying largely on oral, and possibly erroneous,
training of new people.
If a matter comes to arbitration or court controversy, the arbitrator or judge will be much more likely to give effect to clear,
written agreements in order to carry out the intention of the parties.
In the absence of clarity of the arrangement, he will be much more
likely to fall back on general principles of law which more likely
4
than not will favor the distributor.1
The use of a formal, rather detailed agreement also helps the
supplier to establish consistent arrangements from one distributor
to another and from one country to another, which is most desirable
in setting up a simple and effective network. 15 Naturally, the agreements must vary from country to country and from situation to
situation, but using a formal agreement will encourage the use of
standard terms to the maximum extent.
The mere fact that one starts from a written form of agreement
forces both manufacturer and distributor to think about future
possibilities before they arise. In the enthusiasm of setting up a new
relationship, the parties are not likely to want to think about termination, arbitration, travel cost and other items unless they are required to.
Required government filings of distributor agreements are on
the increase.' " Having a written agreement in some detail allows
clear and expeditious filing without extensive narrative explanation
of the relationship. In effect, the greater use of formality allows
the parties more latitude in choosing the legal regime of their
relationship rather than leaving it to some relatively unknown body
of law to establish it for them.
C. Relationship
The manufacturer or supplier will normally want to establish
a principal-to-principal relationship in dealing with his distributor.
He will want to avoid, to the extent legally possible, the creation of
a relationship of principal and agent or employer-employee with the
distributor. For this reason, something should be said directly about
14 See

generally Meek, supra note 9.

15 Id. at 663.
16 See the discussion of Trade Restraints, infra, part II D.
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this in the agreement (compare paragraphs 2 and 3 of the form
in the Appendix). Moreover, continual buttressing throughout the
agreement is needed. Allowing too much control by the supplier and
too much dependency of the distributor on the supplier may result
in the creation of a dependent relationship regardless of what the
17
parties say the relationship is.
In any event, the American lawyer must understand that the
relationship created may be governed to a large extent by the law
of the country where the distributor is located regardless of the
contractual provisions between the parties. A variety of laws may
affect the situation and the lawyer should be familiar with these
wherever a distributor is established in order to avoid undesirable
effects.
Taking Belgium as an example, general law and the agreement
between the parties will govern nonexclusive distribution arrangements and exclusive distribution agreements entered into for a
definite period of time."8 However, the Law of July 27, 1961, provides a special regime for exclusive distribution agreements entered
into for an indeterminate period of time. l" Except when one of the
parties fails to comply with his obligations, the distributorship can
be terminated only by giving the other party a reasonable notice
period or a just idemnity. The length of the notice period or the
amount of the compensation may be determined by the parties only
at the time notice is given. The option between notice and indemnity
belongs exclusively to the party who cancels the contract. The notice
period must be long enough to permit the other party to find another
principal (or another distributor) of the same ability. If the parties
fail to agree, the courts will settle the matter in equity. If the
notice period granted is deemed by the court not to be sufficient,
it will determine the amount of compensation to be paid, taking into
account the advantages which would have accrued during a reasonable notice period.
The Belgian law gives further protections to the distributor.
If the principal terminates an exclusive contract for reasons other
than serious fault on the part of the distributor, or if the distributor
terminates by reason of serious fault by the supplier, the distributor
can claim a special idemnity (in addition to receiving notice) established under the following criteria: (1) additional clients acquired
by the supplier as a result of the distributor's efforts; (2) expenses
incurred by the distributor which will benefit the supplier after
See Meek, supra note 9, at 665-66.
Law Office, Frank Boas, Esq., Doing Business in Belgium, 2 CCIi
6438.01 (1967).
19 1d.
6438.01-.11.
17

18
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termination; and (3) amounts which distributor must pay to his
personnel whom he is obliged to release as a result of termination.
The Belgian law has very strong statements to the effect that
it will apply notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary by
the parties, and to the effect that litigation may always be brought
before the Belgian courts which will apply Belgian law.2"
Generally, in reviewing the applicable local law, the American
lawyer would do well to consider the following:
(1) Are there any special statutes enacted for the protection
of distributors in countries where the distributor will
operate?
(2) Does the relationship which is contemplated bring into
play any special provisions of the local law regarding
commercial agents or other commercial relationships?
(3) Will provisions of local labor law be deemed to apply
2
to the relationship? 1
D. Trade Restraints Considerations
Various legal problems will be encountered if the distributor
agreement contains any features which may be construed as restricting freedom of trade. This is particularly true with respect to
so-called "exclusive" features of the distributorship relation. Here,
as in all trade restraint problems, the American lawyer will be confronted with the necessity of considering three bodies of law:
(1) United States law bearing on foreign trade arrangements;
(2) national law of the country or countries where the distributor
is located or operating; and (3) regional law set forth in treaties
and other legal materials bearing on trade relations among states
parties to a regional arrangement. The leading example here is, of
course, the law deriving from the Treaty of Rome 2 establishing the
European Economic Community.
Reviewing these laws is a formidable task and the problem
is not made easier by the fact that United States law affecting foreign
trade is difficult to ascertain, in flux, and often confusing. A widely
knowledgeable commentator has recently said:
Antitrust laws are another matter. Given the requisite nexus

with the foreign or domestic commerce of the United States, in
this instance the domestic law applies to the foreign operations
"'See id.
6438.09-.11, which refer to arts. 4 and 6 of the Belgian Law of July 27,
1961. For special problems of arbitration and comparison of rules for agency agreements, see id.
6438.11, 6438.50.
21 Meek, supra note 9, at 666-73, contains a fine discussion of how to apply this analysis
in civil law countries, particularly in the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Cuba,
Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland.
22See 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
121 (1967) for a profile of the Treaty of Rome
which was signed on Mar. 25, 1957, and made effective on Jan. 1, 1958.
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of a domestic company, notwithstanding the use of foreign subsidiaries or other insulating devices. But the requisite nexus is often
unclear, and there are many problem areas that cry out for analysis
and classification. The critical question is not the existence of hardcore horizontal offenses under the Sherman Act such as horizontal
price fixing or division of markets, but the legality of vertical distributional and licensing arrangements under the Sherman, Clayton
and Federal Trade Commission Acts.
For example, may an exporting manufacturer grant his foreign
dealer exclusive trade territories and product lines? May he designate
resale customers?
Under present law the answers to these questions are at best
uncertain and at worst so inconsistent with traditional international
commercial practices as to evoke disbelief and even derision on the
part of foreign dealers and licensees.
If precisely the same standards of antitrust legality apply in
foreign as in domestic commerce, the plain truth is therefore that
the U.S. exporter or investor is at a serious competitive disadvantage.
If different standards apply in foreign commerce the U.S. businessman should be so informed - promptly, authoritatively, and without
equivocation.

What is needed is a statement of policy from the Department
of Justice clearly identifying distributional and licensing practices
in which businessmen may engage without
in foreign commerce
23
fear of prosecution.
Fortunately, the field of trade restraints is one in which a
relatively large amount of up-to-date material is available to the
American lawyer. 24 Frequently the foreign, national and regional
law is clearer than that of the United States, and it is more common

to allow for advance administrative clearance of a proposed practice.2"
It may generally be said that the tendency is toward more rules
governing trade and enlarging the area of free competition as the
years go by. It is not possible within the scope of this article to
analyze antitrust or restraint of trade legislation in a large number
of jurisdictions. No is it possible to treat the U.S. rules fully.2 6
23Murphy, supra note 1,
24 For example, detailed

2-

at 45-47 (footnotes omitted).
European Economic Community materials are kept up to date

in CCH Common Market Reporter and special reports published in connection therewith; national and regional laws are published and supplemented in Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Business Practices- Europe and North America (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, last supplemented in April,
1967); both U.S. and foreign developments are reported in Antitrust and Trade
Regulation Report (Bureau of National Affairs, Washington) ; and a wide range of
subjects is covered in the volumes of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law and The Antitrust Bulletin (Federal Legal Publications, Inc., New York.)
Compare procedures under the German Act Against Restraints of Competition of
July 27, 1957, set forth in II ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND

DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICESEUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, Germany 2.0, at 1-21 '(June 1966).
2 A brief summary is contained in A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

TRANSACTIONS, supra note 1, at 631, and an extensive bibliography is found, id. at
673-92. See also Timberg, Foreign DistributionArrangements and the Sherman Act,
2800 et. seq. (1965).
1 ANTITRUST BULL. 80-86 (1955); 1 TRADE REG. REP.
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However, comment should be made on a recent development in
the Common Market having great significance to distributor networks in that area.
Common Market authorities, economists, lawyers and businessmen have been addressing a great deal of attention to "exclusive
distributorships" in the past several years in their effort to develop
a truly common market for Europe. At the outset, it should be
observed that the term "exclusive distributorship" is frequently
employed as if it had a common, accepted and specific meaning.
This is far from the case. The EEC work particularly has shown
there are many "exclusive" features of an arrangement, and distributor agreements may have some, all, none or many combinations
of these features. The most common "exclusive" features are
(1) The appointment of a firm as the sole dealer for the manufacturer's product or products in a certain area or market.
This is frequently accompanied by the right of the dealer
to advertise this fact and to identify itself as a carrier of
manufacturer's goods.
(2) The obligation of the dealer not to sell goods competing
with those of manufacturer.
(3) The undertaking by the dealer of a promotion and sales
program. This may be limited to a certain area or language and may contain minimum required actions and expenditures, usually with aid of various kinds by the manufacturer.
(4) The obligation of the dealer to service and repair the goods,
to replace defective goods or parts, and to carry specified
minimum stocks and to offer specified services to customers.
(5) The obligation of the manufacturer to prevent all imports
of his goods from other areas, by agreements with other
dealers and other devices.
(6) The obligation of the dealer not to sell outside a certain
area, and to refer inquiries and orders from outside its
territory to the appointed dealers in the areas from which
they come.
(7) Freedom for a dealer to sell outside a specified territory,
but the obligation to split his profits or commissions with
the appointed dealers in the areas affected.
(8) The obligation of the manufacturer to offer new products
through the previously appointed distributor, or the obligation of the dealer to handle new products.
(9) The obligation of the dealer to take various actions in its
area to protect the name, trademarks, patents, licenses and
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other property of the manufacturer; similar obligations on
the manufacturer to protect and promote dealer's position.
(10) Variations of these arrangements: a manufacturer may
appoint a dealer for a territory or a market, but reserve
the right to sell directly to certain customers or industries
within the market.
The use of some of these devices has of course come under
question or prohibition under the broad protection of competition
rules of the Treaty of Rome. 2 7 Dealers in the Common Market know
that certain trade arrangements and practices are prohibited, certain
ones are allowed if notice is given to the EEC Commission, and certain ones may be allowed by specific exemption if an application
for exemption demonstrates benefits to trade that outweigh anti28
competitive features.
Some important EEC and national court and EEC Commission
struggles over distributorships having been disposed of, the Commission issued in March 1967 its Regulation No. 67/6729 exempting a large group of bilateral exclusive dealer agreements from the
antitrust prohibitions of the Rome Treaty. Some 30,000 agreements
which have been notified to the Commission under its regulations
are expected to be exempted by this group decision. Agreements in
existence on March 13, 1962, and notified before February 1, 1963,
wilt be exempt if modified to conform to the new regulations before
August 2, 1967, as long as the Commission was notified of the
changes before October 3, 1967.30 Exemption under the new regulation will be good until December 31, 1972."' Future agreements
meeting the requirements of the regulation need not be notified to
the Commission.
The American lawyer who is accustomed to groping through
court developments in this field in the U.S. may find this regulatory
"blueprint" by the Commission a great help. The Commission generally recognizes that exclusive dealing agreements in international
trade may result in improvement in distribution of goods because
a firm can concentrate its selling activities and not be obliged to
maintain business ties with too large a number of dealers. In this
27
Treaty of Rome, arts. 85 and 86, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2005, 2101 (1967).
28 The law and literature on these subjects is extensive. See generally 1 CCH COMM.
MKT. REP.
2000 (1967) ; Deringer, Exclusive Agency Agreements with Territorial
Protection under the EEC Antitrust Laws, 10 ANTITRusT BULL. 599 (1965) ; Deringer, Problems of Distribution Within the Common Market, 10 ANTITRUST BULL.
105 (1965); Stanton & DeCroy, Much Ado About Restrictive Business Practices in
Europe, 21 Bus. LAw. 891 (1966); Newes, Exclusive Distributorship Agreements
in the Common Market, 22 Bus. LAW. 533 (1967).
2Official Journal No. 13, Feb. 21, 1962, at 204. English translation at 1 CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. 2727 (1967).
30
Art. 5, Regulation No. 67/67, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
2727E (1967).

3' Art. I, id. 2727A.
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way businessmen may better overcome difficulties resulting from
linguistic, legal and other differences in markets. Furthermore greater
sales promotion may be expected in these arrangements, more exploitation of the market, and a better flow of goods. The Commission
recognizes that designation of exclusive dealers is often the only way
small and medium-size firms can enter the market as competitors."
The new regulation is fairly specific. It applies generally to
agreements in which only two enterprises take part and in which one
agrees to deliver products only to the other for resale within a specified area of the Common Market or where one agrees to purchase
for resale products only from the other. 3 Certain restrictions on
competition are authorized to be imposed on the distributor. These
include (1) the obligation not to manufacture or distribute, during
the life of the agreement or for one year after, products competing
with the products under contract; and (2) an obligation not to advertise the products, establish a branch or maintain a distribution
warehouse outside of a specified territory. (3) It will be permissible
to obligate the distributor to purchase complete lines, or minimum
quantities, to require selling with certain packaging or trademarks,
and the distributor may be obligated to undertake certain sales promotion measures, including maintenance of inventory, assumption of
responsibility for customer services and guarantees, and employment
34
of personnel having specialized or technical training.
The possibility of parallel imports must be maintained. Therefore, it will specifically not be possible to take measures or use industrial property rights to prevent other dealers or consumers from
obtaining the products from other sources in the Common Market
or from selling them in the specified territory. Also, a reservation
is made to the effect that some agreements, although qualifying on
paper for the group exemption, may have effects that are incompatible with the Treaty requirements. In such cases, the Commission may engage in ordinary cartel procedures and withdraw the
exemption, especially where there is reason to believe the goods
are not competing with similar goods in the territory, that other
manufacturers do not have access to the trading level of the exclusive dealer, or that the exclusive dealer is making improper use of
the exemption.3 5
The result of the Common Market developments has been to
make it completely clear that the antitrust provisions of the Rome
32

Preamble, id.

2727.

33 Art. 1, id. T 2727A, with certain further provisions.
34 Art. 2, id. 2727B.
35

Arts. 3 & 6, id.
2727C, 2727F. Background comment on the drafting of Regulation
No. 67/67 is found in BUSINESS EUROPE, Apr. 12, 1967, at 113 (Business Int'l S.A.,
Geneva); EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Apr.-May 1967, at 22 (European Comm. Information Service No. 102, Washington).
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Treaty apply to vertical agreements. Furthermore, the escape provisions of Article 85(3) are going to be rather strictly construed.
Thus, a showing that there is a production or distribution advantage
to the manufacturer or distributor involved is not going to be enough
to gain specific exemption. Manufacturers dealing in the Common
Market will have to take careful note of these developments in establishing or modifying their distribution arrangements.
E. Export Controls
Exporting manufacturers should be aware of severe limitations
under U.S. law on certain exports, primarily in the areas of goods
having military and important economic significance.3 6 The chief
laws involved are the Trading with the Enemy Act, 37 the Export
Control Act of 194938 and the Mutual Security Act. 39 Detailed
regulations have been issued under the various statutes, and the exporter finds he may be dealing with the Commerce Department, the
Department of State and other U.S. agencies.
Normally an exporting manufacturer will arrange for the licenses and other procedures necessary and his distributor will not be
involved. However, there are at least two problem areas. First, if
the manufacturer believes there is any danger of future government
controls not now present, or if he anticipates any delays or prohibitions in shipping his products, he should be certain to include an
appropriate force majeure clause in his agreement. Second, is there
any duty on the exporter to investigate or try to control resale of his
products overseas? There certainly is no perfect answer but it is likely
many companies follow the practice described by one commentator:
Generally, the rule is that the American company should exercise reasonable care to determine whether or not the exported U.S.
products are intended for use in the prohibited countries. It is not,
however, necessary that the American company affirmatively investigate the subsequent use or disposal of goods or materials sold
40
to an unrelated Distributor who purchases for his own account.

F. Disputes and Governing Language and Law
If disputes arise which are so serious that they cannot be worked
out between the parties through discussion or correspondence, then
The laws and regulations are discussed generally in Meek, supra note 9, at 662-63.
Analogous problems of a licensor are discussed in detail by Hannon, Government
Regulation of Exportation of Technical Data Under Foreign License Agreements,
20 Bus. LAw. 51 (1964).
374o Stat. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-6, 7-39 (1959), as amended
and supplemented by the Foreign Assets Control Regulation and the Transaction
Control Regulations.
3863 Stat. 7 (1949), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2021-32 (1959), as amended,
(Supp. V, 1964).
39 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1964).
40
Meek, supra note 9, at 663.
36
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the arrangement is probably at an end. In this case, most manufacturers and distributors will want dispute settling machinery which
is quick in action and simple and inexpensive in procedure. For one
thing, most disputes will concern relatively minor matters: commissions due on sales by others in the distributor's territory; the proper
calculation of termination payments; return or allowances on defective shipments. Even if the dispute is serious, it may primarily involve
questions of fairness and compensation computation.
These considerations suggest the use of arbitration. Many will
prefer this rather than recourse to the courts. 4 Manufacturers particularly may fear the local courts will favor the distributor. If arbitration is to be employed, it should be provided for in the agreement
(see, for example, paragraph 15 of the form in the Appendix to
this paper). In designating arbitration as a dispute settling mechanism, it is well as a minimum to specify where it is to take place and
the rules governing the arbitrators. The drafter may wish to go
further and specify a mechanism for the parties to select arbitrators,
maximum times for submission and award, and provisions governing
the division of the costs of arbitration.
It is most desirable for many purposes, including disputes, to
specify the official language of the text of the agreement. Even
though the text of only one language is used in the signed agreement, the existence of translations for various purposes may lead to
confusion and dispute over the authoritative version. It is very easy
for different language versions of the agreement and its amendments
to have widely varying meanings and interpretations.
Another factor favoring arbitration is the multitude of laws
and legal systems which may have a bearing on the agreement, as
various sections of this article have sought to demonstrate. 42 Analysis
of these laws and their use and proof in court may be quite difficult
and expensive. Therefore, it is most desirable to have choice of law
provisions included in the agreement. 43 This remains true even when
arbitration is specified, since it will give the arbitrators a specific
legal reference. And it may prove useful should one party refuse to
arbitrate, or refuse to honor an award when rendered.
U.S. manufacturers are somewhat prone to specify the law of
one of the American states as the governing law. This has some
advantages. For example, the U.S. state law may be easier for the
U.S. supplier to ascertain and quote when arguing its position, and
it may be somewhat more favorable to freedom of contract, and
See generally Burstein, Arbitration of International Commercial Disputes, 6 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 569 (1965), and authorities cited therein.
See id. at 570-71.
43 See Professor Peterson's treatment of this subject elsewhere in this symposium.
41

42
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thus support the protection of the U.S. supplier. Also, the U.S. party
or lawyer may feel more comfortable in attempting to have his
home law apply.
These advantages may be more theoretical than actual. In matters touching public policy and the protection of the distributor, a
foreign court is very likely to apply local law regardless of the contract language. 44 Moreover, if a dispute actually comes to a court
trial and U.S. law is applied, it can prove extremely costly to ascertain the U.S. law on the subject and set it forth in the manner necessary for use in the foreign court. This is particularly true in Rocky
Mountain States where the applicable law is often unsettled. Therefore, it may be more practical to specify as governing law the law
of the area in which a dispute is most likely to arise and be argued.
In any event, it is clearly desirable to be aware of the essential features of the foreign law, and be prepared to meet them or contract
out of them, regardless of the choice of law provision.
G. Payments
The drafting lawyer and his client will wish to provide mutually
acceptable payment procedures and terms and at least the basic outline of shipping arrangements. These provisions will include credit
terms which will vary widely with the goods involved and the standing of the distributor. Normally, but not always, the distributor will
make all of its own arrangements for credit terms to its customers.
In preparing these provisions, thought should be given to the
currency or currencies in which payment is to be made. Currency
restrictions in the target country may dictate these terms. On the
other hand, foreign currency remittances may be possible but the
agreement may have to require the distributor to obtain necessary
permits. Where inflation is a factor, or devaluation is expected or
feared, the manufacturer will usually want payment in U.S. currency
if this is possible to obtain. Where long-term credits are used, serious
loss may result from failure to provide for payments in U.S. or other
"hard" currency, or payments geared to a standard expected to be
stable. The usual device in the latter case is to require payment
in foreign currency equivalent to a specified amount of U.S. dollars
45
calculated at the time of payment.
H. Termination
Even the best of relationships may come to an end. Distributor
performance may become unsatisfactory or even deteriorate to the
point where it is damaging to the manufacturer. The manufacturer
44 Compare the Belgian requirements discussed at note 20 supra.
4Exchange problems and additional protective devices are discussed in P. MACDONALD,
supra note 9, at 421-32.
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may wish to terminate an exclusive appointment and appoint competing distributors, or create smaller territories or markets where
volume has increased. It may even wish to engage in direct sales,
or switch to a more promising distributor. There may be pricing or
servicing problems; the distributor in turn may wish to switch to
competing products with greater profit potential. These and other
factors may bring a distributorship to an end, and the reasons for
termination may have a definite effect on the legal ramifications of
the termination.
In trading relationships there has been a tendency for the
stronger, better financed manufacturers to insist on broad freedom
to terminate a distributor, with or without specific cause, and with
no particular compensation or protection for the distributor. This
practice has been tempered by concepts of fairness, the desire of the
manufacturer for a good reputation, and the ability of effective distributors to bargain for contractual protection. Now it is increasingly
the case that local law will give some protections to distributors for
46
abrupt, unfair or "abusive" terminations.
This development is not surprising. The distributor is enabling
the manufacturer to enter the foreign market, and a firstclass distributor will have taken some or all of these measures: (1) deciding
to sell a particular manufacturer's goods to the exclusion of competing lines which might return profit; (2) advertising and promoting
the goods and name of the manufacturer; (3) building customer
relations by expense and effort; servicing the goods supplied and
solving customer problems; and (4) maintaining an inventory of
,goods, investing capital in warehouse and office, building a staff
of salesmen and technicians.
The longer the distributor relationship continues, the greater
may be the investment in effort and money by the distributor, and
the greater its resistance to sudden termination of what it may consider a satisfactory line. In considering termination, three principles
seem paramount:
(1) The agreement should have a definite termination provision. Termination should not be faced without advance
agreement on how it is to be handled.
(2) Consideration should be given to the kind of commitment
each side will be giving to the relationship, and a termination provision should be drafted that will give a fair opportunity for reduction or liquidation of that commitment.
46 For Common Market developments see Blondeel, supra note 1, at 15-17; these and

other developments are discussed in Meek, supra note 9, at 664-71; cf. Pavia, Methods
of Operation in Italy, 6 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 501 (1965). For termination
aspects of dependent and independent agents in Germany, see 2 CCH COMM. MKT.
REP.
6640 (1966).
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(3) Special protective provisions of local law should be known
and provided for in the agreement to the extent legally
possible.
The form in the Appendix provides, in paragraph 11, a simple
example of termination with certain notice provisions and arrangements for inventory disposition. Notice itself is a great protection,
giving each side time to make other commercial and employee arrangements, and to use up stocks and selling materials.
As shown in the discussion of Belgian law in this paper,"7 a
termination provision of the kind in the Appendix may not be sufficient under the applicable foreign law. An indemnity may be necessary to compensate a terminated distributor for his investment. For
example, in France there are extensive protections for commercial
terminations, and the French courts have extended some of these
protections to distributors in instances where the manufacturer terminated with malice or with results deemed to be inequitable.4 8
In short, some of the care employed in investigating and establishing a mutually advantageous relationship should be used to prepare, in advance, the machinery for a graceful exit, and careful consideration of the distributor's real problems should be given when
it becomes necessary to make that exit.

47 See note 19 supra.
4

Blondeel, supra note 1, at 15-16.
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APPENDIX
DISTRIBUTOR AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT, made in Junction City, Colorado, U.S.A. as of
., 19
, between TECHNO MANUFACTURERS,
INC., a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Colorado, U.S.A.,
(called "Manufacturer") and IMPO & SONS, a
organized under the laws of
(called "Distributor"),
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Manufacturer has developed and manufactures certain industrial products catalogued in Manufacturer's literature, together with certain
service equipment (all called the "Techno Products"); and
WHEREAS, Distributor wishes to act as a distributor of the entire line
of Techno Products with respect to the territory described in paragraph 1;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the undertakings and covenants
set forth in this Agreement, Manufacturer and Distributor agree as follows:
1. Appointment of Distributor and Territory.
Manufacturer appoints Distributor a distributor of Techno Products
with primary marketing responsibility for the following territory (called "the
Territory"):
2. Distributor Relationship.
The purpose of this appointment is to provide for the development
and maintenance in the Territory of a substantial volume of sales of Techno
Products and adequate service of the Products in the mutual interests of
Manufacturer and Distributor. Manufacturer will sell to Distributor and
Distributor will purchase from Manufacturer Techno Products to be resold
by Distributor. Distributor accepts its appointment and undertakes diligently
to canvass for purchasers of Techno Products and in all reasonable and proper
ways vigorously to promote the sale of Techno Products in the Territory.
Distributor will maintain adequate sales, service and warehouse factilities in
the Territory and a representative and adequate inventory of Techno Products.
3. Distributor Not Manufacturer's Agent.
This Agreement shall not constitute Distributor the agent or legal
representative of Manufacturer for any purpose whatsoever, nor shall Distributor hold itself out as such. This Agreement creates no relationship of joint
adventurers, partners, associates or principal and agent between the parties,
and both parties are acting as principals. Distributor is granted no right or
authority to assume or create any obligation or responsibility for or on behalf
of Manufacturer or otherwise to bind Manufacturer or to use Manufacturer's
name other than as may be expressly authorized by Manufacturer. Distributor
shall bear all of its own expenses for its operation and staff, except for such
items as Manufacturer shal by prior written agreement undertake to pay.
4. Manufacturer's Sales Policy.
Distributor shall carry out Manufacturer's sales policy with respect
to the Territory and Techno Products as set forth in the written Sales Policy
of Manufacturer as supplied to Distributor, and as may from time to time
be communicated to Distributor in written additions to or revisions of such
Sales Policy.
5. Shipment and Delivery.
Manufacturer shall in good faith supply requirements of Distributor
for Techno Products and make shipments promptly in accordance with Distributor's orders. Whenever Manufacturer shall deliver to a common carrier
any Techno Products ordered by Distributor, Manufacturer shall not be
responsible for any delays or damages in shipment. Distributor may specify
the routing as well as consignees for shipments ordered, but in all cases
billings shall be directed to Distributor by Manufacturer.
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6. Failure to Ship for Reasons Beyond
Manufacturer's Control.
If Manufacturer shall fail for reasons beyond its control to make
shipments of any orders, such orders shall be subject to cancellation at the
discretion of Distributor unless shipment is commenced within 30 days from
the date called for in the order.
7. Payment.
Distributor shall purchase Techno Products from Manufacturer F.O.B.
its plant at Junction City, Colorado, at such United States dollar prices as are
scheduled in Manufacturer's export price list, payable in United States currency and upon terms of payment net 30 days from date of invoice with a
__

% distributorship discount from list price.
8. Warranty, Servicing and Returns.

Manufacturer's warranty of Techno Products is set forth in its Sales
Policy, and Distributor shall handle warranty problems, returns, obsolescence
and servicing in accordance with such policy. Manufacturer shall bear once
each year the out-of-pocket cost (but not salary) for one Distributor representative to attend a three week training school in Colorado for instruction
in Techno Products servicing.
9. Selling Aids and Advertising.
9.1 Manufacturer shall supply to Distributor without cost reasonable
quantities of Manufacturer's selling literature and displays, and other sales
aids and devices as may be designed and made available by Manufacturer from
time to time. Distributor shall at its own expense employ such items and
participate in such trade and industry meetings and shows in the Territory
as in its judgment will enhance the sale of Techno Products.
9.2 Distributor shall cause Techno Products to be advertised in suitable media in the Territory with due regard to its appeal to industry. Manufacturer shall furnish to Distributor at no expense to Distributor samples of
advertising materials used in other territories, with the right to use the same,
but Distributor shall not be bound by these and may in its discretion adopt
such advertising methods and displays as its believes most effective for the
market in the Territory. Upon advance approval of copy and media, Manufacturer will contribute up to $
per annum for Distributor's
advertising budget for Techno Products, provided that Distributor's total annual
advertising budget for Techno Products shall be at least three times the
amount contributed by Manufacturer.
10. Inquiries and Information.
10.1 Manufacturer shall forward to Distributor for its handling all
inquiries and orders received by Manufacturer from the Territory, both from
correspondence and personal visits in the Territory, along with copies of any
acknowledgments Manufacturer may have made, and Manufacturer shall make
available to Distributor such sales, product and technical information as may
be useful to Distributor in handling the inquiry or order. Distributor will
supply Manufacturer with information as to the disposition of all referred
inquiries or orders.
10.2 On request by Distributor, Manufacturer will render such sales,
product and technical information, and estimates and specifications, as shall
be helpful to Distributor in promoting the sale of Techno Products. At least
once each year Manufacturer shall have its representative call upon Distributor
and supply any information needed concerning the use, application or development of Techno Products. Distributor shall forward reports of significant
sales and technical information gained in the Territory concerning the use
and development of present Techno Products and possibilities for new developments in the industry.
11. Term of Agreement; Disposition of Inventory.
11.1 The term of this Agreement shall be for three (3) years from
the date hereof, but the Agreement may be terminated at any time during
such period by either party without cause upon the expiration of 90 days after
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written notice to the other party. The term of the Agreement may be extended
for successive periods by the joint written consent of both parties. If there
is any such extension, the notice period for termination without cause shall be
increased to six months. In the event of a breach of any term or condition of
this Agreement by either party, the Agreement may be terminated by the
other party upon giving 30 days written notice of such termination. In the
event a petition in bankruptcy or similar proceeding shall be filed by or against
either party, or if either party shall make an assignment for benefit of creditors,
this Agreement may be terminated by the other party on five (5) days written
notice.
11.2 In the event Manufacturer terminates this Agreement, it shall
purchase or cause to be purchased from Distributor its then inventory of
Techno Products which may be in unopened factory packing, and any other
items that are resalable as new, provided that such items are listed on Manufacturer's then current export price list, at Distributor's cost less 15%, plus
return freight cost. If Distributor shall terminate this Agreement, Manufacturer
assumes no responsibiliy with respect to Techno Products then or thereafter
in possession of Distributor, provided however, that Manufacturer will have
the right within 30 days after the effective date of such termination to purchase all or any Techno Products in Distributor's possession at Distributor's
cost less 15%, plus return freight cost. In the event of any termination, Distributor agrees to return all sales aids and materials in its possession at the
direction of Manufacturer who shall bear the freight cost.
12. Notices.
Any notices hereunder shall be in writing and shall be deemed given
when properly deposited in the normal mails, airmail postage prepaid, addressed
as follows:
To Manufacturer:
Techno Manufacturers, Inc.,
Junction City, Colorado,
U.S.A.
To Distributor:

Impo & Sons,

13. Waiver of Breach.
The failure of either party to require the performance of any term of
this Agreement, or the waiver by either party of any breach of this Agreement, shall not prevent a subsequent enforcement of such term nor be deemed
a waiver of any subsequent breach.
14. Amendments.
Any modification or amendment of any provision of this Agreement
must be in writing and bear the signatures of the authorized representatives
of both parties.
15. Disputes.
Any disputes, controversies or claims between the parties arising out
of or relating to this Agreement shall be settled by arbitration in accordance
with the rules of the
Arbitration Association. This
Agreement shall be enforceable and judgment upon any award rendered by
the arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction. Arbitration
shall take place in
., or such
other place as the parties may mutually agree.
16. Construction of Agreement; Language.
This Agreement shall be construed and the relations of the parties
shall be determined, in accordance with the laws of the State of Colorado;
provided, however, that if any provision of the Agreement is in violation of
any applicable law, such provision shall to such extent be deemed null and
void, and the remainder of the Agreement shall remain in full force and
effect. The English language text of this Agreement shall be the authorized
text for all purposes.
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17. Assignment and Benefits.
Neither this Agreement nor any interest in it shall be assigned directly
or indirectly by either party without the prior written consent of the other.
Further, upon any substantial change in the ownership or management of either
party, such party shall give written notice of the change and the other party
may terminate this Agreement after 30 days written notice given not later than
30 days after notice of the change. Subject to the foregoing provisions of this
paragraph, this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of
the legal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of
the date first written above.
TECHNO MANUFACTURERS, INC.
By
President
IMPO & SONS
By
Title:

PATENT PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
By COOPER H. WAYMAN*
The transfer of technology abroad may require the acquisition
of patent rights in foreign countries by American businessmen. Mr.
Wayman discusses the contrast between United States patent laws
and the laws of several foreign countries in terms of acquisition,
duration, and protection of patent rights. He demonstrates the uncertainties inherent in the various systems, pointing out that recent
internationalmeetings in Geneva may give rise to a workable international patent system in the future. Until then, Mr. Wayman
suggests that arbitration may be a possible solution to the inherent
difficulties in the enforcement of patent claims abroad.
INTRODUCTION

N

EARLY 100 countries currently have systems for granting
patents on inventions, processes or products. There are many
variations, the most important of which involve exceptions to
patentability for certain types of products. For example, special
provisions frequently are applicable to food, medicinal and chemical
products. Some countries grant patents both on manufacturing
processes and the products themselves. Others grant patents only
for processes.' An excellent description of the vast differences in
patentability is noted in the following statement:
Let us take first a new chemical substance which is not a medicine. A claim for a new process of making the substance can be
obtained in all the countries of the group. In addition a product
claim can be obtained in Belgium, France and Italy. A product
claim can also be obtained in Germany and Luxembourg if the substance is a composition or mixture but not if it is a single chemical
compound. However, in the latter case a process claim can be obtained for the use of a known type of process to prepare the product provided that the product is new and has unexpected advantages. This is the so called "analogy process" claim -in form
a process claim but relying for patentability on the features of the
product rather than the features of the process. To the extent that
such a claim is broad and covers alternative processes, it may be
almost as good as a product claim in providing protection for the
invention.
In Holland a product claim cannot be obtained either for a
mixture or a single compound but it is possible to obtain an "analogy" type of process claim for methods of preparing the product,
*Assistant Professor of Chemistry, Colorado School of Mines; B.S., Rutgers, 1951;
M.S., University of Pittsburgh, 1954; Ph.D., Michigan State University, 1959; J.D.,
University of Denver, 1967.
The author originally prepared this paper for the Seminar on International Business Transactions, at the College of Law, spring 1967.
'Lightman & Lee, Patent Laws Worldwide, INT'L COMMERCE, Feb. 22, 1965, at 4.
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and in many cases also a process claim for bringing the product in
the necessary form for a new use.
Turning now to pharmaceutical products or medicines, the
situation is as outlined above except that only process claims, and
not product claims even for a composition, can be obtained in Germany and Luxembourg. In Italy not even a process claim can be
obtained. In France a product claim can be obtained but only in a
special medicament patent (BSM).
The situation in Italy is obviously unfair to nationals of the
United States and other countries where pharmaceutical inventions
are protected. It puts the Italian manufacturer in a position where,
without any research expenditure on his part, he can copy an
American pharmaceutical invention and sell the products not only in
Italy but also in any other country where2the American inventor has
been unable to obtain product protection.
The uncertainty in these rules, at times, may mislead an in-

ventor as to exactly what protection he has. In the pharmaceutical
situation, in Italy, an obvious unfair business practice is certain, but
permissive by law, notwithstanding a possible patent infringement.
Other important differences in the laws concern the degree of
novelty required. In general, an invention is not considered new
in a country if it has been known or used before filing of the patent
application. Most countries extend this test of novelty to publication,
use or exhibition in any country in the world. Others apply this
test only to such prior knowledge in their own countries.
Search and examination procedures also vary widely and some
countries dispense with examination altogether, except as to matters
of form. Fee costs cover a wide range, with renewal fees common
to most foreign systems.
U.S. inventors and businessmen can expect to receive national
treatment equal to that afforded local citizens in protection of their
patent rights in about 90 countries with which the United States
has concluded bilateral and multilateral agreements.3 The most important multilateral agreement is that of the International Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Union), to which
the United States and 64 other signatories adhere. The United
States also is a member of the Inter-American Convention of 1910
on Inventions, Patents, Designs and Models, together with 13
Latin American countries. The United States has bilateral agreements in terms of the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) with China, France, Germany, Greece, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, and the Netherlands, although those
with France and Iran are not strictly friendly.
Goldsmith, Difficulties Facing American Business in Patent Application in Europe,
in DOING BUSINESS IN THE COMMON MARKET, CCH COM. MKT. REP., SPEc. REP.
107, 110 (1963).
3 See Lightman & Lee, supra note 1.
2
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Most countries specify that a "working" (an actual use) of the
patent be achieved in a specified time, otherwise a cancellation is
imposed. Some countries require the patentee to license anyone
upon request, which amounts to a compulsory licensing arrangement. The Paris Convention indicates a 3-year period after the patent
grant before a member country may invoke a compulsory license.
Certain bilateral agreements between the United States and Germany,
Greece, or Switzerland permit a waiver of the working requirement,
if a corresponding U.S. patent is possessed.
The Paris Convention and the Inter-American Convention confer a 12-month "right of priority" period on patent applications.
This means that an applicant has 12 months after filing his first
patent application in a Convention country to file a corresponding
application in any other member country and maintain the priority
benefit from the first filing date. Thus, the inventor is protected
in these countries from unauthorized filing of the same application
during that 12 months, within which publicity will not defeat his
application. Some countries such as Korea and the Philippines, although not members of the Convention, have reciprocal agreements
with U.S. patent owners for similar priority protection.
The patent term (life of the patent) may range from 5 to 20
years in different countries. Some countries offer an option to the
patentee of 5, 10, 15, or 20 years. Latin American countries notably
offer what is called "confirmation," "revalidation," and "importation" patents, conferring upon the foreign patentee a term coextensive with his original grant, said grant forming the basis of issue.
Soviet Bloc countries in Eastern Europe issue an inventor's
certificate. This certificate vests ownership and exclusive use in the
state for which the assignor receives a stipend commensurate with
its value to the state.
The U.S. Department of Commerce can render assistance to
potential patentees for application abroad, but in all instances it
is advisable to seek competent patent counsel to avoid the many
vagaries and uncertainties attendant upon the foreign patent laws.
This article is concerned with some of the problems encountered
by private business enterprises in their attempts to acquire a patent
abroad, in the effectuation and enforcement of the patent monopoly
once acquired, and the types of problems present when infringement
actions are provoked.
I. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PATENT SYSTEMS

A. The United States' Patent System
The U.S. patent system is quite complex. Only selected sections
are presented here to enlighten those unfamiliar with patent law.
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Patent laws are sanctioned through the power of the U.S. Constitution,4 and specific statutes.5 Inventions patentable are covered by
a pertinent section stating:
Whosoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.6
Conditions governing patentability are numerous. The potential
patentee must establish novelty or his right to a patent is precluded.
The patentee has failed to establish novelty if any of the following
are present:
(1) the invention was known or used by others in the United
States or patented or described in a printed publication in
the United States or a foreign country prior to the invention
of the applicant;
(2) the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in the United States or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country more than one year
prior to date of application in the United States;
(3) the invention was abandoned;
(4) the invention was first patented by the applicant, his legal
representatives, or assignees in a foreign country, with
application filed more than 12 months before the application date in the United States;
(5) the invention was described in a patent already granted;
(6) the applicant did not himself invent the subject matter
disclosed; or
(7) before applicant's invention thereof the invention was
made in this country by another and was not abandoned,
suppressed, or cancelled; in instances where priority of
invention is uncertain, the examiner will consider not
only respective dates of conception and reduction to practice, but also reasonable diligence related to time of conception and last applicant to reduce to practice.7
A patent will be granted only if the subject matter is non-obvious. 8 If the applicant examined the prior art, and it would have
been obvious to one with only ordinary skill in the art, that the
4

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8:
'The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries."
5
Patent Act of July 19, 1952, 35 U.S.C. (1964) [hereinafter cited as 35 U.S.C.]
6 35 U.S.C. § 101.
735 U.S.C. § 102.
8 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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subject matter as a whole would effect invention, then a patent
would be denied. The obviousness must be at the time of invention
and not thereafter. It is immaterial how the invention was made; a
process developed in a series of independent steps (batch process)
is just as valid as a continuous process, an integration of steps. If it
is obvious to the inventor that a combination of A and B will yield
C, and D is actually produced, then the invention might be allowed
for product D but probably not for product C.
An applicant domiciled in the United States, but serving abroad
on behalf of that country will be accorded treatment identical to
that shown any other citizen who conceives of an invention.9
Strict statutory conformity is required in patent application.'"
Generally, all applicants must apply in writing to the Commissioner
of Patents, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. Each
application for a patent must contain a specification," a drawing
where required," and an oath by the applicant.'" The applicant
must sign the application and remit the fee as required by law. Each
original application, except design cases, must be accompanied by
a basic fee of $65, with additional amounts in some instances de4
pendent upon the form of the claims.'
The specification is a written description of the invention. It
describes the manner and process of making or using the patent in
full, clear and concise terms, so as to enable any person skilled in
the art to make use of the same in the best mode contemplated by
the inventor. The specification contains one or more of the claims
with specific reference to exactly what is claimed. Claims may be
set forth in dependent or independent form, but, if in dependent
form, all those limitations of the daim are read by incorporation
by reference into the dependent claim. An element of a claim may
be combined with another to express a step or means to carry out
a specific function without reciting the structure, material, or acts
in support thereof. But the claim is tantamount to the structure,
material or acts as described in the specification or their equivalents.
Hence, one cannot mention something in a claim that is omitted
from the specification.
The Commissioner may construe the subject matter of an application to form the basis of two or more independent and distinct
inventions. In such instances, only one patent may be allowed. But
any subsequent filing of similar subject matter, referred to as a
9 35 U.S.C. § 104.
10The statutory requirements are set forth at 35 U.S.C. § 111.
"iThe statutory requirements for a specification are set forth at 35 U.S.C. § 112.
12 35 U.S.C. § 113.
"3The statutory requirements for the oath are set forth at 35 U.S.C. § 115.
14 35 U.S.C. § 41.
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divisional application, is filed as if it had the date of the original
application in the establishment of priority. If the divisional application pertains directly to the subject matter of the original application, the Commissioner may disallow the second filing. The
limitation of the subject matter to one invention, however, in no way
invalidates the patent.' 5
An interference in patent action may arise, if in the opinion of
the Commissioner, an application contains substantially the same
subject matter of a pending application or of an unexpired patent.'"
Questions of priority of invention are the dominant concern in interferences. Priority issues are determined by a Board of Patent
Interferences comprised of three examiners. A decision of the Board
adverse to one applicant constitutes a rejection of his claims and an
allowance of claims to the successful applicant. In general, the
Patent Office will disallow any claim bearing substantially on the
same subject matter of an issued patent unless the claim is made one
year prior to the issuance of the patent. Parties to an interference
may file an agreemeot or understanding between themselves prior
to the termination of an interference proceeding. These agreements
may be kept in a separate file, but available to government agencies,
upon request of a party. Filing an agreement after termination of the
interference will not abrogate a decision contrary to the agreement
unless a showing of good cause is filed within six months subsequent
to the termination. Any discretionary action by the Commissioner
is reviewable with regard to interference proceedings.
Upon resolving all issues in favor of the applicant, a patent
is issued to the patentee, his heirs, or assigns for a term of 17 years.' 7
After payment of the necessary fees and issuance of title, the holder
has the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the
invention throughout the United States. The patent becomes dedicated to the public after the term expires. The government-grantor
apparently employs the philosophy that the patentee is entitled
to a monopoly for this period in return for fully disclosing his discovery for the benefit of mankind.
Situations may arise whereby a patent is defective. The defect
can be cured by a patent reissue, providing the error was not deceptive.' Patents are deemed defective, and subject to reissue when
the patent is wholly or partly inoperative or invalid by reason of a
defective drawing or specification, or by reason of the patentee
claiming more or less than that to which he was entitled. Upon
'5 35 U.S.C. §
18 35 U.S.C. §
17 35 U.S.C. §
18 35 U.S.C. §

121.

135.
154.
251.
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reissue of a defective patent, all claims of the new and amended
application are valid for the unexpired term of the original patent.
No new matter is allowed to be introduced into the application
for reissue. The reissued patent will not be granted for enlargement
of the scope of the claims of the original patent unless applied for
within two years from the date of grant of the original patent.
The holder of the title to Letters Patent of the United States
owns personal property. Patents are freely assignable in law by an
instrument in writing. The assignment pertains to the patent application or any interest in the patent. The patentee, his assigns, or his
legal representatives may grant and convey an exclusive right under
the patent for the whole or a specific part of the United States. Any
assignment is void as to any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee
for valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the
Patent Office within three months from its date or prior to the date
of such subsequent purchase or mortgage. 19 Patents may be held in
joint ownership and in the absence of any agreement to the contrary,
each of the joint owners of the patent may make, use, or sell the
patent without consent of the other owners and without an accounting thereto.2 °
Patent infringement is appropriately contemplated and protected by rather extensive statutory coverage. 2 ' A patent infringer
is anyone who makes, uses or sells any patent invention, without
authority, in the United States, during the term of the patent. The
infringer need not specifically act himself; infringement can easily
be found by the inducement of another to do the act. Such inducement is known as contributory infringement.2 2 A contributory infringer is anyone who sells a component of a patented machine,
manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus
for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part
of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not
a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use.2 3 The act must constitute a direct or contributory
infringement of a valid patent.24 It has been held that unless there
is a direct infringement, there is nothing to contribute to, and con19 35 U.S.C. § 261.
- 35 U.S.C. § 262.
21 35 U.S.C. § 271.

- 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
23 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
24 Irvin v. Buick Motor Co., 88 F. 2d 947 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 702

'(1937). The unauthorized use of an invalid patent is not an infringement. Hyster Co.
v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 263 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1959) ; The Diversey Corp. v. Charles

Pfizer & Co., 255 F.2d 60 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Simmons Co. v. A. Brandwein & Co., 250
F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1957); Cummings v. Moore, 202 F.2d 145 (10th

Cir. 1953).
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sequently, no contributory infringement. 25 The legal owner of a
patent will not be denied relief for infringement or contributory
infringement to his patent nor will he be deemed guilty of misuse
or illegal extension of the patent right by virtue of his having done
one or more of the following:
(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent;
(2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if
performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent;
(3) sought to enforce his patent 2 rights
against infringement
6
or contributory infringement.
Case law is replete with infringement suits and has been epitomized in a number of rather famous cases. 2 7 There is no such thing
as an infringement or contributory infringement made in good faith
or where the infringer was unaware of the infringement. About the
only defenses allowable for contributory infringement are those
where the parts furnished by an infringer for use in a patent can be
adapted to other lawful uses in addition to the infringing uses, or
where the parts furnished are perishable, or used for legitimate purposes of repair, or where the patent is being used to protect an unpatented part or material from competition.28
An infringement of a patent may result upon substitution of
similar compounds, steps, or ingredients in a patent, sufficient to
invoke the doctrine of equivalents.29 The essence of this doctrine
is that one may not perpetrate a fraud on a patent. A patentee may
invoke the doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device, if
said device performs substantially the same function in substantially
the same way to obtain the same result. If two devices do the same
thing in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially
the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name,
shape, or form.
A defense to an infringement suit is the so-called "file wrapper
estoppel." 8' This is a type of estoppel which purports to hold the
Frommberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1963); Angel Research, Inc.
v. Photo-Engravers Research, 223 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. I11.
1962); Trico Products
Corp. v. Delman Co., 199 F. Supp. 231 (S.D. Iowa 1961); Chicopee Mfg. Corp. v.
Columbus Fiber Mills Co., 165 F. Supp. 307 (M.D. Ga. 1958).
26 35 U.S.C. § 271(d).
25

2

v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100 (1923); Peters & Russell, Inc. v.
Dorfman, 188 F.2d 711 '(7th Cir. 1951); Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil
& Refining Co., 137 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1943), a/I'd, 322 U.S. 471 (1944) ; Laskowitz
v. Marie Designer, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 541 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Kraft Foods Co. v.
Walther Dairy Products, 118 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Wis. 1954).
28 Freedman v. Friedman, 242 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1957).
29 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
3
t Lewis v. Avco Mfg. Corp., 228 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Keith v. Charles E. Hires
Co., 116 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1940).
7Heyer

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 45

patentee to all statements, amendments and rejections in the history
of the case file. For example, a patentee cannot draft an amendment narrowing a claim to obtain allowance and later broaden the
construction of his narrowed claim to invoke an infringement action."'
There is a well known and consistently observed rule of patent construction, stating that a claim in a patent as allowed must be read
and interpreted with reference to claims that have been cancelled or
rejected, and the claims allowed cannot by construction be read to
cover what was eliminated from the patent.8 2 Once the patentee has
agreed to cancellation or narrowing of a claim he cannot resort to
the doctrine of equivalents to recoup the loss and invoke infringement. The Supreme Court, in considering the issue of whether the
doctrine of file wrapper estoppel supersedes the doctrine of equivalents in Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., stated:
Whatever may be the appropriate scope and application of the doctrine of equivalents, where a claim is allowed without a restrictive
amendment, it has long been settled that recourse may not be had to
that doctrine to83recapture claims which the patentee has surrendered
by amendment.
In order to succeed in an infringement action, the patentee must
overcome a number of other defenses available to an alleged infringer. 4 In one noteworthy case,"3 the defendant claimed the defense of double patenting, in addition to anticipation, indefiniteness
in claims, non-invention, and non-infringement. Double patenting
arises when the patentee receives two patents for claims that substantially state the same thing in an invention. It is well settled that
a patentee may receive two patents for a single disclosure - one for
the method and the other for the apparatus, the former often referred to as merely functionality of a machine. 6 Double patenting
only occurs when claims of two patents issued to one applicant are
identical.3 7 The patentee may then seek a remedy when either of
his patents are infringed in double patenting. The defense of different mode of operation is often employed to avoid infringement. 8
3' Falkenberg v. Golding, 195 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1952).
32

Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211 (1940), amended in 312
U.S. 654 (1941).

315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942).
34 See, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stuart Laboratories, Inc., 194 F.2d 823
(3d Cir. 1952) (failure to make full disclosure) ; Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v.
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1944), cerl. denied,
325 U.S. 876, rehearingdenied, 326 U.S. 804 (1945) (improper use); John Waldron
Corp. v. Equitable Paper Bag Co., 106 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1939) (different mode of
operation) ; General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Fisk Rubber Corp., 104 F.2d 740 (6th
Cir. 1939) (double patenting); Waterbury Buckle Co. v. G.E. Prentice Mfg. Co.,
294 F. 930 (D. Conn. 1923).
35 General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Fisk Rubber Corp., 104 F.2d 740 '(6th Cir. 1939).
The court disallowed all of these defenses.
36 Hartford-Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 71 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1934).
33

37

Scharf v. Weinfeld & Kahn, 31 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).

38 See cases cited note 34 supra.
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Thus, if an applicant achieves the same result as found in an issued
patent through a different scheme of operation, then non-infringement might be determined. Mr. Justice Day has stated:
If the device of the respondents shows a substantially different
mode of operation, even though the result of the operation of the
machine remains the same, infringement is avoided.39
The defendant may overcome an infringement suit by the "omission of an element" defense. If two devices perform the same function, but the alleged patent causing infringement contains an element lacking in the prior patent, then there is no infringement. When
the accused structure omits an essential element of a patent, without
the substitution of an equivalent, operating substantially in the same
40
way to achieve practically the same result, there is no infringement.
The patentee must always make a full disclosure, 41 or the infringer
may plead that the patentee filed a description and specification
42
which contained less than the whole truth relative to the invention.
The patentee need only disclose those details to effect invention
known to him at the time of application for the patent. The law is
quite clear that an addition to a patented process does not avert
infringement, even where the addition amounts to an improvement:
A limited use of terms of effect or result, which accurately
define the essential qualities of a product to one skilled in the art,
may in some instances be permissable and even desirable, but a
characteristic essential to novelty may not be distinguished from the
old art solely 43by its tendency to remedy the problems in the art met
by the patent.
Infringement will be found, if the patent is used without authorization, even when the infringer improves the art over and above
that disclosed by the patentee. The defense of improper use or antici44
pation is often cited as a desirable means to obviate an infringement.
In effect, if A is practicing a process prior in time to issuance of a
patent to B for that process, then A is not an infringer even though
A is not aware of the technicalities of that process. There is a well
established principle in patent law that if a process is disclosed in a
prior art, a patent whose validity is attacked is anticipated even
though the prior patent failed to state and the inventor did not know
that his invention brought the process into operation. The principle
is clearly enunciated in the Vitamin Technologists, Inc. case:
We refuse to entertain the absurd proposition that because the
farmer and copra grower did not know the photo chemical process
involved in their immemorial practice, they may be enjoined as

infringers.
39 Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. American Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399, 414 (1905).
40 Kay Patents Corp. v. Martin Supply Co., 202 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1953).
41 See cases cited note 34 supra.
42 35 U.S.C. § 282.
43
General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371-72 (1938).
44
See cases cited note 34 supra.
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Assuming that Dr. Steenbock discovered, as he claims, that the
sun's rays coming from millions of miles away could irradiate foods
with vitamin D and that this was the reason, unknown to them,
why farmers and coconut growers regarded their sun-cured hays
and sun-dried copra were good foods, 45such a discovery does not

entitle him to a patent on their processes.
The patentee has his remedy by civil action whenever his valid
patent is infringed.46 Every patent issued by the United States is
presumed to be valid until proven invalid. Each claim in the patent,
whether in independent form or dependent form, shall be presumed
valid independently of the validity of other claims; dependent claims
shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid
claim. The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim
47
thereof rests on the party asserting it.
Injunctive relief is not uncommon in patent litigation as permitted by statute. Several courts possess concurrent jurisdiction to
grant injunctions, in accordance with the principles of equity, to prevent a violation of any patent right.48
The successful litigant patentee may be awarded damages adequate to compensate him for the infringement, but in no event shall
the award be less than the reasonable royalty due the patentee as a
result of the infringer's use, plus interest and court costs. The court
may award treble damages in the event damages are found or not
found by a jury. In the assessment of damages or in the determination of what constitutes a reasonable royalty, the court may receive
expert testimony. 49 In very exceptional cases the court may also
award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. "° The statute of limitations to preclude waiver for infringement suits is six
years from the date of filing of the complaint or counterclaim."
B. Contrast of U.S. Patent Laws to Laws of Other Countries
In some instances the patent laws of other countries are in substantial compliance with U.S. patent laws; in other instances a nuance
is observed or there is a marked dissimilarity. The following is an
extraction of the patent laws of various countries to demonstrate
some differences and similarities.52
In Brazil, a patent is valid for 15 years. Medical and chemical
processes are patentable. Compulsory licensing is possible within
2 years after grant, if adequately worked. Revocation, if not worked,
45 146 F.2d at 948. See cases cited note 34 supra.
46 35 U.S.C. § 281.
47 35 U.S.C. § 282.
48 35 U.S.C. § 283.

o 35 U.S.C. § 284.
50 35 U.S.C. § 285.
51 35 U.S.C. § 286.
52 See Lightman & Lee, supra note 1, at 5, 6, 9.
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is possible within a 3-year period. Importation does not constitute
work.
In France patents are valid for 20 years. No novelty examination is required. Special legislation applies to patenting of pharmaceutical products.
German (Federal Republic) patents are valid for 18 years. A
novelty examination is required and compulsory licensing may be
imposed any time. Patenting in the United States constitutes working in Germany.
A patent in the United Arab Republic is valid for 15 years and
renewable for 5 years. No novelty examination is required. Revocation is possible 2 years after the first compulsory license.
United Kingdom inventions are valid for 16 years and renewable for 5 or 10 years where inadequately remunerated. Substances
of food or medicine which are mixtures of known ingredients are
not patentable. Certain newly-independent members of the British
Commonwealth are in the process of developing and promulgating
their own national patent codes. In the meantime, they continue to
use pre-independence procedures and facilities in providing patent
protection within their respective territories. These countries include
Cyprus, Ghana, Kenya, Malaysia, Singapore, Sarawak, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone and Uganda. Hong Kong conforms to these regulations, but
has instituted their own peculiar exceptions. Generally speaking, in
these countries the only patent protection available is by means of
the registration of a United Kingdom patent which must take place
within 3 years of the original British grant.
In Venezuela, invention and improvement patents are valid up
to 10 years after the grant; revalidation patents (based on prior
foreign filing) are coterminous with the basic patent for 10 years,
while introduction patents are granted for 5 years, but do not protect imports. Chemical products are not patentable. Exploitation in
Venezuela in lieu of manufacture constitutes working for invention,
improvement and revalidation patents. Patent registration must be
marked on the product. Though not a member of the Paris Union,
Venezuela grants a 1-year priority right on foreign patents.
In India, patent validity extends to 16 years. Prior public knowledge or use in India is prejudicial. Food, medical or chemical products are subject to compulsory licensing at any time regardless of
working. Reciprocal priority rights are granted on basis of applications filed in certain Commonwealth countries, but India is not a
member of the Paris Union.
The extreme variations in the patent laws of many countries
require careful consideration of the inventor or assignee to comply
carefully with the laws in order to avoid litigation. In essence, this
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demands the acquisition of native counsel, familiar with the patent
laws in his country.
II. SELECTION OF PATENT USE

The predicates upon which patent monopolies are granted to
natives, in contrast to foreigners, are different. When a patent is
granted to a national, the economic assumption derives from the
premise that the monopoly is essential to the stimulation of invention and investment. The stimulation afforded by the grant should
contribute more to the well-being of the nation than the inherent
cost of the monopoly to the grantor. Thus, different products, even
competing with each other for the same end use, may tend to encourage competition through the creation of new competitive products. Different motivations are involved in grants to foreigners. A
patent grant from a sovereign to a foreigner must be weighed against
the factors that might militate against or encourage sociological,
political, and economic implications. Specifically, should the granting country allow a patent to a foreigner which stimulates its own
industrial growth even though the grantor and grantee may be from
not-so-friendly nations? Factors related to these considerations no
doubt influence the decision of the grantor. These considerations,
coupled with treaties or conventions that might be enforced, are
conducive to and exemplify the rationale inducing a country to establish different standards for foreigners and nationals applying for
patent protection.
Upon issue of a foreign patent, the patentee may exercise his
vested right by various alternatives. It may be satisfactory to manufacture the protected product in his own country, where sufficient
facilities and labor force are established, and to export the product
to the foreign market where patent protection was acquired. Licensing of the patent right, either exclusively or nonexclusively, is another
well-known means of exploitation. Cross-licensing is another alternative, though its effect may be an antitrust interdiction, producing
leverage in a foreign market whereby each patentee gains access to
the patent rights of each other in his home territory.
A. Exporting Patentee'sProducts
Peculiar patent laws of a country may preclude importation as
a working and the patent may become revoked. It seems apparent
that public policy is an issue which some laws contemplate. Though
products imported may provide commodities essential to the stability
of underdeveloped or undersupplied countries, patent laws may
tacitly have been effectuated to develop the technological know-how
of an underdeveloped country. Therefore, the patent must actually
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be worked by physical means in a country to stimulate growth, importation not constituting a working. The patent laws then, may
inhere more to development of the national than the foreigner. If the
granting country is not underdeveloped, its laws may proscribe imports so as not to dilute the markets of similar products produced
by its own citizens.
One reason for disinterest in exportation by Americans is the
Webb-Pomerene Act,58 once a protection against the antitrust laws,
now of questionable application.54 In 1949, United States v. United
States Alkali Export Association clearly established that international
cartels fall within the law." It is also possible that conspiracy-type
5
behavior by certain export trade associations could easily be reached. 1
American companies have considered a joint venture with a foreign
company as one possible way to obviate the exportation difficulties.
In effect, a joint venture serves the purpose of giving a foreigner
the status of a quasi-national in the country of interest. Though
these types of business nuptials may seem desirable, there are some
exceedingly complex problems present.
B. Licensing Arrangements
The obvious use of a license to the patentee is the situation
wherein the granting country prohibits importation of products or
imposes quantitative restrictions. However, licensing to a foreigner
is fraught with many potential hazards. The most important consideration is the reliability and trustworthiness of the potential licensee. The licensee must have the financial capability to meet the
patentee's royalty requirements. It must be understood that the licensee will not violate any contractual provisions of the license, will
limit the use only to the manufacture and sale in a definite area, and
will avoid any possible industrial piracy with respect to property.
Thus, the licensee should be prohibited from usurping the patentee's
good will and know-how, and prevented from sublicensing to others.
An excellent summary has been given for the criteria requisite to
consideration of a license grant:
In summary, a successful industrial property licensing program
calls for a careful business survey of the market in which the
licensees will operate and the abilities and prospects of the licensees, a royalty compensation formula based on equity and on the real-

ities of the situation, the taking of maximum precautions for the protection of the licensed industrial property, a careful statement of
the nature, scope and duration of the license and of the specific
Export Trade Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1964).
Timberg, Foreign Licensing Programs: Their Planning and Formulation, 35 U.M.K.
C.L. REv. 2 (1967).
55 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
5
6United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
57 See Mr. Ross' treatment of this subject elsewhere in this symposium.
5
54
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obligations of the licensee and licensor (both as respects the performance and the breach, voluntary or involuntary, of the license
agreement), informed and relevant insights into the operation of
the national legal system involved in the agreement, and clear but
not necessarily over-detailed draftsmanship.5 8
The advantage or disadvantage of a license grant must, by
necessity, be predicated upon many factors: the cost advantage, the
quantitative restrictions upon imports which may be imposed by
tariff laws, the provision in some patent laws that an import is a

nonworking, and the worthiness of the licensee.
C. Cross-LicensingAgreements
The express purpose of cross-licensing is that monopoly rights

are reshuffled to preclude the rights of one competitor in another's
area, notwithstanding the monopoly. Another motivation for this
type of licensing is that certain industries may have a monopoly on
only a phase of the process or a lack of product patents. The arrangement permits cross-fertilization among the various patentees and is

construed as "healthy" in the fostering of competition.
On the other hand the effects have not always been considered
to be so benign and constructive. Such agreements have been thought
to divide world markets in conflict with the antitrust laws. These
undesirable results have been found in a number of product industries, such as acetic acid, activated carbon, alkalis, detergents, aluminum, sulfur, resins, optical goods, radio equipment, rubber and the
like. Most cases involve some division of markets within Western
Europe: a separation of the German from the French market, the
Italian from the German market, or some other compartmentalization. Typically, the British market has been separated from the
Continent, and North America from the markets of the Eastern
Hemisphere. 9 This separation, in effect, places an undue burden
on the underdeveloped countries because they are subjected to the
bargaining power of the limited producers with monopolies.
It is clear that cross-licensing will not be permitted at the expense of division of world-trade. In the Imperial Chemical Industries
case, the court said:
These agreements, irrespective of their per se legality, were instruments designed and intended to accomplish the worldwide allocation of markets; their object was to achieve an unlawful purpose
an illegal restraint of trade prohibited by Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The agreements are unlawful because they provided
a means for the accomplishment of this purpose and objective.
We have also found that these agreements did, in operation, result
in restraints of United States trade. 60
58
59

See Timberg, supra note 54, at 15.

E. GOLDSTEIN, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 679 (1959).
6OUnited States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
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Similarly, territorial allocation and trade suppression was interdicted in the National Lead case" 1 and the Carboloy case. 2 For a
more elaborate discussion of these proscribed acts, the reader is referred elsewhere. 63
The opportunities to use a foreign granted patent are not without difficulties. Import-export trade laws may severely limit the
use to a per se export attempt and certain types of cross-licensing
may place the wrongdoer in the hands of the antitrust laws. The
most sacrosanct use, if one as such exists, would be the development
of the process or product locally or the use of a simple license.

III.

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

The international patent system is basically composed of about
five different elements: (1) the International Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention of 1883), (2)
the Inter-American Convention of 1910, (3) national patent laws
of the sovereign states, (4) international treaties involving patents
as subject matter, and (5) those practices which use foreign patents
in international trade and investment. Without reservation or qualification, the Paris Convention has had the most pronounced effect
on patents in world trade and international development.
A. The Paris Convention
The convention was held in Paris in March 1883. The articles
were amended and proclaimed14 by the United States and 78 other
countries in 1931. The Convention reassembled in 1934 and 1957
without significant amendment.
The major achievement of the agreement was the recognition
of the principle of reciprocity among the signatories. 5 A number of
61 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
62
United States v. General Electric Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1009 '(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
63Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ; see REPORT OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

NATIONAL

COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST

31, 1955).
Stat. 1789 (1931-1933), T.S. No. 834 (proclaimed Mar. 6, 1931).

LAWs'(Mar.
647

Id.:

Article 1. The contracting countries constitute themselves into a union for
the protection of industrial property....
Industrial property . . . in the broadest meaning . . . is to be applied
not only to industry and commerce . . . but likewise to agricultural industries . . . and extractive industries (minerals, mineral waters, etc.).
The term "patents" includes the various types of industrial patents
granted by the laws of the contracting countries such as patents of importation, improvement patents, patents and certificates of addition, etc.
Article 2. Nationals of each of the contracting countries shall, in all other
countries of the Union, as regards the protection of industrial property,
enjoy the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter
grant, to their own nationals, without any prejudice of the rights specially
provided by the present convention. Consequently they shall have the same
protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringement
of their rights, provided they observe the conditions and formalities imposed
on subjects or citizens.
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other points are worthy of mention.6 Any signatory who has filed
an application in any signatory country and who is entitled to the
Convention's protection has a period of 1 year in which to apply for
patent protection in any other convention jurisdiction. In the absence
of such a priority provision, the inventor of a process or product in
country A, having duly made a patent application in his own country,
might well find that country B is unwilling to consider him entitled
to claim a patent in that country. Country B might insist, for instance, that the first introducer of the invention into its territory
was the eligible patentee, or it might insist that no patent was issuable
at all if the invention was already being publicly practiced in countryA.
The convention even goes further in protecting the patentee's
priority. Once a patent is granted on the basis of priority provisions,
the subsequent invalidation of the patent by the original granting
nation will not of itself affect the validity of patents granted elsewhere on the same invention. The thrust of such an argument would
have powerful significance if the granting country rejected the patent
on grounds of junior priority or where the subject matter may lack
in inventiveness.
Compulsory licensing has also been regulated by the Convention to the extent that the grantors cannot necessarily reward their
favorite citizens to stimulate domestic development. Most of the
restraint is imposed upon the "working" provisions. This provision
prohibits the cancellation of a patent when the action is based simply
on the fact that the relevant product had been imported into the
jurisdiction. The convention prevents its signatories from taking
any steps to compel "working" in the first 3 years after the issue.
Also, the convention binds its signatories to resort initially to compulsory licensing at reasonable royalties as a remedy under the "working" provisions or for any other patent abuse under the national's
laws, rather than to cancellation of the grant.
The convention confers on the patentee the right to use the
foreign patent in international trade and investment. A foreign
patentee thus acquires a monopoly in an area far beyond the locus
of his operation. The effect of the foreign patent is that the patentee
who grants a license for a use is less likely to create direct and immediate competition for his own production than would be the case for
patent licenses in his local territory.
The Paris Convention, though 84 years old, has achieved a high
degree of satisfaction and workability in world trade, and no doubt
66

SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM

AND FOREIGN POLICY 1-4, 6-12 (Comm. Print 1957).
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has contributed significantly to the aid of underdeveloped countries.
The Inter-American Convention of 1910 has encouraged the
development of international relations between many of the nonsignitories in Latin America and the United States along similar guide
lines as the Paris Convention.
B. The Common Market Patent
Even with benefits of the Paris Convention, the patentee must
be confronted with a new application in every country. The design
of the common market patent has some desirable characteristics because, if successful, the patentee receives six patents for one, theretofore unachievable.
The "Kennedy round" has been regarded by many as a crucial
corollary to the Common Market. Formally known as the European
Economic Community or EEC, the Common Market was established
by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, with France, West Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg as members. The United
States speculated that the EEC could become a great vehicle for
liberalizing world trade, or it could become an engine of protectionism. To cope with the protectionism doctrine, President Kennedy gave first legislative priority to what became the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. This was a bold, new approach, designed to pierce
the Common Market tariff barrier which the EEC nations planned
in order to compel concessions by the United States and others. This
approach which became known as the Kennedy round, was that, as
a customs union, the six countries would progressively lower the
tariffs against each other to zero. This would expand trade by promoting greater efficiency, competition and economic rationalization.
Expanded trade and more efficient industry would mean increased
income. Increased income would produce a larger and more diversified market for American exports. This was the risk the Kennedy
round was willing to take to compete with the veil around the six.67
Whether or not this will ever come into fruition is not readily predictable. The Common Market patent may remain the mere suggestion it is at present.
The Common Market patent should inure to the benefit of
underdeveloped countries. At the present time, Africa and Latin
America have a limited supply of educated manpower. Thus, educated people must be employed as teachers, engineers, physicians,
and the like. Countries in these areas cannot devote the numbers
required to competently man a patent office. Hence, a Common
Market of Africa, for example, is a sensible solution, developing
6 Porter, U.S. to Learn EEC Effect Soon, The Denver Post, May 8, 1967, at 30, col. 4.
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the countries by technology and helping that development through
patent interchange.
Some of the problems the potential patentee now faces would
be avoided by the Common Market patent. This elimination would
not necessarily make the patentee immutable to patent laws, but
would tend to reduce infringement suits. Only those points significant to this discussion will be pointed out with respect to the requirements for a Common Market patent: 8
(1) A novelty search, preferably made by the International Patent Institute at the Hague, will precede any grant (art. 78).
(2) The grant will be accomplished in two stages:
(a) a provisional grant after a successful novelty search;
(b) then the definite patent upon application to European
Patent Office.
(3) If a definite patent is not applied for after the provisional
grant, patents will lapse in 5 years.
(4) The subject matter must be sufficient to obtain a grant;
trivial new matter will not be patentable.
(5) Invalidity of a patent cannot be pleaded in an infringement
suit, but must be brought before a Special Department of
the Common Patent Office with appeals to an International
Court; this provision will aid in comity considerations and
res judicata for judgments.
(6) Infringement suits will be tried in national courts, wherein
lie difficulties:
(a) all litigants will use substantive common law;
(b) nationals may use their own procedural rules as to
Statute of Frauds, statute of limitations and damages.
(7) The common patent constitutes an indivisible property right
and cannot be assigned by one country only.
(8) Adequate provisions are made for all types of licensing.
The major problem with the common patent is in determining
rights of nonmembers of the EEC. Important questions to be answered are (1) will the non-EEC patentee have access to a common
patent; (2) what conflicts are precipitated if rights are denied nonmembers of the EEC; and (3) what rights are in conflict if EEC
members also are signatories to the Paris Convention? It seems certain that the EEC will regulate the rights of nonmembers.6 9 However, this right to regulate must not be in conflict with the Paris
Convention. It would seem a matter of propriety that even if the
6 See G. OUDEMANS, THE DRAFT EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION (1963).
69

Weiser, The European Common Market Patent Convention: The Right to Apply for
a Common Market Patent, 6 IDEA 317 (1962).
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patentee cannot obtain a Common Market patent, he could still
achieve this end by separate application under the articles of the
Paris Convention. The most significant advantage of a common
patent is that the laws will have some uniformity and the patentee
will have an easier time to determine his rights. Thus, the term of
the patent and its scope (subject matter) will be uniform throughout the countries involved.
C. Treatiesin General
The United States and her citizens do a significant amount of
business with countries which are not signatories to any multilateral
treaty. Bilateral agreements achieve a similar result, but may not
possess the force and effect of multilateral agreements. In essence,
many of these bilateral treaties are set up for political reasons, but
sociological and economic benefits are often included to establish
good will and promote better trade relations. One of the incidents
of these treaties is often the grant of foreign patents to U.S. patentees.
D. InternationalPatent System - A Possibility?
To date there is no unified approach to an international patent
system. The source of all international relationships is the Paris
Union of 1883. A similar arrangement exists with certain Latin
American countries. However, with those countries that are nonmembers of any international agreements, a working agreement
often exists in terms of the "reciprocity principle" through various
types of treaties. For the specific types of treaties and their effects
on international transactions, various sources of reference should be
consulted.70 Attempts to give one a patent valid in at least six
countries have, at least in fact, been seriously contemplated by the
common market countries. 71 Though no one situation covers all the
prescriptions and proscriptions of international patent law, industrial property is at least qualifiedly protected, but by laws displaying
many variations on the theme. Thus, the specific arrangement that
a national of one country has with another should be the primary
source of consultation in connection with the initiation of a patent
application.
0

7 R.

WILSON,
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(1960) ; Bayitch, Conflict Law in United States Treaties, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 501 (1954).
With respect to the effects of treaties on private international law, see Nadelmann,
Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and InternationalEfforts to Unify
Rules of Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 323 (1954). The significance of various
multilateral treaties and the Hague Conference on International Private Law is discussed in 1 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws: A COMPARATIvE STUDY (2d ed.

Drobnig 1958). See also 5 AM. J. CoMp. L. 650 (1956), and Nadelmann, The
Hague Conference on Private International Law- Ninth Session, 9 AM. J. COMP.
L. 583 (1960).
71 G. OUDEMANS, supra note 68.
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In mid-October 1967 delegates from 22 major countries - including the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany,
Japan and the Soviet Union (which countries account for 80% of
the world's patent applications) -met at Geneva, Switzerland, and
reached preliminary agreement on some long overdue patent reforms." The first draft of an international treaty was accomplished
by a committee of patent experts of the Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT) from a working group of the United International Bureau
for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI) .73
At the present time there are basically three patent systems: the
French, the German or American, and the Dutch. Each system provides its peculiar advantages and disadvantages. The French system,
without a novelty or priority examination, leads to rapid granting of
a patent but affords no security to the patentee. The American system
gives security but requires long delays. The Dutch system is a socalled deferred examination system and has been used since January
1, 1964. West Germany deems the deferred examination system
desirable and hopefully will adopt it.74 This system would no doubt
improve the long delays required in examination now experienced
(e.g., 21/2 years for a patent to issue in the United States, 5 years in
Germany, and 7 years in Japan). The deferred examination system
works as follows: an application is filed for a novelty search or an
examination; the requests could be filed at the same time as the
application but no later than 7 years from the date of the original
application; the application would be disclosed 18 months after the
date of priority (date of application), regardless of the state of the
procedure.
The Geneva meeting was in essence a revival of the Paris Convention, but a much more pragmatic goal was sought. If the proposal
becomes reality, an applicant would file, through his national office,
an international application with BIRPI. A worldwide search would
be initiated, either by a national patent office or an international
patent institute. If the search is favorable, the applicant could request
a full examination and an international certificate of patentability.
The most significant changes recommended in the PCT at the
convention were as follows:75
(1) Further simplify the use of the system and reduce its cost.
(2) Concentrate international transactions as much as possible
in individual countries. For example, a U.S. applicant would
work primarily through the U.S. Patent Office.
72

TIME, Oct. 20, 1967, at 92.
CHEMICAL & ENG. NEWS, June 12, 1967, at 37.
74Id., June 19, 1967, at 15.
15 1d., Oct. 16, 1967, at 15.
7
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(3) Give maximum freedom to each country to retain its present concepts and laws. In its current form the treaty would
require the United States to switch from the "first-toinvent" to the controversial "first-to-file" system, which
was eliminated at the convention.
(4) The treaty also calls for publishing applications within
18 months from the date of filing, which left a sour taste
in the mouths of U.S. industry.
Thus, a single multilingual international patent application may
yet become a reality. The treaty must yet be drafted in final form and
approved by the Geneva delegates, then submitted to all 79 Paris
pact signatories for ratification. With only conservative success, the
plan may be in force by 1970.
IV.

PROSECUTION OF A VIOLATED PATENT RIGHT

A. Partiesto a Suit
If a licensee defaults or a patent becomes infringed, the problems usually created fall into one of two classes: actions either between nationals and foreigners, or between foreigners from the same
country doing business in another country. The types of situations
arising in any patent proceeding must, by their nature, demand consideration of the effects of extraterritoriality, act of state, effect of
the judgment, res judicata, and antitrust laws.
1. Foreigner v. National
Consider the problem created when a foreign patentee has
licensed his patent to 50 different nationals in different areas of the
same country. A situation could arise wherein each of the nationals
sublicenses, without authority, to another national, in breach of the
license contract. If a large segment of the nation's economy has been
dependent on this operation, a major problem may arise if the patentee revokes all licenses. One possibility is that the national may be
shielded from a suit because the Act of State Doctrine might be
invoked. The Act of State Doctrine is an actual taking of the property, to justify the ends of the State with little, if any, rational reason
given for the act. A nation employing this doctrine could justify the
taking of the property on grounds that poverty might result if the
license of the industry responsible for the wrong was revoked. Thus,
the effect of the Sabbatino case7" may be in point for this situation.
7

'Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). In this
case, even though the action could not be justified on grounds of public policy the
the Supreme Court reversed stating "that no compensation was required for expropriation of the sugar," apparently to avoid more severe international political
ramifications.
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Undoubtedly, the foreigner would attempt to thrust the laws of his
country upon the violators as an effect of extraterritoriality. However, the United States has been less prone of late to interject its
laws into a foreign jurisdiction, fearing adverse political effects.7 7
It seems certain, however, that a national will be protected and a
foreigner's property expropriated, if the well-being of a country
might be injured. The foreigner, even though he has the protection of
multilateral treaties, is always faced with the international implications which might control the outcome.
2. Citizens of the Same Country Doing Business in a Foreign
Country
The patentee in this situation is normally not confronted with
the problems which result from doing business with a national, or
from infringement of a foreign patent by a national. If a United
States corporation infringes a foreign patent in Germany, how can
the infringer be reached? Should the United States have jurisdiction
or should the country which grants the foreign patent obtain jurisdiction? Obviously, the patentee stands in an advantageous position
because the United States can extend its laws beyond the United
States if a U.S. citizen is involved.7" The rationale is that the United
States can and will protect her citizens. Litigation between citizens
of the same country could be brought in the foreign country on
grounds that the proper venue is the locus of the alleged infringement. The apparent drawbacks, of course, would be the proper choice
of laws and judgment enforcement. Hence, the patentee would profit
by bringing the action in his native country for a number of reasons,
including jurisdiction, choice of laws, and enforcement of the judgment.
B. Remedies
Whenever a patentee has been wronged, there are three possible
routes to litigation. The suit might be litigated in the United States,
it could be litigated abroad, or the device of arbitration might be
employed. What are the problems of the foreign forum? The difference of substantive law questions might be reasonably resolved, but
if the law of the forum controls procedural matters, then the patentee
faces serious obstacles. The availability of witnesses, documentary
evidence, and compulsory process must be considered. In some jurisdictions the unsuccessful litigant is required to pay his adversary's
77 For a thorough discussion of patents and interposition of acts of the state, see Spiro,
Foreign Acts of State and the Conflict of Laws, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 145 (1967).
78

Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). Skiriotes was diving for sponges outside
the three mile limit and the Supreme Court allowed the Florida statute to be
extended.
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attorney's fee. Fees are frequently strictly prescribed by a statutory
schedule and contingent fees are practically unknown. The nonresident plaintiff may be required to post a security deposit for court
costs and attorney's fees. 79 Added delay and inconvenience of various
characteristics of the trial are added detriments.80
1. Litigation Abroad
In trying actions abroad it must be remembered that Americans
are accustomed to common law and many of the European countries
use civil law. Most civil law countries have trial to the court and not
by jury, the court often being comprised of lay judges.
Actions are commenced with filing of the complaint. Civil law
procedure provides for the pleading of evidentiary matter, and the
trial may be interrupted by a hearing. This would preclude admission
of all the evidence at one time. This latter effect, however, is similar
to transactions in the U.S. Customs Court.8 ' Service of process is had
after the complaint is filed and is interpreted as a notice rather than
a basis for jurisdiction."' Jurisdiction usually is in personam - in rem
and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction being virtually unheard of. Jurisdiction
is often established, but by no means uniformly, through a choice of
laws based on the nationality of the defendant (his domicile); the
place of the wrong or where committed (impact rule) ; or the place
of execution or performance of contract. The more modern approaches of weighting of contacts (center of gravity) or "most
substantial connection" theories are usually neglected. Service of process upon American citizens is often achieved through the assistance
of U.S. Consulates, based upon the United States' refusal to invoke
sovereign immunity. However, U.S. courts will refuse assistance of
process, if the foreign process conflicts with the domestic procedure.83
The major problem with a foreign judgment is that a patentee
84
may be unable to effect its enforcement in the United States.
American courts employ local rules in their own jurisdiction. While
rules are not uniform, they do reflect consideration of the general
rules that a judgment, to be enforceable, (1) must be final; (2)
must have gone to the merits; and (3) must be based on competent
jurisdiction. The reciprocity rule is the ground in many jurisdictions,
though judgments are often reviewable on the merits as a matter of
79 Hess, Litigation and Arbitration In International Trade, 72 CASE & COM., Tan.-Feb.

1967, at 34.
8 Rivkin, International Litigation and Arbitration, in A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 963 (W. Surrey & C. Shaw, eds. 1963).
81 U.S. CusT. CT. R. 3(r), 28 U.S.C. App. (1949).
82

M. KATZ & K. BREWSTER, JR., INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS,
468-69 (1960).
83 In re Letters Rogatory Out of First Civil Court of City of Mexico, 261 F. 652
(S.D.N.Y. 1919).
84
28 U.S.C. § 1696'(1964).
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course."s American courts will not grant enforcement to judgments
awarded in courts that do not give a similar reciprocal treatment.
Thus, in Hilton v. Guyot the court said:
[T]here is a distinct and independent ground upon which we are
satisfied that the comity [emphasis added] of our nation does not
require us to give conclusive effect to the judgments of the courts
of France; and that ground is, the want of reciprocity, on the
part of France, as the effect to be given to the judgments of this
and other foreign countries. 86
In those countries granting Americans favorable reciprocal privileges,
a foreign judgment will be enforced.8 7
2. Litigation in the United States
An alternative to a patent suit for an infringment abroad is litigation in the United States. However, jurisdiction over the subject
matter and in personam may be unavailable. Any application of local
law, such as discovery or production of documents may be likewise
unavailable.8 8 One possibility might be the use of the long-arm statutes, if the foreigner is also doing business in the United States.
Hence, if the patentee can show that there was at least a minimum
of contacts between the infringer and the court concerned, then jurisdiction might be established in view of the InternationalShoe case.89
Jurisdiction may be established through the use of foreign consulate
service, but the service may not always be made direct in some
instances.9 0
With respect to a conflicts of law question, problems are found
in the proof of foreign law. Although the United States will not
recognize the laws of uncivilized countries, foreign law, if a proper
choice was made, can be proven through various statutory means. 1
Once the U.S. citizen has obtained a judgment in the United
States, can he enforce it abroad? The reciprocity principle no doubt
will apply, but attacks of the judgment may be made on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and res judicata. The successful patentee will be
perplexed. In some countries he will be able to collect his judgment,9 2
85Smith, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in American Courts, 19 MILITARY
L. REv. 1 (1966).
86 159 U.S. 113, 210 (1895).
87

Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S. 235 (1895) (decided the same day as Hilton v. Guyoi
but with a different result).
88 Rivkin, International Litigation and Arbitration, 34 U.M.K.C.L. REy. 60, 67 (1966).
89 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
90 Miller, International Cooperation in Litigation Between United States and Switzerland: Unilateral ProceduralAccomodation in a Test Tube, 49 MINN. L. REV. 1069,
1076 (1965). Switzerland refused to effectuate the service and invoked sovereign
immunity when service upon their citizens did not come through the country.
91 See UNIFORM JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW ACT § 5. See also FED. R. Civ.
P. 44(a).
92
A. NUSSBAUM, AMERICAN-SWISS PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-54 (2d ed. 1958)
(indicating that Switzerland is willing to cooperate fully).
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but it is equally clear that in others the judgment will not be
enforced. 8
The consensus indicates that an infringed patentee or one whose
license agreement has been breached may be in no better position to
litigate in the United States than abroad. Each forum will have its
own difficulties and some of these may be insurmountable.
C. Arbitration - a PossibleSolution
Because of the uncertainty in successful enforcement of a judgment either abroad or in the United States, and because of the most
onerous task of litigating a patent claim, the use of arbitration seems
highly desirable. Many of the problems inherent in the court situation,
e.g., jurisdiction, use of foreign law, conflicts of law choice, enforcement of the judgment, and res judicata, might be obviated by an arbitration clause in the contract. However, if a patent is infringed, this
remedy would not be available, unless tied to some type of a licensing
agreement or an assignment providing for this resource. The application of arbitration could be of paramount importance in patent licensing agreements.
Arbitration is defined as "the submission for determination of
disputed matter to private unofficial persons selected in a manner
provided by law or agreement. ' 9 4 Arbitration agreements impose
several obligations and duties upon the parties. Neither party may
seek aid from a tribunal other than the one agreed upon. No party
may attempt to interfere with the proceeding, set aside the award, or
resist its enforcement. Once the parties select arbitrators and an award
is made, the judgment is final. Res judicata is presumed, and the
judgment must be honored.9" The agreement to arbitrate may be
effectuated by (1) direct specific enforcement (an order to arbitrate); (2) collateral enforcement (appointment of arbitrators by
93The Netherlands will not give effect to a foreign judgment notwithstanding the
propriety of the reciprocity principle.
94 BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 134-35 (4th ed. 1951):
Compulsory arbitration is that which occurs when the consent of one
of the parties is enforced by statutory provisions....
Voluntary arbitration is by mutual and free consent of the parties.
The submission is an agreement by which parties agree to submit their
differences to the decision of a referee or arbitrators. It is sometimes termed
a reference. . . . In a wide sense, "arbitration" may embrace the whole
method of thus settling controversies, and include all the various steps. But
in a more strict use, the term denotes only the submission and hearing, the
decision being separately spoken of, and called an "award." An award is
the judgment or decision of arbitrators or referees on a matter submitted
to them. It is also the writing containing such judgment....
As distinguished from appraisal, an arbitration presupposes a controversy or a difference to be tried and decided. On the other hand, an
appraisal or valuation is generally a mere auxiliary feature, as of a contract
of sale, the purpose of which is not to adjudicatea controversy but to avoid
one. [Emphasis supplied.]
95
See cases collected in E. CHEATHAM, E. GRISWOLD, W. REESE, & M. ROSENBERG,
CONFLICT OF LAws ch. 6 (5th ed. 1964).
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court order) ; and (3) indirect specific enforcement (the staying of
an action brought in violation of an agreement to arbitrate) 96
The use of arbitration in foreign patent licensing agreements has
been suggested 97 to avoid high court costs, conflicts of laws and
enforcement difficulties. But arbitration is not without risk. The
arbitration clause should be adequately drafted to show with exactness and clarity what the parties intended, since these types of proceedings function as plenary actions. Rules employed should be
those that have been well tested. Reputable organizations such as
the American Arbitration Association or International Chamber of
Commerce should be the tribunal if the arbitration is to be in the
United States or elsewhere. Availability of a qualified arbitrator
should be determined prior to the inclusion of an arbitration clause.9 8
It should be made clear whether the clause pertains to antecedent
proceedings or applies only to those in the future.9 9 Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 10 0 the laws of 19 states,10 ' and in many
foreign jurisdictions, 0 2 agreements to arbitrate future disputes are
valid, enforceable and irrevocable. Treaties (bilateral and multilateral) often give effect to arbitration awards.
Experience has shown that arbitration should not be contemplated unless honest disputes actually exist, and the parties intend to
deal with each other amiably subsequent to the award. Once parties
have endured litigation, they may wish to consider some other means
of settlement in the future; comparative costs, speed of the determination, enforceability of the awards, and the nature of the issues
involved are all criteria in this consideration.
Arbitration might be desirable in Communist bloc countries who
not infrequently invoke sovereign immunity to protect their citizens
in international relations. However, more recently this doctrine has
been waived and some resort to arbitration has been employed to
establish an interest in the principles of "fair play" in anticipated
future dealings.' 03
Thus, the settlement of foreign patent claims by arbitration
might turn out to be sui generis when other methods are notoriously
96 Phillips, Arbitration and Conflicts of Laws: A Study of Benevolent Compulsion,
19 CORNELL L.Q. 197, 199 '(1934).
97 Knopp, Licensing and Related PatentProblems Within the EEC, in DOING BUSINESS
IN THE COMMON MARKET, CCH COMM. MKT. REP., SPEC. REP. 114 (1963).
98 L. ECKSTROM, LICENSING IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS 434 (3d ed.
1964).
99See Hess, supra note 79. Some foreign countries and 31 jurisdictions in the United
States preclude future disputes to be settled by arbitration.
1- 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
101 See Rivkin, supra note 80, at 984.
102 See L. ECKSTROM, supra note 98.
103

K.

GRZYBOWSKI, THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH
AND INSTITUTIONS 215-41 (1964).

OF NATIONS,

ORGANIZATIONS,
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fraught with uncertainty as to the outcome and the efficacy of
enforcement.
It is well established that submission of a controversy to arbitration by prior agreement confers jurisdiction on the forum notwithstanding the absence of a defendant. In Gilbert v. Burnstine,10 4 the
defendants agreed to sell and deliver goods to the plaintiff in the
United States. An arbitration clause provided that the parties would
submit any difference to an arbitration forum in London using the
Arbitration Law of England. The defendant left England to avoid
jurisdiction. An arbitration award of £46,000 was made to the plaintiff. The court held that the defendant had consented in advance to
submit to the jurisdiction of English courts and their processes. This
consent was irrevocable without approval of the opposite party.
Neither party could defeat jurisdiction by remaining outside England
and the plaintiff was allowed to show that the terms of the agreement were substantially fulfilled. The defendant was given actual
notice of the proceeding, consistent with the requirement of due
process. This case exemplifies the efficacy of conferring jurisdiction
upon a tribunal in advance of a controversy and obviates any difficulties that normally are encountered when the forum lacks this grace.
Though extraterritoriality is frowned upon in most foreign jurisdictions, it becomes part of the procedure in arbitration.
It is also clear that an arbitration clause merges into the contract
and a defendant cannot attempt to avoid arbitration, even if the
agreement states Russia as the situs. In Amtorg Trading Corp. v.
Camden Fibre Mills, 105 a Pennsylvania corporation agreed to do
business with Amtorg, an agency of the Soviet Government. The
contract provided that any disputes would be tried before the U.S.S.R.
Chamber of Commerce Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission in
Moscow. Camden brought suit in New York against Amtorg, but the
latter moved to stay the suit pending arbitration. The per curiam
opinion held that
Camden chose to do business with Amtorg and to accept, as one of
the conditions imposed, arbitration in Russia; it may not now ask
the courts to relieve it of the contractual obligation it assumed.1 06
Thus, the use of arbitration in international trade seems to be a very
desirable device to avoid many of the uncertainties resulting from
expanded or attenuated differences of opinion. Jurisdiction, choice of
laws and their conflicts are seasonably avoided. Foreign awards under
arbitration will, in most instances, be enforced in contrast to nonarbitral awards. Res judicata is a conclusive presumption in arbitra255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
304 N.Y. 519, 109 N.E.2d 606 (1952).
106 Id. at 607.
104

105
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tion. Agreements to submit disputes to a foreign tribunal are tantamount to a similar submission of the controversy exclusively to the
courts of a sister state.'"" There is nothing novel about arbitration
in international business.' 1 However, the use of arbitration in patent
litigation seems to have certain novel attributes, not heretofore contemplated.
CONCLUSION

Patent infringement suits and licensing agreements on an international scale are fraught with many potential hazards. Patent laws
of foreign countries contain many vagaries and esoteric implications,
in many instances understood only by native counsel. Multilateral and
bilateral treaties provide a means of protecting property in a foreign
country. Litigation that may ensue presents the patentee with an
undue burden to enforce his award either internally or externally.
The patentee always must overcome the sometimes insurmountable
problems of jurisdiction, conflicts and choice of laws, enforcement of
foreign judgments, and res judicata. Enforcement in the United States
of judgments awarded abroad may be as difficult to obtain as foreign
enforcement of U.S. judgments. Arbitration is suggested as a salutary
means to obviate some of the inherent difficulties of enforcing a
patent monopoly abroad. However, arbitration would be limited to
those situations involving a contractual arrangement or licensing
agreements, and inapplicable to patent infringement suits.

lm See Parker v. Krauss Co., 157 Misc. 667, 284 N.Y.S. 478 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
108 INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION (M. Domke ed. 1958) ; Bayitch, Treaty Law
of Private Arbitration, 10 ARB. J. 188 (1955) ; Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration International and Interstate Aspects, 43 YALE L.J. 716 (1934); Nussbaum, Treaties
on Commercial Arbitration, a Test of International Private-Law Legislation, 56
HARV. L. REv. 219 (1942) ; Pisar, The Law Governing Arbitration, J. Bus. L. 342
(1959); Czyzak & Sullivan, American Arbitration Law and the U.N. Convention.
13 ARB. J. 197 (1958). See especially on arbitration and conflicts of law several
scholarly articles, e.g., W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS ch.

17 (1930); Stern, The Conflict of Laws in Commercial Arbitration, 17 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 567 (1952) ; Note, Commercial Arbitration and the Conflict of
Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV.902 (1956).

NOTE
COLORADO'S OMBUDSMAN OFFICE
INTRODUCTION

N 1605 Don Quixote de la Mancha rode forth from the pages of
Cervantes' classic book to do battle against all wrong. He fancied
himself a grand knight in shining armor whose self-appointed quest
was to seek out the destroyer, end tyranny, and bring justice to the
weak and the oppressed. His thirst to conquer the foe soon set him
tilting at a giant knight who proved to be a windmill and then pitted
his prowess against a great army which was only a flock of sheep.
His goals may have been admirable, but his lack of contact with
reality doomed him to defeat from the start.
Today a new knight is setting out on much the same mission.
This present day defender of the public, the ombudsman, has not
cast himself in the ancient quixotic mold. He is a concept which
citizens throughout the world' have conjured up from enthusiastic
reports from Scandinavia.' The people would dub the ombudsman
their champion and send him forth to battle every official wrong.
They want him as a means of satisfying their need for a sense of
personal importance in the vastness and the facelessness of bureaucracy. They have romanticized the ideals inherent in the office into
a fantasy that does not exist;' the ombudsman they see is a panacea
4
for most of the shortcomings of the modern administrative system.
As agency control over the lives of people grows more pervasive,
their demand for relief from governmental red tape becomes more
audible and their infatuation for this hero becomes more clear. In
response, a bevy of nations, including the United States and its state
and local governments, have recently begun considering transplanting
1 Bainbridge, A Civilized Thing, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13, 1965, at 136, reprinted in
Hearings on S. Res. 190 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings]; Kastari, Finland's Guardians of the Law, in
THE OMBUDSMAN 58 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
2 W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS 5-6, 239 (1967); Krislov, A Restrained

View, in THE OMBUDSMAN 246, 247 '(D. Rowat ed. 1965); e.g., Asher, Ombudsman (Mr. Fixit) Here to Explain Unique System, Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1966,
reprinted in 1966 Hearings 28; see Anderman, The Swedish Justitieombudsman,
3

11 Am. J. CoMP. L. 225 (1962), reprintedin 1966 Hearings 96.
See W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS 195 (1967). This development has

been referred to affectionately as "ombudsmania." Marshall, The United Kingdom,
in THE OMBUDSMAN 173 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
4 A Pattern of Executive Protection: The Ombudsman, address by Hans Blix, at Howard University School of Law, Feb. 21, 1965, reprinted in 1966 Hearings 90.
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this ancient Nordic institution to their shores.' At least two American governments, Hawaii 6 and Nassau County, New York,' have
adopted the idea, and others seem destined to follow suit. Whether
this American experiment will fulfill the public's high expectations or whether it will prove to be only a quixotic exercise remains
to be seen.
Colorado, having docketed an ombudsman bill in both houses
during the 1967 legislative session and having an unofficial and
voluntary ombudsman in the person of Lieutenant Governor Mark
Hogan, may count itself in the forefront of the American governments which have seriously considered the ombudsman idea. The
Lieutenant Governor has done more than anyone else to spark interest among the people of the state. Shortly after taking office in
January 1967, Mr. Hogan announced that he intended to assume
the role of ombudsman for Colorado.' The public has taken advantage of his offer, and requests for his aid are increasing as publicity about his work mounts. The local newspapers have added to
the interest by carrying on a lively debate over the merits of the
concept. The question which this situation presents to Coloradans
is whether the institution should be given formal status by the enactment of an ombudsman bill at some future date.
Intelligent consideration whether this foreign institution has
any value for Colorado must be founded on a good understanding
of what the institution involves. The theory is simple: an ombudsman is a government official appointed to receive and investigate
complaints made by individuals against abusive or capricious acts of
public officials. If he finds the complaint is justified, he tries to
correct the action. He cannot reverse the official decision, but he
does try to persuade the agency to change its ways. He can often
influence a reluctant agency to adopt his recommendation by publishing his own opinion in the news media to bring public pressure
to bear.
Although the theory is simple, the ramifications are complex.
A good deal of information should be considered before any conclusions are reached about Lieutenant Governor Hogan's ombudsman work or about the ombudsman bills proposed for Colorado.
The Colorado situation can be better evaluated after viewing the
ombudsman institution in its historical setting and after analyzing
5 Anderman, supra note 2; Krislov, supra note 2, at 246-47.

6 10 STATE GOVERNMENT NEWS, July 1967, at 7.
7 County Executive of Nassau County, N.Y., Press Release, May 31, 1966. See also N.Y.
Times, Nov. 20, 1966, § 1, at 53, col. 1. The County Executive presented a proposed
local law to the Board of Supervisors which would create the office of Public Protector. On the same day he appointed the Commissioner of Accounts to assume the
powers and duties detailed in the proposal. The Board has not yet submitted the bill
to the people on referendum.
8 Rocky Mountain News, Jan. 12, 1967, at 23, col. 1.
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its strengths and weaknesses as revealed by the existing ombuds-man systems in other countries. Then this institution which developed within a parliamentary, civil law form of government must
be measured against the unique aspects of our congressional, common law system.
Reports of the detailed workings of most of the present ombudsman offices have been published by competent authors. That
material will not be repeated here except to the extent necessary to
give a glimpse of how the office has traditionally functioned and
to show what results have been achieved. The parts of this article
which deal with specific facts and statistics recorded in the ombudsman countries are drawn in large part from the first hand
reports written by Professor Walter Gellhorn and collected in his
excel!ent book, Ombudsmen and Othersf
I.

THE SWEDISH

INSTITUTION

The ombudsman concept is a product of monarchial Sweden.1 °
The direct predecessor of the present Ombudsman 1 came onto being
in 1713 during Sweden's war with Russia under Czar Peter I. After
twelve years of absence from the country as Commander-in-Chief
of his army, Sweden's King Charles XII found himself unable to
dispense enlightened justice or to assure himself that his servants
were faithfully carrying out the law. Therefore, he made a decision
which was to prove fateful for modern administrative government.
He appointed the King's Supreme Ombudsman to oversee the tax
collectors, the judges, and the handful of public servants who administered the law in his name.' 2 The Swedish of today have praised
his decision," but it is likely he was motivated more by a desire
to insure himself against embezzlement than by a desire to protect
4
his people against oppression.1
The temporary appointment became a permanent part of the
9W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS (1967) [hereinafter cited as GELLHORN].
10It is noteworthy that the office was created by an absolute monarch, since American
critics have attacked the idea as part and parcel of "creeping socialism." Unruh, The
Need for an Ombudsman in California, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1965).
11 "Ombudsman" is an early Swedish term composed of three syllables. "Om" trans-

lates as about, "bud" means message, and "man" is person. Thus the literal translation is "man with a message about something." Fowle, Two Ombudsmen Report on
Roles-Civic Control Described by Swede and New Zealander, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20,
1966, § 1, at 20, col. 1,reprinted in 1966 Hearings 380. In Swedish idiom the term
more accurately means a 'person who represents someone." Address by Blix, supra
note 4, at 93.
12 GELLHORuJ, supra note 9, at 194-95; Bexelius, The Swedish Institution of the Justitieombudsman, 27 INT'L REV. AD. SCI. 243

(1961),

reprinted in 1966 Hearings

77-78; address by Blix, supra note 4, at 93; Rudholm, The Chancellor of Justice, in
THE OMBUDSMAN 17-18 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
13 See, e.g., Bexelius, The Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, in THE OMBUDSMAN 22, 25
(D. Rowat ed. 1965).
14GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 2.
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royal government. After the death of Charles XII the officer became
known as the Chancellor of Justice. In 1766 when Sweden's Parliament, the Riksdag, had gained the balance of power, it appropriated
the right to appoint the Chancellor. Later when the winds of political
fortune reversed, the new King reasserted the monarchial authority
and made the Chancellor the Crown's officer once more. Then in
1809 while the nation was again at war with Russia and engulfed
in national and international crises, the Riksdag led Sweden away
from royal government toward representative democracy. The Constitution which was drafted and adopted by the Riksdag gave it
many new powers to offset the great authority of the King. One
brief clause created the office of Justitieombudsman as a safeguard
against disregard of the law by royal officers. The King had his
Chancellor of Justice to watch the civil service; now the Riksdag
had its own inspector of courts and administrative agencies, the
Ombudsman. 5
A. Results in Sweden
These developments in Sweden in 1809 launched the revolutionary idea of an official critic of government. The institution has
flourished there, and after more than one hundred and fifty years
the tradition permeates the thinking of the Swedish people. 6
With only a few assistants and a present annual budget of
$120,000,'7 the Ombudsman has carved a permanent niche in Swedish life and has exerted a definitely beneficial influence on the
quality of its government.' The Ombudsman has been particularly
effective in protecting the civil rights of citizens, e.g., the rights of
peaceful assembly, free speech, and access to all official documents.
The liberties of the citizens have been safeguarded against encroachment by the judiciary, the prosecutors, the police, and the penal
institutions. While success in checking administrative agency derelictions has been less noteworthy, 9 the results have been impressive,
15 Authorities cited note 12 supra.
16Anderman, supra note 2, at 237-38, 1966 Hearings at 105-06.
17Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 142, 1966 Hearings at 108. The staff consists of nine
lawyers and three secretaries.
IgAnderman, supra note 2, at 234-35, 1966 Hearings at 102-03. -i[F]ew would deny
that the Ombudsman institution has in its various forms achieved much good in
those countries where it exists." Mitchell, The Irrelevance of the Ombudsman Proposals, in THE OMBUDSMAN 273 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
19 Anderman, supra note 2, at 235-37, 1966 Hearings at 103-05. There are special factors which have hindered progress in this field. The administrative branch of government is expanding rapidly without an increase in the staff available, or a decrease in
other responsibilities. The agencies usually do not explain their decisions. There is
no administrative procedure act, and furthermore, neither the courts nor the Ombudsman can easily determine their jurisdiction over administrative decisions. The institution is presently shifting focus from supervision of the judiciary to supervision of
administration, and the transition is not complete. It has been suggested that a
country with a more highly developed system of judicial review would not experience
these difficulties because jurisdiction could be more clearly defined. Id.
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especially in achieving uniformity of procedure and uniformity of
interpretation. 0 It is as legislative reformer that the Ombudsman
has made little progress. His proposals to Parliament for statutory
change have largely been ignored although his annual reports to
Parliament and his petitions to the executive branch continue to
repeat his advice on matters in the expectation that his suggestions
2
will eventually prevail. '

The influence of the Ombudsman does not result from the
few constitutional powers he is given. It stems from his position
as the trustee of Parliament, and from the tremendous prestige the
office has accumulated over the century and a half of its existence.
His carefully reasoned arguments made from this respected position
are usually sufficient to persuade an official, if not the Parliament,
to accept his suggestion. These factors are the source of his influence, and the press is the means by which it is maintained and
disseminated.2
The Swedish would be the first to admit that their Ombudsman
is not a single handed miracle worker. There have been no sensational disclosures of scandal on a national level. In fact, very few
of the cases have been remarkable, but that has not detracted from
23
their importance to the individuals involved.
The first Ombudsman corrected the most spectacular abuses
which have been discovered. On one inspection in 1825 of a debtors'
prison at Stockholm, the Ombudsman found an unfortunate brewer
who had been imprisoned for twenty-two years waiting for the
Supreme Court to decide his appeal. The Court had mislaid his
file! The executive branch was moved to release the man without
any further penalty.2 4
A more typical example of recent years resulted in standardization of agency procedure. Swedish law authorizes county administrators to revoke driving licenses on evidence that the holder does
not meet the standards of skill, responsibility or reliability required
of a driver. The Ombudsman's investigation into revocation procedures showed that various administrations employed widely different standards. Some revoked the driving licenses of persons for
20 GELLHORN,

supra note 9, at 240.

21 Id. at 244-46.
22 See Bexelius, supra note 13, at 25; Anderman, supra note 2, at 225, 1966 Hearings

at 96; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 138, 142, 1966 Hearings at 107-08. "[Tlhe
Ombudsman's finding fault causes some temporary pain and perhaps some loss of
self-esteem in most instances, but . . . it rarely leaves permanent scars if the offense
was not willful. . . . A headline saying the Ombudsman has criticized the police is
almost the equivalent of a prosecution." GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 249-50. The
individual's career is not lost because his superiors may choose to ignore the incident
in favor of the rest of his record when promotions are considered.
23 Bexelius, supra note 13, at 36-37.
2

Id. at 38.
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drunkenness even though they had not been driving. Other administrations only revoked licenses after two or three cases of drunkenness. The Ombudsman's remarks were sufficient to cause each administration to adopt the same revocation procedure.25
An examination of 400 cases involving driving under the influence of alcohol revealed that some courts had used incorrect
formulas to determine the alcohol content of the blood. Two outstanding scientists were called upon to define a valid calculation.
Their information was passed along to the courts which were able
to increase accuracy and administer better justice.2 6
A man in a mental hospital wrote a letter complaining that one
of the doctors was opening his mail. The Ombudsman could only
reply that the doctor was authorized by law to do so.2 7
In another case, a band of gypsies set up camp on a beach in
a town. They were located on a public camping site so they refused
to leave when the local chief of police requested them to move on.
The next day the gypsies and their belongings were loaded onto a
police bus and dumped off in a desolate area. They asked the Ombudsman to investigate. Since the gypsies had violated no law, the
police chief had acted illegally. The police chief was prosecuted
by the Ombudsman under the rarely used constitutional authorization to prosecute officials who commit unlawful acts or who neglect
to perform their duties in the proper manner. The court found the
police chief guilty of the charge and assessed a fine. 8
The Ombudsman once read in a Stockholm newspaper of an
alcoholic who had killed his wife in a drunken rage. Four days
earlier she had asked the police for protection, insisting that her
husband was a dangerous alcoholic. The Ombudsman wrote to the
police and asked why they gave the lady no protection. They replied
that they had taken the man into custody at once, but had to release
him since the law did not allow detention of an alcoholic for more
than one day. During that day the police had not been able to
gather sufficient evidence to have him committed to an institution
for alcoholics. The police were exonerated, but the government was
moved to amend the law so as to authorize detention of a person
charged as a dangerous alcoholic for enough time to complete the
investigation.29
A statistical examination of the Swedish Ombudsman's efforts
gives another perspective of the work he and other ombudsmen do.
In 1964 the Ombudsman received 1,429 new cases. Of those, 1,239
21966
2

Hearings at 35-36.

6Id. at 36.

Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 142, 1966 Hearingsat 109.
1966 Hearings at 33.
29Id. at 30.
27

28
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were citizens' complaints, 179 were the result of his inspections or
other information, and eleven were initiated on his own motion on
the basis of newspaper reports.80 Although they comprise only
thirteen percent of his caseload, the Ombudsman thinks his inspections produce the most significant leads to administrative shortcomings. 31 About twenty percent of the private complaints come
from inmates of mental hospitals and penal institutions.8 2 About
thirty percent of the personal complaints are dismissed without an
inquiry. Approximately ninety percent of all investigated complaints
are dismissed after an examination of the relevant documents. All
complainants whose cases are dismissed receive a written explanation of the dismissal.83 Only about ten percent of all complaints are
34
determined by the Ombudsman to be justified.
B. Adoption of the Swedish Institution Elsewhere
In spite of its longstanding acclaim in Sweden, it is only within
the last two decades that the ombudsman institution has gained
much recognition elsewhere."n Finland is the one exception; her
historical links with Sweden caused Finland to create an Ombudsman
office in 1919. 36
Denmark generated the current worldwide interest by installing
an ombudsman for civil and military affairs in 1954." T The office
was adopted by West Germany in 1957,38 and then, in quickening
9
succession, by Norway and New Zealand in 1962.3
Guyana, a newly emerged nation state, created an ombudsman
office by its new constitution.40 Laval, Canada, a suburb of Quebec
City, became the first North American government to establish the
office by adopting its own version in January 1966.41 Nassau County,
New York, was the first United States government to have an ombudsman. However, the office created there in May 1966 was instituted by executive order rather than by legislative enactment or by
30 GELLHORN, supra note 9, Table XII at 208.
31 Id. at 208.
32 Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 142, 1966 Hearingsat 109.
33GELLHORN, supra note 9, Table XIV at 214; address by Blix, supra note 4, at 94.
34 GELLHORN,

supra note 9, at 213.

35GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 5; Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 136, 1966 Hearings at

106.
36 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 48-50; Anderman, supra note 2, at 225, 1966 Hearings

at 96.
37 See generally GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 5-8; Northey, New Zealand's Parliamentary
Commissioner, in THE OMBUDSMAN 127, 131 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
38 Anderman, supra note 2, at 225, 1966 Hearings at 96-97.
39 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 154-59 (Norway); Northey, supra note 37, at 127

(New Zealand).
40 Gellhorn, Ombudsman in America?, TRIAL, Apr.-May 1967, at 38.
41 Cloward & Elman, Poverty, Injustice and the Welfare State, An Ombudsman for the
Poor?, THE NATION, Feb. 28, 1966, at 230, 233.
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referendum of the people.4" Hawaii, in June 1967, became the first
of the states to enact an ombudsman bill. But that legislation remains on the books, unconsummated, because the legislature did not
fill the office or provide a fund for its operation. 8
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING OMBUDSMAN OFFICES

Each government which has transplanted the institution has
built on the original foundation, making adaptations to fit the
special needs of the adopting country. An examination of the
strengths and weaknesses which have been highlighted by the variations from Scandinavia to New Zealand reveals much about the
form the office should take. At the same time, the comparison gives
some indication of the success which could be expected in Colorado.
A. Qualifications
It may not be essential that an ombudsman be an attorney, but
legal training would be an important asset.. 4 While a good portion
of his work primarily requires common sense and an overall view
of the administrative system, there remains a substantial part of the
program which only an attorney is trained to handle. For example,
the ombudsman must provide expert investigation involving questions of law if the public, the agencies and the legislature are to be
influenced." The officer must be capable of demanding certain
standards of conduct from an agency and be capable of persuading
officials that the law requires no less.4 8 As another example, it is
highly unlikely that anyone other than an experienced attorney could
successfully argue that the case of SEC v. Chenery Corp.47 requires
42

Authorities and material cited note 7, supra.

43 10 STATE GOVERNMENT NEWS, July 1967, at 7. See also Rocky Mountain News,

June 15, 1967, at 55, col. 1.
GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 422-23; cf. Aaron, Utah Ombudsman: The American
Proposals, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 32, 44.
5 Abrahamson, Ireland, in THE OMBUDSMAN 201, 204 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
46 See Abraham, The Need for an Ombudsman in the United States, in THE OMBUDSMAN 234, 236 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
47 332 U.S. 194 (1947). Many experienced attorneys will find this reading of the
second Chenery case startling. It is, however, an interpretation which has been made
by the respected Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association.
[T]he Chenery case is uniformly cited or miss-cited [sic] to support an
agency's election to proceed by ad hoc adjudication rather than by rule
making. Occasionally, as in the E & B Brewing case [NLRB v. E & B
Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 '(6th Cir. 1960)), it is cited as establishing
limitations upon retroactive application of standards established in such
adjudications. It has not been cited as establishing or suggesting, as it
does, standards for finding abuse of discretion in the persistent failure or
refusal of agencies to promulgate as rules those "rules of decision" which
have become hoary as "well established" precedents, sometimes followed
with stare decisis faithfulness.
Recommendations of Vice Chairman Smalley to the Committee on Agency Rule
Making, 12 AD. L. BULL. 190 (1960).
4See

1968

COLORADO'S OMBUDSMAN

OFFICE

the agency in a given situation to establish policy by published rules
rather than by ad hoc adjudication. It is doubtful that a non-legally
trained person could convincingly argue that an agency's denial of
an application for a license without following announced criteria
violates due process as defined in Hornsby v. Allen."' Moreover,
it is unlikely that case law arguments would even occur to someone
outside the legal profession.
The constitutional guarantees of the first eight amendments as
well as those of procedural and substantive due process have become familiar terms to large numbers of the public. But whether
they have been violated is a question requiring legal skill, and safeguarding these guarantees has traditionally been treated as a legal
concern.
A large number of complaints force the investigator to construe statutes, rules and opinions of courts and agencies. He must
be able to analyze legislative history when that is necessary to statutory interpretation. He must be capable of suggesting reorganization
and delineation of responsibility among the various agencies. His
work as a legislative reformer means he must be adept at many
phases of law, from determining what reforms are necessary to perhaps drafting the legislative revision.
The ombudsman's effectiveness can be bolstered if his opinion,
based on hindsight and expertise in administrative law, is convincing
on its merits.4 9 He cannot satisfy the complainant unless the individual is assured the investigation was thorough and accurate. He
cannot effectively urge the legislature to revise without presenting
solid reasons for the change. He cannot persuade the agency to
adopt a new procedure without convincing it that the proffered
method is more sound administratively. In the final analysis, he
cannot be wrong often or he will not be able to influence anyone
that his opinions are reliable.
All these requirements do not mean, however, that legal training is an indispensable prerequisite to effectiveness as an ombudsman. It is commonplace for administrators and executives without
legal backgrounds to succeed. They must make many decisions involving legal considerations, but they rely on advice from attorneys.
An ombudsman could do the same by making an attorney a member
of his staff. Nevertheless, legal training would relieve an ombudsman of the necessity of relying on another person's advice in many
matters. An ombudsman with a legal background would undoubtedly
- 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
49 W. GELIHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 229-30 (1966).
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have a valuable advantage; without it his efforts could be seriously
hampered.
The Scandinavian countries explicitly make legal education a
prerequisite, and Norway even requires that the ombudsman meet
the qualifications of a judge of its highest court. 50 New Zealand
sets out no qualifications for its ombudsman,"' evidently trusting the
House of Representatives to select a suitable individual. The only
man appointed so far has been considered eminently qualified; he
was a successful lawyer before becoming an administrator and
52
diplomat.
Personal characteristics are probably the most important criteria
in the selection of an ombudsman. 3 His effectiveness rests upon
several highly significant but intangible characteristics: his personality, his public image, his ability to communicate, his tenacity. 4 His
own integrity and objectivity must be beyond doubt; if they are not,
there is little that his criticism can do to effect changes or little that
his opinion can do to placate complainants. 55 He must be selfsufficient if he is to carry out his task in the face of the criticisms
that are sure to be made. He must be strong enough to criticize high
ranking officials when necessary, and courageous enough to take an
unpopular position. Above all, he must remain apart from partisan
politics to retain the confidence indispensable to his work."
The Danish Ombudsman, without trying, is the only official
critic around whom a personality cult has developed.57 While this
gives him great prestige and ability to persuade, it tends to transform
criticism of the man into criticism of the office. This development
is probably due to the selection of a highly popular and prominent
individual, and it is certainly fostered by what Professor Gellhom
describes as colorful and able performance.5 8
Most countries have tended to select someone who is relatively
unknown, perhaps to avoid choosing a political partisan. The Swedish like to say, as one parliamentary leader expressed it, "The man
we select does not lend distinction to the office; the office distinguishes him." 59 The Norwegians chose a judge from their Supreme
50
51
52
5

GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 158.
Ombudsman Act § 2 (1962) (New Zealand), reprinted in 1966 Hearings 132.
GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 92.

3 Id. at 423.
54 See Abraham, supra note 46, at 237.
5 W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 47 (1966).
56 Anderman, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 11 Amt. J. ComP. L. 225, 226 (1962),
reprinted in 1966 Hearings 96, 97.
57GEILHORN, supra note 9, at 33-34.
58
Id. at 5 & n.1. Mr. Hurwitz was a law professor on the faculty of the University of
Copenhagen.
59 Id. at 203.
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Court to be their first Ombudsman.60 He has been described as a
modest and shy man who does not receive widespread press coverage. Even without news reports, his work has been effective due
mainly to dissemination of his opinions through specialized publications."'
On the other hand, the mildness of Finland's Ombudsman has
meant that the potentialities of the office have been only partly
realized. For example, while the Ombudsman agreed that local
officials had no authority to intrude into the private life of one
complainant, he did no more than that. He did not come to the
defense of each citizen's right to privacy by issuing a rebuke and
giving it widespread publicity. If he had, he might have been re62
sponsible for strengthening this right throughout the country.
Mr. Bexelius, the Swedish Ombudsman, furnishes a good example of the attitude required. He has said:
[M]any of my friends have been angry with me. Often when I
criticize a judge, he is a man with whom I have worked in court
and know very, very well. Naturally, I don't like to criticize him,
but I must. The ombudsman cannot be concerned about his popularity. It is no secret that high officials in Sweden - all of them dislike the ombudsman. They say that he is always interfering in
things he doesn't know anything about, and that they could do their
jobs better if he would stop meddling, and so on. But all their
grumbling doesn't mean a thing. Everybody knows that it is necessary to have an ombudsman. 6 '

B. Method of Selection
The Swedish procedure of a non-partisan selection by the legislative body has been widely followed. Since the ombudsman has
been conceived everywhere as the legislature's agent, that body naturally exercises the prerogative of selection. Realizing that the ombudsman's whole power depends upon his objectivity, most legislatures have not succumbed to the temptation to make a partisan
64
choice.
The Swedish Parliament chooses a body of forty-eight electors
and empowers it to elect the Ombudsman. Seats on the electoral
body are proportionate to party representation in the Riksdag, twentyfour members being chosen from each house. Since World War I
the elections have been unanimous. Pending elections have not received much attention by the public or the press which presumably
leaves the electors free to choose a well qualified individual rather
60

Id. at 158.

61

Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 88-89.

62

3 Bainbridge, A Civilized Thing, NEW
in 1966 Hearings 106, 112.
6GELLHORN,

supra note 9, at 424.

YORKER,

Feb. 13, 1965, at 136, 151, reprinted
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than a spokesman for the majority party. The tradition in Sweden
of selecting a jurist strengthens the absence of a choice based on
partisan considerations because the judiciary is removed from political elections. 65 The ombudsmen of Denmark, Finland and Norway
are elected directly by their parliaments.6 6
New Zealand's method of selection is unique. The Ombudsman is appointed by the executive branch, but only upon the recommendation of each Parliament. It is possible that the Government
can dictate the choice since it nominally controls the votes of its supporters. This has not happened; New Zealand's election has followed the non-partisan tradition firmly established in most of the
Scandinavian countries." It should be noted that the institution was
established in Sweden in an era when party politics in the modern
sense did not exist.6 The recent experience in Denmark and New
Zealand,6" however, is a strong indication that the office can be
transplanted into today's political atmosphere without loss of neutrality.
Finland is the exception to the tradition. Perhaps the injection
of partisan considerations into the selection accounts for the fact
that this ombudsman has less influence than those of other countries.
Each party nominates a candidate and the nominee of the majority
party is routinely elected. At least the procedure of voting by secret
ballot without discussion 0 avoids what otherwise could be irreparable damage to the prestige of the individual and to his ability
to fulfill the task.
If the premise asserted here that the ombudsman must function
independently is accepted, then most considerations favor a nonpartisan selection, and little valid reason exists for a political choice.
Playing politics here is a two-edged sword. A sophisticated citizenry
might soon realize that the controlling party had not acted to help
and protect the public but rather to advance its own fortune by
entrenching a political hack in a powerful position to heap abuse
on the opposition and to make excuses for his own party. The tactic
could well cause an adverse reaction at the polls. Appreciation of
this possibility probably accounts for the fact that few legislatures
make a partisan choice.
65 See Lundvik, Comments on the Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, in THE OMBUDSMAN

44-45 (D. Rowat ed. 1965) ; GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 202-03.
GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 424. The Finnish Parliament elects its Ombudsman by
a simple majority vote. Id. at 51.
67 Id. at 103-04.
68 Holmgren, The Need for an Ombudsman Too, in THE OMBUDSMAN 225, 230 (D.
Rowat ed. 1965).
66

69 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 103-04.

70 See generally id. at 424.
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C. Tenure, Salary and Staff
Sweden's experimentation with the most advantageous length
of term has provided a touchstone for others. Before 1941 Sweden's
Ombudsmen were elected for a one year term. Even though many
were re-elected the changeovers proved to be too frequent. At present
the Swedish Ombudsman serves a four year term, and his salary is
equal to that of a judge of the Supreme Court. He may be re-elected
indefinitely although indications are that Parliament considers twelve
years service the maximum. It deems a new officer with a fresh
outlook desirable. Parliament is also aware that the strain of the
responsibility might take its toll on any person's devotion and initiative after many years in the office.
Although Parliament retains the power to remove the Ombudsman during the term for exceptional reasons, it has never done so. 7
Even failing at re-election the officer is not without security; he
may choose to resume his previous career or to retire on a full pension.72 The other Scandinavian countries allow each new parliament
to elect an ombudsman or to re-elect the incumbent. The New
Zealand Ombudsman serves until his successor has been appointed
by a succeeding Parliament.
Removal from office during the term is more difficult in New
Zealand than in most of the Scandinavian countries, although removal has seldom occurred anywhere. The New Zealand Ombudsman can be removed or suspended only for disability, bankruptcy,
neglect of duty or misconduct.7 3 The Nordic parliaments can remove their appointee when a simple lack of confidence occurs.
A term of at least three or four years is necessary for the individual to master the demands of the office, to establish rapport with
those he serves and for the public to realize full benefits. The notion
applied to the judiciary in some jurisdictions of insuring autonomy
by means of an appointment for life might unduly rigidify the institution while gaining an independence that most legislative bodies
are already willing to grant. An individual could lose both his
initiative and his flexibility after holding the office for a long time.
Further, there must be a hedge against loss of confidence by the
legislature, the agencies or the people. An ombudsman without
influence would be a lameduck appointee without effectiveness.7 4
If lengthy tenure is not a desirable feature, other aspects must
make the job appealing to attract highly qualified individuals to
See generally Lundvik, supra note 65, at 45. See also Bainbridge, supra note 63, at
140-42, 1966 Hearings at 108.
72 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 203; Lundvik, supra note 65, at 45.
73 Ombudsman Act § 5 '(1962) (New Zealand), reprinted in 1966 Hearings 132, 149.
74 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 425.
71
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this formidable task. The possibilities of future advancement in
public office are no longer much of an inducement. Even in Sweden
it is the practice to choose an older individual and to refrain from
appointing him to another office at the end of eight or twelve years
of service. He is then relieved of the economic need to curry favor
rather than criticizing forthrightly.7 5 This philosophy in altered
form has appeared in some of the ombudsmen bills proposed in
the United States. Most of the proposals bar any member of the
state legislature from holding the office within two years after
leaving the legislature. 76 At the same time the proposals bar the
ombudsman from holding any state position for either two or three
years after he relinquishes that office.77
While these restrictions will be helpful in preventing the office
from being used as a reward for the faithful, but losing, political
candidate, or from being turned into a patronage post for a career
civil servant, they will also tend to limit the number of interested
applicants. To be barred from a public position for several years
after serving as ombudsman would seem to eliminate the career civil
servant. It could well eliminate judges, the class which has most
frequently filled the office elsewhere. There would be no guarantee
that these people could ever resume their careers in public service
after their terms as ombudsmen.
The American proposals would prevent the incumbent from
holding any position for remuneration during his tenure, 78 but he
should be able to take a leave of absence from many vocations. The
latter factor should broaden the field of selection somewhat, even
if legal training is made a requisite. In that case, attorneys engaged in private practice and law professors would be likely classes
to provide the ombudsman. However, the right individual could
come from the bench or the district attorney's office, or from any
legal background if he expected to retire at the end of his service.
In that event the restriction on employment after service would be
no hindrance.
Two factors which might cause a qualified individual to accept
the position are an adequate salary and a competent staff. An additional reason to set a high salary is to enhance its public image by
giving material recognition to the importance of the office. The
Scandinavian countries have fixed the salary at a level cormensurate
with that of a judge on the highest court, or equal to the chief
judge's compensation. Only in New Zealand is the salary left to
75 Bainbridge, supra note 63, at 140, 1966 Hearings at 108.
76 Aaron, Utah Ombudsman: The American Proposals, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 32, 44.
77 Id.

78Id.
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the discretion of the chief executive. The salary there has been
fixed below that of most of the higher judges and other ranking
officials.7"
The power to determine salary level can be important as a
control over the independence of the ombudsman. It can mean an
executive official, a legislative committee, or a legislature itself with
power to reduce the flow of funds during the ombudsman's term
can influence his work. The Scandinavian procedure which establishes the salary at a par with that of the judges of the supreme
courts is one solution to this problem.
It seems highly likely that the recurring governmental problem
of competing poorly with private business salaries will appear here.
The individuals who are qualified will likely be receiving compensation at a rate well over what the government will pay. These
factors may be unimportant, however, since no country has experienced difficulty in attracting able men to the post. The chance to
make a real contribution to a better life and the attendant prestige
are probably persuasive enough to cause many to accept the challenge in spite of the hardship it entails.
An ombudsman's work is invariably viewed as highly personal
since his own integrity and objectivity are the factors which make
his judgments effective. His effectiveness can be hampered if he
is not allowed to choose his own staff. It is essential that the assistants who will do much of his research have his confidence. All of
the countries which have an ombudsman allow him to select his
own assistants. Several of them, however, select a deputy ombudsman in the same manner as his superior is chosen to assist and to
fill a vacancy. 8"
One engaging feature of the institution is the small staff with
which it has traditionally functioned. The Danish staff consists of
seven lawyers and five clerical employees. Most of them work only
part time because their services as attorneys are in great demand in
private practice. Yet they consider working with the Ombudsman
desirable employment because many have been able to advance to
good positions after their broad exposure to governmental activities.81
Sweden's Ombudsman operates with a staff of nine attorneys
and three secretaries.8 2 The New Zealand staff consists of a lawyer, an administrator, an investigating officer and two clerical employees. Another attorney and another typist also work part time.8"
9 GELLHORN,

supra note 9, at 425.

80Id. at 425-26.
81 Id. at 29.
82 Bainbridge, supra note 63, at 142, 1966 Hearings at 108.
83 GELLHORN,

supra note 9, at 116 & n.56.
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These staffs are not large considering the populations they
serve. Sweden, the most populous of the Scandinavian countries,
counts eight million people.8 4 New Zealand has a population of
three million people.85 It is encouraging to note that no ombudsman
has been denied the staff he needs, nor has had difficulty in recruiting qualified persons.86
D. jurisdictionalPowers
Limiting the jurisdictional reach of the ombudsman has been
one of the most difficult problems encountered. An ombudsman
cannot revise the entire governmental framework let alone function
as a superior administrative authority for each agency. He cannot
be made competent to examine every public problem, but the difficulty lies in where and how to draw the line. No matter how jurisdiction has been defined, it is characteristic of each ombudsman
office that much time and effort has been required to determine
whether a particular matter falls within its scope.87
No ombudsman has been empowered to supervise the work of
the legislature which, after all, created the office to assist it and
not to govern it. Yet the responsibility to criticize inadequate laws
and to recommend revision amounts to an indirect supervision of
the legislature. Still, an ombudsman has no formal sanctions to
compel the adoption of his suggestions for legislative reform, just
as he is given no formal power to effect his other suggestions.
The Danish Ombudsman is authorized to supervise some local
matters and every phase of national administration, military and
civil, excluding the courts. His jurisdiction encompasses "ministers,
civil servants and all other persons acting in the service of the State"
except those who work in judicial administration.8" Even with this
wide jurisdiction the Ombudsman has sought to enlarge his jurisdiction. In 1964 he took cognizance of complaints against lawyers
appointed by the national government whose indigent clients were
dissatisfied. He felt these attorneys were within his reach as "persons
acting in the service of the State." In fact, he astounded the entire
profession by intimating that lawyers should be within his jurisdiction because they perform a public function and can only serve when
duly licensed by the state. The issue has not been finally settled
84 The

Swedish government estimated the population at 7,773,000 in 1966. THE WORLD
1967, at 258.
8 The New Zealand government officially estimated the population at 2,647,282 in
1965. Id. at 258.
86GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 426. But the rapidly increasing backlog of cases in the
Swedish office indicates that this ombudsman staff is reaching the limit of its capability to handle the increasing volume of cases. Text accompanying note 106 intra.
87See generally id. at 426-27.
88 id. at 10-11.
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although the bar association persuaded him to disclaim a present
competence."9
New Zealand's experience is informative. Its statute states that
the principal function of the Ombudsmen is to "investigate any decision or recommendation made . . or any act done or omitted,
relating to any matter of administration and affecting any person
A schedule
or body of persons in his or its personal capacity."'
lists those departments which are placed by statute within the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, but that does not solve the problem. The
Ombudsman has the difficult task of deciding whether an act relates to what the statute terms a "matter of administration" over
which he has jurisdiction or to a matter of policy over which he does
not. The Ombudsman has not been able to devise any general principles which resolve the problem so he is forced to decide his jurisdiction case by case. His decisions have sometimes been strongly
criticized, his detractors fearing that he is extending his jurisdictional
reach into policy decisions. 9 The New Zealand Ombudsman has
stated that a quarter of his working time is taken in resolving his
own doubts about jurisdiction.9 2
1. Review of Discretion
The Swedish institution was originally charged with the responsibility of insuring compliance by public officials with laws and
regulations. It gradually assumed the additional duty of reviewing
administrative decisions, not so much to change the result of the
case at hand but to insure other cases are properly considered.9"
Traditionally an ombudsman does not criticize simply because he
would have reached a different decision but only if the action under
review is so clearly erroneous as to be illegal. Discretion is only
abused where there are no valid reasons for the way it is exercised,
that is, where the controlling reasons are arbitrary or capricious.
Yet this distinction is notoriously difficult for the courts or the
ombudsman to draw in practice.
The New Zealand statute allows the widest latitude for ignoring the distinction. The Ombudsman may review an administrative
decision not only for illegality, but to determine whether it is "un89 Id. at 43. The Scandinavian countries do not have a declaratory judgment procedure
which could provide a definite answer to disputes such as this. E.g., Lundvik, Comments on the Ombudsman for Civil A/airs, in THE OMBurDSMAN 44, 46-47 (D.
Rowat ed. 1965). This article also includes a discussion of the difficulties caused by
this lack.
90
Ombudsman Act § 11 (1962) (New Zealand), reprintedin 1966 Hearings 132, 136.
9
1 See generally GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 107, 110.
9
2 Id. at 118.
93 The Office of Ombudsman in New ZealandIts Origin and Operation, address by
Sir Guy Powles, before the Canadian Bar Association, reprinted in 1966 Hearings
207, 208.
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reasonable, unjust, oppressive, or improperly discriminatory," or "was
based . . . on a mistake of law or fact," or "was wrong." 94 The
statute in effect opens the door to review of all decisions, discretionary or otherwise, and the present Ombudsman has seized the
opportunity to do so."
Other countries try to restrain their critic more closely. Norway
allows review and criticism when the decision is "found to be clearly
unreasonable or otherwise clearly in conflict with fair administrative practice." 9" Yet the Ombudsman has found it proper to consider more and more of the borderline cases, and Professor Gellhorn
concludes he has acted on many complaints which are outside his
jurisdiction since there was no clear abuse of discretion.9 7
The Danish statute provides that the Ombudsman is to "keep
himself informed" whether those subject to his supervision "commit
mistakes or acts of negligence in the performance of their duties."
The Parliament's general directives expand on this by directing
criticism of "arbitrary or unreasonable decisions."9 8
The actual practice of ombudsmen to assume wide jurisdiction
over matters of discretion is clearly apparent.9 9 The statutory definitions may be different semantically, but in practice there is no distinction between an "unreasonable" decision and a "clearly unreasonable" decision. Language will probably never be adequate to
control the extent of an ombudsman's assertion of his jurisdiction.
It seems that the only effective check will be supervision by the
legislative committee which is commonly charged with responsibility
to oversee the ombudsman's work.' 0
2. Exhaustion of Remedies
One of the controversial issues is whether the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies should be applied to the ombudsman. Theoretically, the citizen has enough protection if he has a right of
appeal to any court or administrative tribunal. There should be no
need for a second review by the ombudsman; a fully adjudicated
decision is supposed to be better justice than that which the om94

Ombudsman Act § 19 (1962) (New Zealand), reprinted in 1966 Hearings 132, 143.
95 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 433-34.
96 Id. at 168.
97 Id. at 169-70.
98 Id. at 13 & n.15.
99 Id. at 434.
10 Sweden's system of parliamentary supervision of the ombudsman is typical of that
used by other countries. The First Law Committee of the Riksdag is charged with
maintaining a working relationship between the Riksdag and the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman's required annual report of his work is addressed to that committee. The
committee receives any complaints made about his activities, and its members may
criticize his past decisions or suggest he concentrate his energies in a different area.
Bexelius, The Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, in THE OMBUDSMAN 22, 25 (D. Rowat
ed. 1965).
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budsman can offer. If the issue is the substantive soundness of a
decision affecting a private interest, the tribunal is probably best
qualified to consider the merits. But if the complaint relates to
procedure, arbitrariness, behavior or issues other than the merits,
the ombudsman is better equipped to give a decision.' 01
Ideally the ombudsman should be free to cut across the bureaucratic structure to get at the crux of the complaint. If he is able to
do so, however, many complainants will come directly to him rather
than pursue the elaborate and expensive review structure that is
available. The advantage to the individual is that the ombudsman
will take the case upon himself without any further effort or expense of the individual. On the other hand, the ombudsman has
no power to change a decision even though his suggestions or criticisms often achieve that result for the individual.
Furthermore, if the doctrine is applicable many meritorious
complaints will never be appealed to the administrative tribunal
much less reach the courts. The citizen is often thoroughly exhausted
in finances and patience before he has exhausted the administrative
remedies which stand between him and court review. Even if direct
access to the court were granted, many individuals could not afford
it, nor would they choose to accept it. The right to appeal is frequently not exercised.
There are arguments to be made for or against applying the
exhaustion doctrine. Seeking the middle ground by leaving the matter to the discretion of the ombudsman affords no clear solution.
Norway's Ombudsman is instructed by Parliament to require that a
complainant pursue the administrative relief available unless "particular reasons" exist for assuming jurisdiction at once. Where
administrative review remains open he has dealt with the merits in
only two situations. One is when the complaint is clearly unjustified
so that no good purpose could be served by requiring appeal before
giving his opinion. The second is when the matter is too urgent
to insist on following the appeal available. But even this Ombudsman is an example of the trend among official critics to assume
jurisdiction even if other avenues remain open to the complainant.
The Norwegian Ombudsman has managed to exert his influence
without taking actual jurisdiction. For instance, he advised a prisoner to complain through channels, but at the same time he communicated informally with the Ministry of Justice to ask about some
of the points of the complaint. This technique gives the department
a clear indication of the Ombudsman's opinion even when he tech02
nically has not acted on the case.'
101 See generally GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 110-11.

102 Id. at 172 & n.36.
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The Swedish Ombudsman, whose jurisdiction is not limited by
the exhaustion doctrine, affords another example of the tendency
to assume jurisdiction rather than to turn a complainant away. On
occasion a case has been appealed to the ministerial body and simultaneously filed with the Ombudsman. In that situation the ministers
have tended to wait for the Ombudsman to act, and he has waited
for the ministers to act. But the Ombudsman admits that he has
0
usually given in first and assumed jurisdiction.1 3
Other countries have resolved the question by statute in favor
of a flat requirement of exhaustion of remedies.1'0 The decisive
factor is probably that, with any other rule, the ombudsman and
his small staff would be inundated with more than he could handle.
Even the Swedish Ombudsman has suggested that the doctrine be
made applicable to him. 10 5 His backlog of cases almost doubled
from 240 in 1961 to 447 in 1965, and this no doubt accounts for
10 6
his recommendation.
3. Statute of Limitations
Complaints are almost always filed when the matter is current,
but exceptions do occur, necessitating a statute of limitations to
establish a time limit after which an ombudsman no longer has
jurisdiction. A complaint is considered valid in Sweden even if it
is lodged ten years after the event. Other countries draw the line
at one year to avoid airing ancient grudges and to limit complaints
to those suitable for investigation. 0 7
The shorter period has most of the arguments on its side.
There is some reason to give the ombudsman authority to bypass
the one year statute of limitations to pursue a meritorious case, but in
the instances already discussed where an ombudsman has been given
discretion, he has tended to expand his jurisdiction. Unlimited jurisdiction can create an unworkable situation, and it would seem best to
foreclose that possibility with a mandatory statute of limitations.
E. Source and Processing of the Ombudsman's Work
The manner in which the ombudsman institution is
operatioh is important to its effectiveness. Matters are
an ombudsman's attention in several ways. Any citizen
to lodge a complaint.' 0 In addition, ombudsmen often

called into
brought to
may write
investigate

103 Id. at 207 & n.23.
104 See generally id. at 428.

105 Id. at 207 & n.23.
106 Id. at 213.
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Id. at 427.

10 See generally id. at 210-17; Bexelius, supra note 13, at 28; address by Blix, supra
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questionable decisions or practices brought to their attention by the
news media.'0 9 They may also seek out administrative abuse through
inspections of agencies."' The real value of the institution as far
as the public is concerned is direct and easy access to the service
by means of a personal complaint."' The complainant need do no
more. The ombudsman will decide whether to pursue the matter
and he will conduct any investigation. While the Swedish Ombudsman feels that matters which he takes up on his own motion as a
result of a news item or his inspection result in the most productive
work," 2 other ombudsmen have ignored their inspection and selfinitiated powers and have concentrated on individual complaints."
The authority to act by any of the three methods is a power which
each ombudsman should be allowed to develop as he chooses.
1. Complaints
Complaints filed by letter with the ombudsman, either from an
individual or an organization, constitute the bulk of his work. He
is not obligated to leap into action but has broad discretion to dismiss complaints. Little formality is required other than a signed
letter stating the facts, and these requirements are not strictly enforced. An individual may walk into the ombudsman's office and
someone og the staff will assist him in drafting his complaint. No
attorney is required although they have been known to draft complaints for their client's signature. 1 4 Anonymous complaints need
not be considered but ombudsmen have investigated some anyway.
Only New Zealand requires a filing fee, equivalent to $2.80,
to discourage frivolous complaints. Experience shows, however, that
the theory fails in practice. New Zealand has had its share of trivial
letters, but only a few are complaints from prison inmates who usually comprise a large share of the clientele elsewhere. This is some
indication that the fee has not discouraged the maladjusted but instead has disadvantaged the impecunious."'
The Swedish processing procedure emphasizes the personal control of the Ombudsman. He frequently reads the complaint as it
arrives, sometimes scribbling instructions in the margin for a staff
assistant, or choosing to handle the case himself. The complaint is
then noted in a log. Most cases are assigned to a staff member who
109
0

Bexelius, supra note 13, at 29; address by Blix, supra note 4, at 93.

11 See generally GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 218-27; Bexelius, supra note 100, at 29;
address by Blix, supra note 4, at 93.

(D. Rowat ed. 1965).
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takes the next step whether it be drafting a letter stating the reasons
for its dismissal or requesting more information from the complainant. If an investigation is undertaken, the assistant contacts the
agency and asks for the official file. The law requires public servants
to provide documents and to give information, and they cooperate.
The great majority of the cases are disposed of quickly after the file
is received. A letter to the complainant explaining the finding is
drafted for the Ombudsman, and the case is closed. No opinion is
published unless the case is one of those the Ombudsman considers
important enough to publish in his annual report to Parliament.
This publication procedure has produced a body of administrative
agency precedents which the Swedish agencies and Ombudsmen have
followed." 6
Other countries use a less cumbersome procedure. A complaint
which is not dismissed at once is sent to the agency for its explanation. The ombudsman then forwards the comment to the individual.
Most are satisfied at that point; if not, the ombudsman will investi1
gate the official file, or take other necessary steps. I
Inspection
A viable inspection system does not exist even in Sweden where
tradition and publicity cause citizens to feel and to act as if one
were imminent. The Swedish Ombudsman, however, inspects as
much as he can, making deft utilization of the spot check by examining files at random in the agency under scrutiny."'
Field inspection seems to be an essential element of any efficient and effective governmental organization. While the ombudsman can undoubtedly perform a valuable service here, especially by
unifying procedure, the task is beyond his capability as the institution is usually constituted. The public may have to rely on internal
audits by superiors in the structure to safeguard its interest. In
addition any individual subjected to administrative abuse always has
the option of filing a complaint with the ombudsman.
The plain facts are that no individual or small staff can adequately inspect all the agencies in a modern government. Further,
the inspection may emphasize paperwork at the expense of training
of agency personnel, internal audits or reorganization planning." 19
The extra documentation is just as apt to be that which exonerates
the official as that which adds comprehensiveness to the file or
assurance that safeguards were met. The Swedish Ombudsman has
2.

116See generally id. at 210-12. The annual report is discussed id. at 251-54. See also

Bainbridge, supra note 63, at 20, 1966 Hearings 109.
117 GELLI-iORN, supra note 9, at 213.
118Id. at 218.
lip Id. at 223.
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recognized the futility of his attempt to reach each unit even as
seldom as once a decade, and he has pleaded for permission to delegate routine complaints to the agency so as to free himself for exceptional complaints and more investigations.' 2"
3. News Coverage
The news media play a large role in policing administrative
agencies. They usually do not tackle a technical problem but are
superb at exacting every drop of emotion out of a human interest
story. While the ombudsman avoids being drawn into the personalities of the situation, his trained eye may spot a procedural deficiency or an inadequate law when others do not. He is free to delve
into the question on his own initiative.
F. Privilegesand Immunities
The ombudsman's proceedings and decisions have been made
immune from judicial review except for the subpoena power which
he must enforce through the courts. A declaratory judgment, however, may be obtained in some countries when a party alleges the
ombudsman has contravened the provisions of the act creating the
office. Except in Sweden the ombudsman has control over whether
the press shall have access to his work. The ombudsman has been
accorded the same immunity from civil and criminal actions as
judges, and he and his staff are privileged not to testify about their
work.

12 1

G. Investigative and ProceduralPowers
The ombudsman could be hamstrung without sufficient means
to carry out his task. The institution has been given the subpoena
power to compel any official to produce documents or to give testimony relating to an investigation.'
The ombudsman usually has
authority to establish his own rules of procedure for handling complaints, except for the jurisdictional restrictions already discussed.
12 8
He has authority to initiate investigations, usually without notice.
He may recommend a change in statute to Parliament or to the
120

Bexelius, supra note 100, at 43.

121See generally Bexelius, The Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, in THE OMBUDSMAN 22,

24-25 (D. Rowat ed. 1965) (Sweden) ; Kastari, The Chancellor of Justice and the
Ombudsman, id. 58, at 62-63 (Finland); Northey, New Zealand's Parliamentary
Commissioner, id. 127, at 135-37 (New Zealand); Os, The Ombudsman for Civil
Affairs, id. 95, at 105 (Norway); Pedersen, Denmark's Ombudsman, id. 75,
at 81 (Denmark). See also Aaron, Utah Ombudsman: The American Proposals, 1967
UTAH L. REV. 57-58, for a collection of the privileges and immunities afforded by
the bills proposed in the United States.
122 See GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 431; e.g., Ombudsman Act § 16 (1962)
(New Zealand), reprinted in 1966 Hearings 132-49.
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executive branch, or he may petition the agency for a change in its
24
procedures.1
Countries which have adopted the institution have not given
their ombudsmen sanctions as severe as those authorized in Sweden.
Only the Swedish and Finnish Ombudsmen have authority to require any civil servant to aid in investigating any matter, or to prosecute a public servant for the crime of dereliction of official duty.
Probably the most persuasive power an ombudsman has at his
command is publicity. Each existing ombudsman is required to file
an annual report with the parliament. The Swedish Ombudsman's
report, running up to 500 pages, outlines the work he has done and
contains a fully reasoned opinion for each important case. While
most officials never see it because it is printed in only 3,400 copies,
they appear to be aware of its contents through secondary sources,
i.e., the press and specialized publications. There is a determined
effort by officials to avoid the stigma of being named critically in
2

the report.'1

Even more influential than the annual report is the daily press
coverage given an ombudsman's opinions. It is through this medium
that his criticisms and suggestions gain wide circulation. The Swedish public believes it has excellent civil servants so it expects high
quality performance from them. When a serious shortcoming is
brought to light, the public treats it as a scandal. Civil servants on
the sharp end of the news story react quickly to avoid a recurrence.
Usually the news media does not identify the official's name or title,
but his haste to make corrections is no less because his identity will
1 26
be revealed in the annual report.

Experience has shown that an ombudsman seldom has any need
to invoke his procedural powers. The power of publicity and the
existence of the formal powers are subtle threats which have been
persuasive enough to assure the ombudsman cooperation and to gain
7
the information his work requires.'1
The ombudsman's primary powers, the right to investigate and
to recommend, are not insignificant assets because of the very nature of the institution. Since he has no formalized authority to impose his opinion on the agency, he must resort to the persuasive tools
of logic and reason augmented by the weight of his personal influence. If the agency rejects his suggestion without a good reason,
See generally GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 205-08; Anderman, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 11 AM. J. CoMp.L. 225-31 (1962), reprintedin 1966 Hearings96-100;
Bexelius, supra note 121, at 78-79.
12 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 251-54; Bainbridge, A Civilized Thing, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 13, 1965, reprinted in 1966 Hearings107-08.
126 See generally Lundvik, Comments on the Ombudsmen for Civil Affairs, in THE
OMBUDSMAN 44, 49-50 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
12 See generally GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 436-37.
124
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he can resort to publicity to roast the agency in the wrath of public
opinion. Publicity may not be the power to command, but it comes
close to compulsion. Again, this power has not been used frequently, nor have personal attacks been indulged.
H. Common Results
The ombudsman development outside Sweden and Finland is
relatively young, too new to evaluate with certainty that it will remain as effective as it now appears. Even so, its success in these
adoptive countries is generally recognized after the five to fifteen
years of trial it has undergone. The remarkable similarity of results
reached from Scandinavia to New Zealand to Nassau County, New
York, affords some assurance that the established pattern is stable.
Crank letters have comprised only a small percentage of the complaints. Most cases have been dismissed immediately or after a brief
investigation, and only ten to fifteen percent of the complaints have
been judged meritorious.1 2 The variations in results appear to be
due more to differences in classifying cases because of differing
jurisdictional limits and standards of judgment than to variations
in personality characteristics among the nationalities. 9
The small number of complaints found to be deserving is not
an indication the value of the office has been negligible; its mere
existence has considerable effect. Knowledge that its aid may be
invoked serves as an incentive to agency officials to give good
service."' Public confidence in public administration is increased
by the mere fact that anyone has the possibility of presenting his
case to the ombudsman.
If the public is to have faith in the integrity of its government,
accusations of scandal or other abuse should not go unanswered.
The governing officials can hardly assuage the public's suspicion
because they obviously have an interest in whitewashing a deficiency.
The ombudsman, however, can heal the sore before it becomes an
open wound.'
It is his responsibility to investigate these matters
in depth and to publicize his findings. If he is objective enough
to do that unhesitantly, he will do much to restore faith in government. Sometimes he will be responsible for a great shakeup,13 2 but
At the end of the first year of his work, Judge Samuel Greason, Public Protector of
Nassau County, felt that 20% of his cases were well founded. County Executive of
Nassau County, N.Y., Press Release, July 12, 1967.
129 GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 118-19.
130 Bexelius, supra note 121, at 41.
131 Id. at 42.
132 See, e.g., GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 57. The Finnish Ombudsman demanded the
indictment of two cabinet members and two former Ministers for improper use of
government funds. The cabinet members resigned immediately, and the two Ministers
were convicted.
128
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more frequently he will exonerate faithful government servants.
The ombudsman office is a safety valve to those who invoke its aid
as well as to the great majority who know they could call on it for
help if their particular impasse with government grows worse. It
vindicates directly the rights of only a small number whose complaint
succeeds, but at the same time it serves others indirectly.
The great strength of the concept has been the flexibility with
which it has adapted to the differing demands made in each new
home. Most observers credit the individuals who have served as
ombudsmen with its successes. The ombudsmen's skills have molded
the office to their countries while their stature has bolstered its
effectiveness.
This emphasis on personalism casts some doubt about the future capability of a single ombudsman assisted by a small staff.
Many governmental units have populations which already could
produce more complaints than one key individual can effectively
process. Some proponents of an official critic have suggested installing more than one ombudsman so there would be enough to
handle the volume of complaints. 3 3 But there is some question
whether a committee can establish and maintain the rapport and
identity with the people which has seemed necessary to public confidence. Some observers feel those characteristics would not be lost,
but there is little proof.1 3 ' The best approach for Colorado is to
avoid experimenting with a plural ombudsman since the relatively
small population makes it appear unnecessary here.
III. Is THERE A NEED IN COLORADO?

A. Government by Administrative Agencies
Governmental responsibility to regulate is increasingly falling
to the administrative agencies. Major issues in the lives of uncounted citizens are routinely settled by the administrative process.
Observers have estimated that three to four times as many decisions
are handed down by the agencies as by the courts. 13 51 With all this
governmental activity closely touching so many people, it was inevitable that irritations, suspicion and hostility would develop.
This is not to say that those who enter the public payroll automatically become "power-crazed, obtuse, venal, ill-mannered, and
E.g., Reuss and Munsey, The United States, in THE OMBUDSMAN 194-200 (D.
Rowat ed. 1965); testimony of Dr. William Winter before the Colorado House
State Affairs Committee, Feb. 28, 1967. Denver Post, Mar. 1, 1967, at 32, col. 1.
134Professor Gellhorn discounts the necessity of the personalism which has usually been
an obivous factor in ombudsman institutions. He cites the fact that Sweden actually
has three ombudsmen, the Chancellor of Justice, the Military Ombudsman, and the
Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, without any loss of public identity caused by this
multiplicity. GELIHORN, supra note 9, at 255.
133
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inefficient. ' 13 6 Criticism of the agency process is not necessarily
criticism of the individuals who comprise it. Human error will always be present, and American public servants are no different than
other citizens. It is doubtful that their governmental career works
any metamorphosis of their character, as many believe. Approximately one out of six employed Americans is paid from the public
treasury at some level of government. 3 It is contrary to logic and
daily experience to assert that so large a number is unfit to serve
the public faithfully and well.
If all agency personnel are not guilty of deliberate wrongdoing
or careless mistake, all are not innocent either. A Senate judiciary
subcommittee recently concluded that " 'undue influence,' 'illegal
ex parte communications between private individuals and government agencies' and a record of 'inaction, endless delays, favoritism
and arbitrary actions' . . . have created a 'wide-spread lack of public

confidence in the fairness of agency decisions.' ""
The great increase in the number and size of regulatory agencies
widens the opportunity for improper use of governmental power.
Modern administration is both complex and powerful. The immensity of its responsibilities accounts for a serious conflict in its own
goals: the merits and circumstances of each case should be weighed
carefully, but the public obligation to fulfill all its tasks forces the
agency to largely ignore individual differences. It can only operate
efficiently by standardizing its procedures to fit the average case
which cannot exist. Furthermore, the agency becomes so entangled
in its own efforts that it is in no position to objectively evaluate the
quality of the service it provides.
It is common parlance to label this burgeoning governmental
phenomenon, "bureaucracy," and to saddle it with all the unsavory
connotations that the term implies. The citizen increasingly views
himself as living at the mercy of an ever growing and inaccessible
administrative structure. A reasonably high level of public confidence in government is vital to a democracy. While America has
not reached a danger point, it is no exaggeration to say that dissatisfaction continually mounts as the opportunity for friction increases. The belief that governmental decisions are made frequently
by resort to influence peddling or outright graft is common. "3' 9 If
nothing worse, everyone is sure the public's best interest takes secondary consideration to the official's best interest. This type of suspicion has branded every politician's pronouncements suspect; it has
136W.
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kept many of the best qualified from entering public service; it has
encouraged cynicism and apathy. 4 ' The problem is one which no
modern government can ignore.
American governments have more elaborate safeguards against
governmental abuse than any other country in the world.' 4 ' The
safeguards are, ironically, so systematized, inflexible and misunder1 42
stood that they are themselves cited as evidence of red tape.
Furthermore, there is no right to review of administrative determinations beyond the strictly legal issues. 1 43 The individual is not interested in the legal technicalities; the sum total of his grievance may
be that he does not understand why the decision was adverse to his
interests. He may suspect the important facts were ignored, that
procedure was prejudicial, or that somehow he was the victim of foul
play. He wants a full review, far more than the terse technical response the appellate process can provide.' 4 4 The highly vaunted right
of appeal is too frequently illusory, if only because economics exerts
a tremendous pressure to accept the administrative determination.
A good indication of the inadequacy of the present system is
the current level of discontent reflected in the heavy volume of
congressional complaints at the national level. No one knows just
how large it is, but each House and Senate member receives several
hundred to several thousand constituent letters each week. Most of
these are requests for favors or aid and comfort of some sort rather
than a complaint about administrative abuse. Still, the latter com45
prise substantial numbers.
While the criticisms against the national administrative process
are best documented, the same indictment is applicable to state and
local levels of government.' 4 6 Probably the need is greater at the
state level because the quality of government performance is all too
frequently lower.' 4 7
B. ColoradoAdministrative Government
There are good reasons to doubt that the ombudsman institution can be transplanted with success into the American federal
0
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OMBUDSMAN 234, 235 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).

142 W.
143

GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 1 (1966).

Marx, The Importation of Foreign Institutions, in THE OMBUDSMAN 255, 258 (D.
Rowat ed. 1965).

1441Id. at 257-58.
14

5 See generally W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 58-66 (1966).

146
147

Abraham, supra note 141, at 236; see Krislov, A Restrained View, in THE OMBUDSMAN 246, 254 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).
Authorities cited note 146 supra.

1968

COLORADO'S OMBUDSMAN OFFICE

government.'4 8 The staggering size and diversity of the population
are foremost. The sheer volume of complaints would make anything
like personal review totally impossible. The ombudsman, faced with
a heterogeneous citizenry and keen competition for publicity, could
not develop the nationwide rapport which is essential. The complex
and delicate system of checks and balances which are unique to
America also militate against the proposal. The executive branch
would look askance at a legislative agent probing into its administrative processes. The doctrine of separation of powers which gives
rise to the executive privilege to conceal information would interfere with the ombudsman's investigation. The necessity of running
for re-election is a strong incentive for national legislators to deal
directly with their constituents. Therefore, congressmen have not
welcomed a national ombudsman who could receive complaints
and who would thus stand between them and their best chance of
re-election.' 49
The same objections are not so strong when a Colorado ombudsman is considered. 5 ° The problems of unwieldy geographic
size, population and diversity do not exist in Colorado. The institution has been found workable in Sweden with eight million people,
5
and Colorado's present population is estimated at two million.' '
An ombudsman in the traditional, personalistic sense would be
48

See generally Abraham, supra note 141, at 237-38; Krislov, supra note 146, at
245-54; Marx, supra note 143, at 258-63.
149 Representative Henry S. Reuss believes that the congressman's role as a mediator
between citizens and bureaucracy is an unshakeable part of American government
because the legislators feel the breadth and quality of their direct contact with their
constituents is the difference between re-election and defeat. Therefore, he proposes
creation of an Administrative Counsel of the Congress. Congressmen could refer
their constituents' complaints to the Administrative Counsel whose expert staff
would investigate and report to the Congressman. The legislator could use the
information to urge the agency to change an error, and he could reply to the constituent so he would not lose credit for the good deed. Reuss & Munsey, The United
States, in THE OMBUDSMAN 194-98 (D. Rowat ed. 1965). Representative Reuss'
bill was introduced in the House in 1963, but so far he has been unsuccessful in
gaining support for his plan. Abraham, supra note 141, at 237.
The supposition that congressmen depend on constituent service for re-election,
as well as several other points applicable to this article, is made vividly apparent in
a recent letter to The Denver Post:
There is no mystery about why Byron Rogers is returned to office
every two years, and will continue to be just as long as he chooses to serve.
He takes care of his constituents!
A phone call to his Denver office last week got right through to
Congressman Rogers himself. He listened attentively to my tale of woe
about government red tape gone wild, took notes, promised to look into
the matter and called back the very next day to report.
It happens he was unable to remedy the situation, but how comforting
to know that somebody cares.
Big government does not have to be impersonal.
Denver Post, July 24, 1967, at 19, col. 2.
150 Abraham, supra note 141, at 238.
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possible because the -volume of complaints would be manageable
by one official critic aided by a small staff. The ombudsman should
be able to command the attention of his public. He would not be
faced with the tremendous competition for publicity that would
block this development on a national level. Accounts of his work
would be assured of a statewide audience through the local newspapers and the local radio and television stations which extend their
influence throughout the state.
The problems created by the separation of powers are not so
easily dismissed. The Governor may have overshadowed the legislature in actual powers1" 2 as the President has surpassed Congress.
But the personal influence of the Governor is less pervasive and less
jealously guarded than that of the President, and it is likely that
competition for prestige would be proportionally less at the state
level. The legislature's agent could thus expect to be met with less
hostility by the executive branch, so the Governor's people might
less adamantly assert executive privilege to deny access to information. The legislature could no doubt resolve this problem by bestowing upon the ombudsman the authority to subpoena documents and
to compel testimony as has been done in the countries with the institution.' 5 3 The constitutionality of such powers has been upheld
against a due process challenge on the ground that purely investigative proceedings do not require all the safeguards of rule making
or adjudicatory functions.' 5 4 As long as the ombudsman can only
investigate without having authority to issue orders, the separation
of powers doctrine will not be violated.' 5 5
Granting that an ombudsman could be constitutionally fitted
into the governmental structure of the state, what does the future
152
153
154
155

Nader, Ombudsmen for State Governments, in THE OMBUDSMAN 240, 241 (D.
Rowat ed. 1965).
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to refuse the general assembly certain information. In 1950 the Regents of the
University of Colorado investigated their faculty for subversives after one professor
testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee that he had been a
member of the Communist Party from 1938 to 1943. The Regents undertook selfinvestigation to quiet the great public furor which arose and also to head off a legislative investigation. The report was kept confidential by the Regents. In 1951 members of the assembly demanded it be made public. This was not done, so the assembly
then demanded that it be turned over to the legislature in executive session. The
Regents again refused the demand for disclosure, but finally caucused with the
governor and legislative leaders to give them a summary. Other than this, the report
was never disclosed, although there was no court determination of the agency's right
to refuse. R. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME, Appendix B: The University of Colorado Investigates 290-304 (1955).
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in Colorado hold for an ombudsman? Several questions for which
there are no ready answers should be examined before any bold
prediction is made.
C. The Need in Colorado
The crucial issue is whether an ombudsman is needed. There
can be no clear cut statistical answer because there are no figures
by which to calculate the level of citizen dissatisfaction with administrative agencies. Random sampling could easily provide an answer,
but even if statistics were available there is no assurance they would
be useful. We need to know something about the intensity of dissatisfaction. Everyone could say they disliked their prior experience
with administration, but more pertinent is whether that affects their
faith in government.
We need to know whether the present complaints are meritorious, but even this information would provide no definite answer
to whether a Colorado ombudsman is needed. Even if complaints
are unfounded, they should be met head on as long as they are made
in good faith so that trust in government can be maintained. If they
are not justified the individual should be given an explanation, and
if they are justified a remedy should be sought.
Approaching the question of need from a different perspective
may be helpful. Colorado is not among the most populous of the fifty
states. Even so, a vast administrative network has been developed to
carry out state functions. There are departments, boards, divisions,
commissions and other units in great number - 212 by one count,
and more if some closely related units are counted separately.' 5 6
This bewildering array has properly been called "the headless
fourth branch of government."' 5 7 The state constitution neatly categorized government into the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches,"" but in recent years administrative agencies which are
neither one nor the other have been created without clear thought
where they fit. They have authority to promulgate rules which have
the effect of laws, they enforce the laws, and they adjudicate matters
of great importance. They thus have characteristics of each of the
three branches, but they are not effectively supervised by any of
them. The judiciary has no jurisdiction except over the few cases
which reach its appellate courts, so it cannot affect the administra156 State Management Analysis Office, Organization of State Government in Colorado
(Jan. 1967) (organizational chart based on the state statutes and budget groupings).
5
' 7TIME, July 31, 1964, at 57 (Senator Everett Dirksen referring to the federal rcgulatory agencies).
158 CoLo. CONST. art. III.
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tive agencies except in a tangential, sporadic fashion. The general
assembly meets for only four months in the long session and for
only three months in the biennial short session.15 9 It maintains no
permanent legislative oversight committee to keep an eye on the
agencies.' 6 0 The only supervision forthcoming from this branch is
the highly superficial review the general assembly can give an agency
when it passes on the annual budget.
The executive branch should be in the best position to check
administrative abuse. The Governor's singularity has placed him in
a bright spotlight of publicity which focuses on him the year around
rather than briefly during sessions of the assembly. He can call for
expert advice upon his legislation proposals, exercise party discipline
in the assembly, and prevail upon pressure groups to aid his legisBut the Governor of Colorado is practically
lative program.'
powerless to control actual administration of state functions. Several
of the most powerful department heads are elected directly.' " 2 The
Governor is placed in a much weaker position in relation to the
administrative agencies than in many other states by virtue of an
extremely strong state civil service program. He may appoint to
fill a vacancy, but he cannot remove a civil service official. They
serve almost indefinitely and can be removed only in accordance
with the civil service rules' 6 3 which strongly protect the public
servant.
The Governor's 1966 attempt to discipline the commissioner of
insurance is a case in point. The Governor took the commissioner
to task before the public for what he considered unlawful acceptance
of "any valuable thing" from the regulated insurance interests, and
he recommended removal from office. The Civil Service Commission, possibly feeling the heat of public opinion, fired the commissioner, but a Colorado district court ordered him reinstated
because the strict technicalities of the civil service laws had not
159 COLO. CONST. art. V, § 7. The general assembly is limited during the short session

to acting on the state budget and those subjects placed on the governor's call. Id.
160 The Legislative Council on June 22, 1964, authorized the Clerk of the House of

Representatives to review the rules and regulations adopted by Colorado administrative agencies. Mr. Donald H. Henderson's report contained graphic evidence of the
need for some sort of permanent review of agency rule making. Rules of nine of
the twenty-three licensing agencies were studied, and all or part of the rules of seven
were found invalid. The shortcoming was failure to comply with the requirement of
notice established by the Administrative Procedure Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 3-16-1 to -6 (1963). COLO. LEG. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 155.
161 Cf. Nader, supra note 152.
162 Secretary of state, attorney general, state treasurer. CoLo. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3;
Regents of the University of Colorado. Id. art. IX, § 12.
163 State Civil Service Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-5-1 to -32 (1963). See particularly § 26-5-23 for dismissal procedure. COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 13 provides
that appointments to positions classified as civil service employment must be based
on competitive tests of competence.
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been met. 164 The commissioner remained in office, but the Governor's actions probably were an effective reminder to him and
others in similar positions. The problem with leaving this sort of
supervision to the Governor is one of logistics. He simply does
not have the time nor the facilities to take on this additional task
16 5
and to devote the necessary time to it.
In the present situation the Colorado agencies are relatively
free to interpret and apply the law as they see fit without effective
control from any source. The delegations of power to them are
necessarily broad and vague. They must use their judgment to
determine what the law is. The problem is that their biases, although
inherent in any exercise of judgment, may not be what the assembly
contemplated or what the standards expressed by the legislature
would mean to a court. " The individuals whose interests are
adversely affected may protest, but that probably will not be persuasive. The agency interpretation gains significance as a precedent,
and furthermore it is characteristic of human nature to resist
change.' 67
An example of a common administrative abuse is that the
licensing agencies all too frequently have been used by the regulated
industry or profession to close the door to competition rather than
Denver Post, Mar. 11, 1967, at 1, col. 1. The district court ruled that there had been
no compliance with the statute requiring filing of written charges that the employee
failed to comply with commission standards.
Another example of the Governor's lack of effective control over civil service
officials was cited by the Colorado Legislature's Committee on Government Reorganization as the committee was attempting on November 11, 1967, to define the
Governor's role vis-a-vis the heads of state departments:
[The] dispute [was] between former Gov. Steve McNichols and William
M. Williams, head of the old Planning Division. When Williams refused
to follow McNichols' orders, the governor had to bypass Williams to get
certain jobs done. But Williams kept his job because he was protected by
the Civil Service system.
The committee proposed the following statute for enactment by the legislature
as part of the reorganization plan:
The governor, in accordance with Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, shall be the chief executive officer of the state. Subject to the
Constitution and the laws of this state, the governor shall be responsible
for formulating and administering the policies of the executive branch of
the state government.
In the execution of these policies, the governor shall have full powers
of supervision, approval, direction and appointment over all principal
departments....
Where a conflict arises between the head of a principal department
and the governor or between the heads of principal departments as to the
administration of such policies, such conflicts shall be resolved by the
governor and the decision of the governor shall be final.
Denver Post, Nov. 12, 1967, at 28, col. 1.
165 It should be noted that an ombudsman could have done no more in this situation
than the Governor. But the Governor's attempt to remove the insurance commissioner
was certainly fruitful in the long run, and the ombudsman cannot be criticized
because he could have done the same thing.
166 Contra, Byse, A Modest Proposal, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 58-59 (S. Krislov & L. Musolf ed. 1964).
167 See, e.g., statement of Senator Edward V. Long, 1966 Hearings 2.
164
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to protect the public interest by admitting qualified applicants.1 68
Another common fault is that the agencies have not usually exercised
their powers to promulgate rules, preferring instead to decide each
case on the basis of standards which remain unrevealed to the public.
Colorado's Administrative Procedure Act offers little help in correcting this shortcoming because it does not require promulgation of
rules.

16 9

Agency abuses in administering the law continue unchecked
largely because there is no one unit charged with supervision of the
agencies. This fact makes them virtually independent; this is the
strongest single argument for adopting an ombudsman. Many of
the most constructive changes for which he could work are the
sort of thing which no individual citizen would have standing to
contest. The serious problem of agency operation by secret law could
be attacked by an individual affected by it in a particular case, but
only an official critic could systematically review its use in each
administrative unit and issue a single opinion applicable to all
agencies.
Ralph Nader has compiled an impressive list of some of the
administrative abuses which a state ombudsman could attack:
preferential treatment and influence peddling, inadequate and unpublished regulations, wrongful detention, state police overzealousness or laxity, unjust procedures in agency hearings, arbitrary censorship or secrecy, agency reluctance or refusal to give explicit reasons
for decisions, patronage excesses, inefficiencies and delays by state
personnel, undesirable conditions in prisons and mental institutions,
payoffs and kickbacks in state contracts, and discriminatory enforcement or flagrant non-enforcement of state laws.' 70

IV.
A.

THE PRESENT COLORADO SITUATION

Colorado's Proposed Legislation for an Ombudsman

An ombudsman bill was introduced in each house of the general
assembly in 1967.171 While neither bill was enacted, 72 they are
important indicators of the type of institution their proponents
would transplant to Colorado. It is probable that another ombudsman
bill will be introduced at some future date in this state, and that it
168 Hamilton, How to Turn Regulation into License, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
63 (S. Krislov & L. Musolf ed. 1964) (federal agencies); Nader, supra note 152,
at 242.
69
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-2 (1963).
170 Nader, supra note 152, at 246.
171 S.B. 192, 46th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1967), was introduced in the senate
by Demorcatic Senator Anthony Vollack and Democratic Representative Tom Bastien
on Feb. 10, 1967. H.B. 1223, 46th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1967), was introduced in the house by Republican Representative Tom Grimshaw on the same day.
172 The house bill was reported favorably by the Committee on State Affairs, but it was
killed in the powerful Rules Committee. The senate bill died in the Judiciary Committee without having had a hearing.
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will embody the same basic features as the original models. This
is the pattern that ombudsman proposals have taken in the nine
other states which have considered such legislation. 73 Therefore,
it will be useful to consider these bills.
Both bills would create a strong ombudsman in the traditional
sense. They are alike in many features, but there are some important
differences. 1 74 Both bills would make the ombudsman an agent of
the legislature. The senate bill would establish an eight member
ombudsman committee to nominate candidates for the office, to
supervise the ombudsman's work, and to receive the annual report.
The house bill would create a committee, but only to nominate
candidates, not to supervise and not to receive an annual report.
In fact, it does not require a report. The ombudsman would simply
be authorized to report to the general assembly or governor as he
deems advisable.
The house bill would give the ombudsman broad authority to
investigate any administrative action. There is no limit on the authority to examine discretionary acts, and no requirement that
administrative remedies be exhausted. The senate bill attempts to
articulate some limits on jurisdiction. It allows the ombudsman to
recommend corrective action to the agency if he finds any decision
was "unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or discriminatory, or was
based upon a mistake of law or fact," or that a discretionary power
was exercised arbitrarily or for an improper purpose. The ombudsman has wide discretion to refuse to investigate a complaint
if there is an adequate remedy elsewhere or if the matter is more
than one year old.
These broad grants of jurisdiction, without a requirement that
other remedies be exhausted or that stale complaints be rejected,
would no doubt lead to an ever expanding assumption of jurisdiction
as it has in other countries. The senate provision allowing the
ombudsman discretion on these two points is desirable, but there
must be some check or that limitation could become no more than
a mild exhortation. Certainly the language granting such broad
jurisdiction could be seized upon to legitimate recommendations on
any agency action. Experience abroad shows that it could and would
happen. Committee review would be necessary to keep this power
in proper bounds.
The ombudsman would have full investigative powers by either
proposal, including subpoena power for testimony and documents
whether the person is a state employee or not and whether the docu173 Aaron,

Utah Ombudsman: The American Proposals, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 32, 34 n.13.
house bill was patterned after an Illinois bill, and the senate bill was based on
a proposal introduced in California.

174 The
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ment is within the control of a state agency or not. Persons who
mislead or obstruct the ombudsman could be found guilty of a
misdemeanor and fined up to $1,000.
One disturbing aspect of both bills is that they would prevent
the ombudsman from disclosing any information obtained "except
for the purpose of giving effect to this act."1'75 He could thus make
facts public when such action might be conducive to bringing about
a procedural change. There is grave doubt, however, that this
language would allow him to engage in the educational campaign
which other ombudsmen have undertaken. The public must have
a keen awareness of the type of work being done, and possibly
such public education qualifies as furthering the purposes of the
act. But surely the scholarly articles which other governments find
so helpful would be precluded. There is no need for this severe
restriction; those reports should be allowed as long as they do not
divulge names or other personal information.
The House Committee on State Affairs favorably recommended
its bill, and the amendments it made offer striking information about
the aspects with which the legislators were most concerned. The
amendments are encouraging. Instead of election by two-thirds of
each house, the ombudsman would be elected by a majority of each
party in each house, i.e., four separate votes would be necessary. This
is a strong and definite move to place the ombudsman above partisan
considerations. On the other hand, it may be difficult to find someone
whom all four groups would support. By another change, the
ombudsman would be restricted to two full terms of six years
each rather than being eligible for three full terms. The amendment
means the committee appreciated the possibility of stagnation in
office.
The committee struck the requirement that the ombudsman
be a lawyer and retained the prerequisite of being learned in the
processes of law and government.' 7 6 An ombudsman without legal
training would be forced to turn frequently for advice to an attorney,
creating a real danger that his judgments would not be his own.
It would inevitably slow his work by requiring him to take more
time to learn the applicable law or to confer with his adviser.
The provision defeats three of the most important aspects of the
institution: speed, personalism, and expertise. Quick action is necessary or else another bureaucracy with complex procedural rules
175 H.B. 1223, 46th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. § 3 (4)

(1967). A similar restriction
is expressed in S.B. 192, 46th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. § 11 (8) (1967).
176Testimony of Professor Donald Seney of the Political Science Department of the
University of Denver before the State Affairs Committee on Feb. 28, 1967. See also
text accompanying notes 44-52 for a discussion of legal training as a prerequisite.
Lt. Governor Hogan does not have a legal background, and he considers that no
disadvantage.
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for giving service will be created. Personalism is important to public
confidence. The ombudsman must believe in his opinions and be
able to argue them persuasively in his daily contacts without reading
from a staff memorandum. Personal expertise is essential to convincing a reluctant agency there is another way. The whole tenor
of the office calls less for institutional expertise than for personal
ability. In short, the ombudsman must above all be his own man.
The amendment would severely restrict his ability to so establish
himself.
The committee added a provision requiring that someone on
the staff have administrative agency experience. Sweden has recently
found it necessary to appoint specialists from the various administrative fields to the staff, 1 77 and it seems as important in Colorado
as there. This assistant may be appointed from the state government without loss of tenure or retirement benefits, an idea which
could well be extended to the ombudsman too. The house bill would
have allocated $60,000 for the first year's budget. The ombudsman's
salary would be set on a par with that of a judge of the Colorado
Supreme Court. The ombudsman could select his own staff and set
their salaries as he might choose out of the budget. On the other
hand, the senate bill made no appropriation and empowered the
committee to establish salaries, powers which could well destroy the
independence of the office.
Both bills would explicitly make the ombudsman an agency
in the legislative branch. This in itself frees him of the requirements of the state Administrative Procedure Act which requires due
process in rule making and adjudication by agencies in the executive
branch. 1' A requirement to proceed by elaborate APA rules would
stifle his efforts and go far to make the institution just another
bureaucracy.
Each bill alone is woefully inadequate, but taken together their
parts arrive at a facsimile of the traditional ombudsman. They would
create a surprisingly strong ombudsman, place him above politics,
and leave him with virtually no supervision. The weakness of the
proposals lies primarily in their lack of limits on jurisdiction over
stale complaints, over discretionary actions, and over complaints for
which other remedies exist. The drafters drew on some of the strong
points of bills proposed in other states, e.g., giving the ombudsman
power to apply to a court for a declaratory judgment to determine
his authority to conduct an investigation or to issue a report when
either is disputed. And the bills go to great length to assure the
177Anderman, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 11 Am. J. CoMP. L. 225, 237 (1962),
reprinted in 1966 Hearings96, 105.
17
8 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-16-1 to-6 (1963).
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investigated agency a chance to correct a deficiency before it is criticized publicly.
The bills present a potpourri of ideas rather than a comprehensive plan. The legislature would be well advised to substitute most
of the model bill prepared by the Harvard Student Legislative Research BureauT 9 if and when another proposal is considered. The
model bill is impressive for the comprehensive scheme it presents,
and for its limitation on jurisdiction. However, the Harvard idea
for gubernatorial appointment with the advice and consent of the
senate should be rejected in favor of the State Affairs Committee
amendment. The latter assures bipartisan selection by the general
assembly, consistent with the theory that the ombudsman is the
agent of the legislature.
B. The Lieutenant Governor as Ombudsman
Colorado has an unprecedented opportunity to shed valuable
light on the entire question of transplanting an ombudsman to
America since Lieutenant Governor Mark Hogan voluntarily assumed that role for the state. Mr. Hogan announced that he proposed to act as intermediary for people who have problems "in their
relations with that massive, bureaucratic maze called government....
The people of Colorado need this service. For the average citizen
who has business to transact in government, the complex agencies
sometimes are not only baffling but also forbidding."' 8 0 The public
has responded. After the first ten months, Mr. Hogan reports receiving approximately 1,325 cases.' 8 '
The voluntary assumption of the official critic's role by the
Lieutenant Governor means several things. He can compile solid,
statistical evidence of Colorado's need for an ombudsman. For the
first time the number of complaints as well as their merits can be
made amenable to logical discussion rather than based on emotional and intuitive assumptions. The capacity of an official critic
to get results and to stimulate change in statutes or procedure can
be tested. The ability of the people to understand the institution,
and the willingness of the news media to support its efforts can be
analyzed. Perhaps even the traditional value of the institution as an
advocate of better government and a means of increasing the public's confidence in its government can be evaluated.
Not only is this opportunity to evaluate based on solid data
important to Colorado, but it should reveal important facts for the
1792 H.ARV. J. LEGIS. 213, 221-26 (1965).
180 Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, Jan. 15, 1967, at 6-D, col. 1.

181 Interview with Mark Hogan, Lieutenant Governor of Colorado, in Denver, Nov. 2,
1967. The following statements attributed to Mr. Hogan were made during this
interivew unless another source is indicated.
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rest of the United States. It is a unique undertaking. While Hawaii
has enacted an ombudsman bill it has not funded the operation and
there is no present intent to do so.18 2 Michigan has, so far as is
known, the only other functioning ombudsman office outside Colorado. The secretary of state of Michigan appointed an administrative assistant to receive citizen complaints in 1966,113 but this appointee can be no more than an aide to a state officer. Many state
elected officials have received complaints in the past, but those
efforts cannot be considered ombudsman institutions by any fair
definition.
Colorado's experience should be more valuable because the
present Lieutenant Governor has a remarkably independent position.
He is a Democrat holding high office under a Republican governor,
and working with an assembly controlled by Republicans. Whatever
else can be said about the political implications, it is clear that Mr.
Hogan is not functioning as an administrative assistant for an elected
official of the majority party. He holds a virtually autonomous position with no need to act as the majority party's chief of whitewash.
A public protector was appointed along party lines last year
in Nassau County, New York. 84 His work in a metropolitan county
government will be instructive for the states, but Colorado's experience at the state level should surpass it in value.
The only other ombudsman office in operation handles complaints against the federal government and is closer to congressional
constituent casework than the functions of an ombudsman. This last
individual was appointed by Congressman Henry S. Reuss to his
staff to collect data in what will be the congressman's renewed effort to establish a national ombudsman counsel. The work will be
confined to Congressman Reuss's Fifth Congressional District in
Wisconsin. The appointment was effective in February 1967, and
the purpose is to collect data for only a few months after which the
office apparently will be abandoned and the results published."'
Despite its great potential, much of what Colorado's experience
could show will not be realized, or at least not until the present
operation is conducted on a more systematic basis. Mr. Hogan has
stated that he and his staff are making no efforts to collect or to
record data. The reasons are understandable: he has not been allocated state funds for a staff, which forces him to rely on volunteer
assistance; he has no intention to create another bureaucracy with
182 10 STATE GOVERNMENT NEws, July 1967, at 7. See also Rocky Mountain News,

June 15, 1967, at 55, col. 1.
183Secretary of State of Michigan, Press Release, Aug. 31, 1966.
184Authorities and material cited note 7 supra.
185 N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1967 § 1, at 67, col. 1.
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elaborate rules of operating procedure; and lastly he does not wish
to abuse the confidence of citizens by recording personal matters.
These factors seem insignificant, however, when they are measured against the potential importance of what Mr. Hogan has undertaken. They are obstacles which could be overcome. For instance,
since much of the work is first received, then investigated, and perhaps resolved over the telephone, it seems feasible that certain information concerning the complaint could be recorded in a daily log.
Not much recordation is necessary to provide good statistical information. A few simple notations of basic facts should provide
enough data on which to properly evaluate the institution. Foremost
is an accurate counting of the volume. The agency against which
the complaint is lodged is important, and the disposition of cases
is essential to a valid study. Statistics could then be readily compiled
at periodic intervals. The following information would be sufficient:
1. Volume of Cases
Complaints
Referrals from Legislators
Undertaken on Own Initiative
2. Agency Complained Against
3. Type of Complaint
Administrative Procedure
Adequacy of Opinions
Factual Consideration
Inadequacy in Present Law
Misconduct of Officials
4. Disposition of Cases
Requests for Information
Dismissed Without Investigation
Declined for Want of Jurisdiction
Recommended Consultation with Attorney
Lacked Merit
Investigated
Dismissed as Unjustified
Dismissed - No Direct Action Possible
Criticisms or Recommendation Issued
Time is probably the critical factor in the Lieutenant Governor's
ability to collect this data. Mr. Hogan should not be saddled with
great burdens, but by assuming the duty on his own initiative he
takes on some responsibility to the public to provide the means by
which to rationally evaluate the institution. His primary concern,
he states, is to serve the public's need for an official critic. The
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public's need for reliable information about an official ombudsman
for Colorado is hardly less.
Recording these facts would not result in the creation of another
bureaucracy. Those complaints received or answered by letter are
already filed. Use of the telephone has proven beneficial so its use
should be continued in this particular office. But the receipt of a
case and its disposition should be logged in a docket whether it is
handled by letter, personal interview or telephone.
The Colorado proposals for an ombudsman would have required that complaints be made by a signed letter as is the rule
elsewhere. At the hearing before the house committee, Professor
Seney of the Political Science Department of the University of Denver,
criticized this requirement. He said, "A person ought to be able to
come into the ombudsman's office and, in a sense, pour his heart
out. In many cases individuals might hesitate to complain if a written statement were required."' 6
Evidently in response, the committee amended the house bill
to allow receipt of a verbal complaint if it is put in writing, presumably by the staff, and signed by the complainant. This is the
procedure which has been workable in Sweden, but almost all complaints have been received there in writing. Mr. Hogan's experience
already shows that Colorado and probably the rest of the United
States differs from Sweden. Many individuals bring complaints to
Colorado's Ombudsman by personal visit, and large numbers lodge
complaints by placing a telephone call. This is an indication that
the next assembly to consider an ombudsman bill should have data
from Mr. Hogan so it can intelligently decide whether to require
that a complaint be written. Mr. Hogan's initial evaluation is that
some of the most meritorious cases come to him by the telephone.
Identity of the individuals involved with a complaint need not
be revealed by a recordation of the work being done. Ombudsmen
in other countries log a case by a numerical or alphabetical designation so that the annual report does not disclose confidences. Of
course, the agency criticized or exonerated is listed, but usually there
is no need to reveal the identity of the agency personnel involved.
The present Ombudsman's work has provided enough information to make a preliminary and cautious evaluation. Mr. Hogan states
that about 1,325 cases have been received in the first ten months of
the undertaking, from January through October 1967. The volume
of complaints did not decrease when the assembly adjourned, as
Mr. Hogan had expected. He anticipates that it will double next
year as awareness of the service spreads.

I" Testimony

before the State Affairs Committee on Feb. 28, 1967. Denver Post, Mar. 1,
1967, at 32, col. 1.
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Mr. Hogan's evaluation of these cases is revealing. About forty
percent have come from citizens who have private legal problems,
and whom he has referred to their attorney or to a legal aid society.
These are the cases over which an official ombudsman would have
no jurisdiction because they do not involve complaints against governmental agencies. Rather than refusing to recommend the applicable source of assistance, Mr. Hogan has not hesitated to advise
the individual to seek legal assistance. His inclination not to turn
a deaf ear follows the pattern of the ombudsmen in other countries.'" 7
Still they handle less requests for information and legal advice than
this 88 because their public is better educated about the ombudsman
function. Mr. Hogan does not consider these cases to be requests
for information, but bona fide complaints which the individual does
not understand present a private legal question. He considers only
ten percent of his cases to have been requests for information.
The Colorado experience does reflect the widespread demand
for some sort of governmental information service; however, it is
doubtful whether that need can be met by an ombudsman. It seems
clear that information services could not be provided within the
traditional ombudsman scheme. To do so would expand the activity
of the office greatly, making a small staff and a personalistic system
unworkable.' 89 Mr. Hogan no doubt receives more than his share
of information requests because, being self-appointed, he has been
in no position to undertake a public education program. He also
feels that once one individual in need of advice is steered in the
proper direction, others become aware of this service, want it for
themselves when the need arises, and therefore request information
from his office. He is undoubtedly correct when he says that his
unofficial operation allows him wider jurisdiction than an ombudsman working in accordance with a statute would have.
Another forty percent of the cases received have been quickly
resolved by a few telephone calls. These involve situations concerning some governmental branch, although not necessarily the
state government. Many citizens have demonstrated a marked lack
of knowledge about the responsibilities of the different levels of
government. Those complaints involving the federal government
1' E.g., the Danish Parliamentary Directives instruct the Ombudsman to take no action
on a complaint beyond his jurisdiction other than to refer it to the appropriate
authority and to give the complainant reasonable guidance. GELLHORN, supra note 9,
at 21-22.
188 Cf. GELLHORN, Supra note 9, at 134.
18 9 The need by the public for better information about administrative agency functions
has been a major criticism made by the New Zealand Ombudsman. Id. Japan has
over 9,000 Civil Liberties Commissioners who give advice to hundreds of thousands
of citizens annually about "nearly everything under the sun." Id. at 411. At least
one writer feels that an ombudsman should dispense general information about
governmental agencies as one of his primary duties. Aaron, supra note 173, at 59.
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have been referred to the appropriate federal agency, and those involving the local government have been referred to the appropriate
local office. This service is an important function of the institution,
and it should become a part of any official ombudsman program in
Colorado.
That portion of this forty percent which involves state agencies
varies widely in its scope. Many complaints arise because there has
been a lack of communication between the agency and the individual.
A large share of the complainants have been given inadequate information or no explanation at all. Even though they have negotiated, the agency is sometimes unable or unwilling to understand
the individual's position. In some cases the Lieutenant Governor
or his staff have mediated by locating the problem, drawing out the
pertinent facts from the citizen and providing them to the agency,
or arranging for the agency to meet again with the individual.
In one case a young couple decided to move from California
to Denver. They flew to Denver to purchase a home and returned
to California to move their personal property. They bought a motorcycle in California, paid a sales tax and listed their new Denver
address on the registration papers. When they brought it to Colorado and applied for a Colorado certificate of title, the revenue
department insisted on collecting a sales tax for what it thought had
to be a taxable sale within the state. The two sides could not make
the other see their point. Someone told the couple that the Lieutenant
Governor was serving as an ombudsman so they contacted him. He
intervened, explained the situation to the department, and the new
Coloradans got their title without paying a double sales tax.
Another case involved a simple failure by the agency to meet
its obligations. The state brand commissioner is required to inspect
the brands of cattle shipped out of the state, and to collect a tax
for each animal as well as an additional fee for the promotion of
Colorado beef sales. The livestock owner is entitled to a refund of
the promotional fee if he chooses, but he must apply within ten days
on vouchers to be furnished by the beef board.' 9 ° One cattleman
did not receive the necessary application forms from the agency until
after the deadline had passed. He was then refused the refund.
After intervention by the Lieutenant Governor the agency supplied
the forms and paid the rancher his refund.
Other cases in this category have involved situations where the
individual went to an agency and was informed by it that they were
not the unit responsible for his problem. The agency personnel either
could not or did not refer the citizen to the proper agency. The
0
19
Ch. 69,

§§ 15, 17, [1965] Colo. Laws 253, 254.
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Lieutenant Governor has located the department and given the individual the information.
Mr. Hogan estimates that twenty percent of the cases have been
investigated at some depth. Of these, he feels a large share have
been meritorious complaints. His efforts as an ombudsman have
usually resulted in some gain for the individual. Even in those few
cases in which he has had to tell the complainant that nothing could
be done, he feels confident they have been appreciative because they
are at least satisfied everything possible under the present state of
the law has been done. They are perhaps able to understand and
accept a decision they had previously resisted. As Mr. Hogan expressed it, they appreciate the fact that, "Passing the buck has
stopped," and that someone has told them frankly and convincingly
that nothing else can be done.
Professor Seney, speaking for the ombudsman bill before the
State Affairs Committee, said an ombudsman office inevitably would
"be a sounding board for chronic complainers," but he doubted that
such activity would "take over the office." 19 ' Lieutenant Governor
Hogan's experience offers solid encouragement on this point. He
had expected a good many querulous complaints. After ten -months
he could classify only three instances as "crackpot" cases of the
type where "someone tells me they have been visited by little, green
men from outer space and no governmental agency will pay any
attention." His experience supports that of other ombudsmen who
rarely receive complaints indicating derangement, or complaints that
19 2
are frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith.
C. Public Reaction to Colorado's Ombudsman
Lieutenant Governor Hogan has mapped a very precarious route
for himself. It weaves through the ins and outs of Colorado politics
and between the public's desire for service in government and its
strong distaste for increased state taxation. The Denver voters, for
instance, have emphatically rejected every proposed salary increase
for elected city officials since 1951.19' The Colorado General Assembly, no doubt reflecting a general and sharply felt abhorrence
of increases in state spending, has almost as consistently refused to
19 4
raise the pay of elected state officials.
191 Testimony, note 186 supra.
19 E.g., GELLHORN, supra note 9, Table VII, n.a. at 119 (New Zealand).

Denver Post, July 10, 1967, at 14, col. 1 (editorial). This refusal to increase salaries
is all the more significant in light of the fact that salary rates average 30% to 50%
lower than most of the salary scales of U.S. cities of comparable size. Report of
Charter Salary Committee, Denver, Colorado, Mar. 14, 1966, on file in the mayor's
office.
104Salaries of Colorado's top-ranking elected and appointed officials have been raised
substantially, effective in 1970. Ch. 318, §§ 1-2, [1967) Colo. Laws 594-95. These
salaries have remained at low levels since 1958, ch. 42, §§ 1-2, (1958] Colo. Laws
236-37, and the general assembly had refused repeatedly until 1967 to increase them.
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An editorial in the Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph mirrors this public opinion opposing increased spending, but surely
its almost reactionary viewpoints will not be accepted by the majority of an intelligent electorate once it has an understanding of
the ombudsman office:
"Watch it! You are in the process of being softened up for the
creation of another tax-supported, politically motivated and controlled bureaucratic agency to eat out your substance." . . . [It]
would provide for "ombudsmen" - that is, more bureaucrats - to
stand between the already put upon taxpayers and the bureaucracy

itself.
[I]f, as is certainly true, "the bureaucratic maze called government" has grown complex, baffling and forbidding, the answer,
as should be obvious to anyone of even average intelligence, is to
reduce the size, power and expense of the bureaucracy, rather than
adding to it with more full time stenographers and full time administrative assistants.
The people of Colorado need "ombudsmen" and more bureaucratic "special pleaders" like they need more holes in their heads.
. .. "Let the Swedes and Russians and other socialistic countries

keep their obmudsmen. We have eough troubles (and19 5taxes) as it is
without adopting more old world socialistic ideas."'

Even political science professors, who should perhaps be better
informed than emotional editorialists of the history and traditions
of the institution, are not immune from misunderstanding. Also
testifying on behalf of the bill before the State Affairs Committee,
Dr. William Winter, Chairman of the Political Science Department
at the University of Colorado, suggested that a commission rather
than an individual should assume the duties of an ombudsman.
His reasons were that a commission " 'could represent several types
of professional orientation' and would lessen the risk that a single
ombudsman 'might go out chasing administrators just for the sake
of knocking off a few administrators.' "I" The professor's obvious
distrust ignores the strong tradition of integrity and objectivity which
ombudsmen have established everywhere they hold office. In all
the years of their service, not one ombudsman has been implicated
in scandal or any similar misuse of office. There is no reason to
believe Colorado will have a different experience. " 7
With vitriolic and misleading statements emanating from influential and eminent sources in Colorado, one would expect the
195 Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, Jan. 15, 1967, at 6-D, col. 1.
198 Testimony before the State Affairs Committee of the Colorado House of Representatives on Feb. 28, 1967. Denver Post, Mar. 1, 1967 at 3 col 1 See text at note 134
supra for an argument against a plural ombudsman for Colorado.
197 Professor Winter's apprehension is similar to that expressed in an editorial in the
Denver Post entitled, "Who'll Watch the Watcher." It suggests, perhaps facetiously,
that "we might within a decade be hearing that we need some ombudsman-watchers."
Denver Post, Feb. 9, 1967, at 14, col. 8.
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Lieutenant Governor to tread warily. He has done just that. He
has not sought the publicity which the public must have to understand and to support the institution. He has not advocated that the
legislature accept the ombudsman bills. Right now his ombudsman
experience leaves him convinced that his work is essential. "One
hundred percent of these cases present work which ought to be done.
But how it should be done, who should do it, where the office should
fit in, and whether it can be done economically are questions about
which I'm no longer so sure." Mr. Hogan gives the impression that
he still feels an ombudsman could effectively work out of the lieutenant governor's office, and that it would have the advantage of
not requiring another officer on the public payroll, nor requiring
another office and equipment. It probably would necessitate funds
for a full time secretary and an administrative assistant.
If constitutional amendment number one on the 1968 ballot
is approved by the people of Colorado, the offices of governor and
lieutenant governor will be unified politically. Each party's choices
for the top two seats will either stand or fall together at the polls.
Then the lieutenant governor would not be a stranger in his own
administration. While Mr. Hogan realizes that a lieutenant governor might under those circumstances become a full working partner of the governor, he entertains some belief that the additional
duties of an ombudsman could also be assumed.
With political traps lying all about him, the Lieutenant Governor is in no position to advocate that Colorado create an ombudsman in its traditional sense. "If the choice was between spending
$50,000 for an ombudsman," he said, "or for education, I would
not have to hesitate to choose education." Still he is convinced that
the work must be done by someone, and he is determined to fulfill
that responsibility for the remaining three years of his term.
The lesson seems clear. The ombudsman institution must remain above party politics or it cannot perform its functions. Intermeshed with politics, it would not be able to retain the trust of the
people, the news media or the legislature. Mr. Hogan is not naive;
he says his primary concern is in improving government for the
people, but he admits that doing this work well can help him in
his political career. However, it would not be accurate or fair to say
that his work so far has involved partisan politics. For instance, he
has not tried to exert his influence to gain favors for his clientele.
He has made it a practice to approach an agency with respect for
its own expertise and procedures. He asks what the criteria are and
whether the individual has met those standards. Then he evaluates
the worth of the procedure or the law as he evaluates the facts of
the complaint.
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In at least one case he was able to bring about a change in
statute. A Canadian driving a diesel equipped Mercedes-Benz stopped
in northeastern Colorado to fill his tank with fuel. The gasoline
station could not sell him diesel fuel because he had not purchased
the tax stamps from the state police. He could not understand why
the stations could not sell the stamps directly so the station manager referred him to the Lieutenant Governor. Mr. Hogan agreed.
After discovering that the state police saw no merit in having to
leave their patrol to collect taxes, he persuaded the assembly to tack
an amendment on to a pending road bill. The bill was enacted and
the change was made within the week. By then the Canadian was
out of state, probably never to return. The incident is also some
indication that the work so far has not been politically oriented1" 8
because a Canadian has no vote in Colorado.
Mr. Hogan has received some constituent casework from the
legislature. The members have no personal staff, and they are not
in session long enough to handle many constituent complaints. Mr.
Hogan does what he can to resolve problems and then replies directly to the individual citizen, being careful to mention the legislator's name.
There are some disturbing features of Mr. Hogan's ombudsman function. First, no matter how earnestly any elected official
serving as an ombudsman tries to prevent it, his very party affiliation
injects some degree of politics into the institution. This is precisely
what must be avoided if the office is to succeed as it should.
Secondly, a crippled mutation of the ombudsman institution is
being presented to the public. Colorado now has a blend of the
traditional ombudsman and the traditional caseworking politician.
The present unofficial function cannot receive the widespread educational publicity an official ombudsman should have. Therefore,
misconceptions about the office are no doubt gaining currency, and
increasingly so because the volume of complaints is growing as
awareness of the office spreads.
Third, the present ombudsman perhaps conceives of his function too narrowly. He has concentrated more on getting results in
a particular case rather than in improving procedure statewide because his unofficial status does not authorize him to supervise statewide. The latter function has not been ignored, however. One case
serves as a good example. A lady complained that the instructions
on the cosmetology licensing examination were so unclear as to
prevent a fair test. While Mr. Hogan was investigating he discovered that two tests were kept on file. One battery was for Cau198 Mr. Hogan discounted political motivations in an earlier account of his work.
Denver Post, Mar. 27, 1967, at 13, col. 1.
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casians and the other was reserved for minority groups. He referred
the matter to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission which had no
difficulty in ending the discrimination.19 9
Fourth, the lack of a staff and the demands of his other duties
require Mr. Hogan to forego personal supervision of many cases.
While difficult or important cases get his attention, his administrative assistant and his volunteer workers frequently handle all
aspects of a complaint. This situation raises the possibility that no
one person will notice complaints which present a recurring problem,
all of which could be resolved by correcting the root of the trouble.
Fifth, the present investigation procedure cannot be thorough
enough to command universal respect for its accuracy. Usually the
official file is not examined, because there is no power to compel
its submission and because Mr. Hogan fully appreciates his unofficial status. It is too easy for an agency in possession of all the
facts to explain away the complaint when there is no independent
and unbiased examination.
There are some heartening aspects at the same time. The Colorado institution has not slipped measurably into partisan politics.
The ombudsman bill had bipartisan support; the house bill was
offered by a Republican and the senate bill was proposed by two
Democrats.
The Lieutenant Governor's assumption of the role has clothed
the institution with the aura of high office which it must have. If
the second ranking official in the state has served the people well,
the office benefits from a tradition of prestige which should carry
over to an official ombudsman. Mr. Hogan and his staff have
demonstrated a real personal interest in the citizens who come to
the ombudsman. Mr. Hogan reports that it is not easy day after day
to hear complaints with sympathetic understanding, but realizing
that it is essential, he has done so. He is thus doing much to establish the traditions and the public trust in the office that it will need
in any official form.
D. Predictions
Many of the arguments which can be made against establishing
an official ombudsman office in Colorado have already taken form.
The most extreme reaction has come from the Colorado Springs
Gazette Telegraph which decried the concept as socialistic. 200 It
described the office as politically motivated and politically controlled,
199 Interview with J. David Penwell, Assistant Attorney General and Legal Counsel,
200

Colorado Civil Rights Commission, in Denver, Oct. 25, 1967.
Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, Jan. 3, 1967, at 7-B, col. 1; id., Jan. 15, 1967,
at 6-D, col. 1.
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an intolerable appendage to big government which would only make
it bigger and more arrogant, and an inexcusable tax burden.
The Denver Post doubted the need for "a whole new ... layer
of government" since "state administration has been relatively responsive to the needs of the people ....
201 It suggested that an
effective press and an alert minority party leadership could adequately safeguard the public's interest in good government. Another
Post editorial expressed fear that an ombudsman would only become
a "partisan fault-finder."2 °2 Besides, it argued, Americans are chronic
gripers, so no individual could handle the volume of unnecessary
complaints which would inevitably flow once the floodgates were
opened.
Other arguments against adopting an ombudsman office could
be made. It probably will be said that one man and a small staff
cannot do enough to affect the totality of administrative government. It could be argued that there should be no "one man lawgiver," and the courts or administrative tribunals should interpret
all statutes and rules. The majority of the public probably could be
persuaded that administrative problems only plague the poor who
do not know how to deal effectively with agencies, and that the
indigent can go to a legal aid society for help. It could be said
that, all other arguments aside, the effort would not be worthwhile because the complaints are simply too minor and petty to
present a real problem.
Most of these arguments have already been answered in the
preceding material, and that discussion need not be repeated. The
unanswered doubts deserve comment. Colorado administration admittedly has been relatively responsive to the public need. Mr. Hogan
feels strongly that Colorado has a good administrative service,20 '
but even a conscientious public administration contains problems
and red tape as his present workload shows.
The press has long since been unable to uncover administrative
abuse,20 ' and the legislature's inability to do so has already been
discussed. 20 5 Mr. Hogan's examples show that serious shortcomings
have been corrected through his complaint system. Those same prob201 Denver Post, Feb. 9, 1967, at 14, col. 8.

Denver Post, Mar. 4, 1966, at 24, col. 1.
Interview, supra note 181. The institution could not be successful unless the state
was already reasonably well administered. Criticism would have no good effect
where the government was riddled with corruption or where officials did not worry
about public chastisement. See Rowat & Liambias, Canada, in THE OMBUDSMAN
186, 188 (D. Rowat ed. 1965); Northey, New Zealand's Parliamentary Commissioner, id. 127 at 142-43.
24 Abrahamson, Ireland, in THE OMBUDSMAN 201, 203 (D. Rowat ed. 1965); Nader,
Ombudsmen or State Governments, in THE OMBUDSMAN 240, 244 (D. Rowat ed.
1965).
205 See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
202
203
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lems had existed long before his program began, yet the press and
the legislators were not aware of them. Even the individuals affected
by the discriminatory cosmetology examination did not realize their
rights were being violated. Only an independent investigator will
be able to uncover this sort of abuse.
The General Assembly of Colorado has shown its determination
to avoid partisanship in any ombudsman office it creates. With that
sort of backing, it is hard to believe a Colorado ombudsman would
overthrow all the traditions established elsewhere and here to become a partisan fault-finder. By the same token, Mr. Hogan's experience in Colorado shows that Americans are not chronic complainers of the type who would flood the ombudsman with petty
complaints.
No one has as yet attacked the ombudsman idea as an enemy
of the civil service, but that will be forthcoming. It is an accusation
which has been leveled in every country which has recently adopted
the institution. Yet the public employees have invariably found the
ombudsman their friend. Statistics already presented show he has
exonerated them from charges in the great majority of cases rather
20
than casting blame and disrepute upon them.

6

Funding the office is a real problem. On one hand, $50,000
or $60,000 is a small part of the state budget; it is insignificant compared to the cost of operating Colorado's court system. On the other
hand, any allocation of state funds should not be made lightly.
Colorado can rely on Mr. Hogan's ombudsman work to provide the
answer to whether or not this expenditure should be made. It could
be that the office would save the state as much as it would cost by
decreasing the number of cases litigated in the courts and before the
administrative agencies.
If the unofficial ombudsman's work continues to produce favorable results it will generate a widespread public expectation in Colorado that the service be continued after Mr. Hogan's four years in
office are ended.20 7 There will no doubt still be strong opposition
so that a governor is likely at first to appoint his second in command
or an administrative aide to fulfill the function. But before too long
the need for a Colorado ombudsman will be documented from the
206 The

New Zealand public service reacted strongly against the proposal for an
ombudsman, fearing that it would be victimized as his scapegoat. A few years of
experience with the Ombudsman has persuaded the public service that he has been
an impartial friend and defender rather than an enemy. GELLHORN, supra note 9,
at 91-93. See also Os, The Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, in THE OMBUDSMAN 95,

96 (D. Rowat ed. 1965). Pedersen, Denmark's Ombudsman, in THE OMBUDSMAN
75, 77 (D. Rowat ed. 1965).

207 The public's overt response to the ombudsman proposals has been favorable without
exception. For citizen reactions, see these letters to the editor printed in the Denver
Post, Feb. 21, 1967, at 27, col. 1; id., Apr. 16, 1967 ("Perspective" section), at 5,
col. 2; id., July 20, 1967, at 19, col. 2.
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data which should be collected, and eventually a traditional ombudsman will be.instituted.20 8 We can only hope that the, present
conception of the office will not prejudice that possibility by becoming a poliJtical.gimmick or by accustoming.the people to a heavily
diluted perversion of the concept. In the final analysis the view
adopted by the Denver Post will no doubt prove accurate:
Undoubtedly there will be great lethargy and some resistance, perhaps years of delay. But this idea eventually will prevail and then,
after a few years, the-people of Colorado will ask themselves
how
20 9
they got along all that time without an ombudsman.
Loren L. Mall

It is probable that Denver will create an ombudsman office before the state does.
Mayor Tom Currigan said in his second inaugural address on July 3, 1967, that he
would propose soon to the Denver City Council that it establish the post for city
and county government. Denver Post, July 3, 1967, at 4, col. 1.
209 Denver Post, Feb. 7, 1967, at 14, col. 1 (editorial).
208
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